Pakistan’s War Within

Since the Obama administration took office in January the United States has, rightly or wrongly, viewed Afghanistan and Pakistan as a single theatre of operations. Key to this strategy is the defeat of Islamist militants and insurgent groups in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and other parts of Pakistan, including the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). But Washington cannot fight the war in Pakistan; it must rely on Islamabad. Can the Pakistanis succeed?

Since the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, Pakistan’s efforts have been viewed by many in the West as desultory and ineffective. It has had difficulty holding territory and securing the population, despite some recent improvement (as evidenced by the operations in Swat in 2009). The renewed offensive against Islamist forces in FATA in October 2009 has raised hopes that Islamabad is now taking the threat seriously, but it is not clear that it has learned the lessons of failure from previous campaigns.

After 11 September, Washington encouraged Pakistan to conduct operations against militants by offering massive financial assistance (over $2 billion per year). US security assistance included reimbursements through coalition support funds, military aid (such as the provision of helicopters and air-assault training), and counter-narcotics programmes. Washington also provided aid through the Department of State, CIA, Department of Justice and other government agencies to support counter-terrorism, internal security and development programmes. In the past two years, however, American officials and commentators have questioned the terms and outcomes of this assistance, noting Pakistan’s uneven commitment to the ‘war on terror’ and continued support for the Afghan Taliban and anti-India militant groups.

Many, albeit not all, of Pakistan’s hurdles are doctrinal. The army does not claim to conduct population-centric counter-insurgency operations, but rather to engage in low-intensity conflict. The difference has important operational consequences. Pakistan prefers to retain its conventional focus against India and hesitates to adopt a counter-insurgency orientation, viewing operations against internal threats as residing at the lower end of a conventional-conflict spectrum.

Several factors account for the varied outcomes of operations Pakistani security forces have prosecuted against foreign and indigenous Islamist, criminal and insurgent groups in FATA and other parts of Pakistan, including NWFP, since 2001. Firstly, Pakistan has inadequate capacity to clear and hold areas and to win and sustain the support of locals. This likely stems from Islamabad’s hesitance to embrace counter-insurgency doctrinally and operationally. Consequently, operations have caused significant local devastation and displacement of populations in Bajaur and Swat, in particular. Secondly, the security agencies, which are not monolithic, have been willing to conduct operations against groups that have threatened Pakistan, but not those that advance what they see as Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan and India. This policy of sustaining the ‘good jihadis’ has strained Pakistan’s social fabric and endangered the state when erstwhile proxies have turned on it.