Can Deterrence Ever Be Stable?

Stability has been the holy grail of deterrence strategists since the outset of the US–Soviet nuclear-arms competition. This prize has been elusive because nuclear weapons are not stabilising. The bomb has had limited, but important, utility in preventing large-scale conventional war, and by fostering cautious behaviour in severe crises. But the bomb also generates a greater sense of insecurity, magnifying contentious issues and crises. Deterrence stability eluded the nuclear superpowers, and it will be similarly elusive in the hardest contemporary case of nuclear-armed rivals: India and Pakistan.

Despite differences in the scale and circumstances of these nuclear competitions, both pairings have in common an interactive strategic competition compounded by conventional-force imbalances and contentious issues that could lead to conflict. Under these circumstances, deterrence stability is a mirage. Stability has proven feasible only when nuclear-armed states have little or nothing to fight about, when they address their security concerns through diplomatic means, when they agree to set them aside or when one of the rivals collapses.

Diplomacy to reduce tensions is an essential path to increased security. Buttressing techniques include arms-control agreements, confidence-building, transparency and nuclear-risk-reduction measures. But unless these useful steps are accompanied by a broader resolution of security concerns, they will not suffice to provide deterrence stability between rivals with disparate conventional capabilities and severe security dilemmas. Deterrence stability was not assured until the Cold War ended with the Soviet Union’s demise, and is unlikely to be achieved on the subcontinent as long as India and Pakistan remain at loggerheads.