Driven by globalisation, emerging countries have been rapidly rising. Will this lead to new changes in the world or international order in the 21st century?
China became the second-largest economy in 2010. It’s a socialist country with a big population, unique history and culture and, at the moment, is going through profound transformation.
I am often asked what China wants from the world, what China can offer to the world, is China going to challenge the current world order dominated by the United States? For us in China, where food stamps were still printed until 1993, these questions sound premature. The young people born in the 1980s and 1990s in China are the first generation who didn’t suffer hunger growing up. True, China’s economic standing is rising in the world. But for the Chinese people, what matters more is the per capita GDP which determines their living standards.
That said, the Chinese people are not all indifferent to what happens in the world, and the experience from the colonial era left a deep imprint on the Chinese outlook on international relations and order – with an emphasis on inclusiveness and fairness.
As China’s international standing rises, there are lively discussions on these issues inside the country, and Chinese scholars are also making contributions to the debate.
Today, I will share with you some views on this topic. In Chinese we say to ‘chip in with a piece of brick in order for the jade to follow’. I will start with an observation on the current US-led ‘world order’, followed by China’s experience with the international order and a comparative analysis, and then some comments about the challenges.
First, let’s look at the world order led by the United States
Dr Henry Kissinger’s book World Order gave a thorough overview. My take is that he has a strong belief in the Westphalian system, which he also believed needed to be modernised.
The Westphalian system put an end to anarchy among European nation states, providing the basis for a body of laws and mechanisms underpinning modern international relations. But from its very start, it was a Western order and not for universal purposes. For many of the colonised countries, this order is more of an exclusive club and this has remained its inherent flaw. In other parts of the world, there were parallel concepts of orders that existed.
It took the US about a century to complete its rise and establish leadership position in the western world order. After the end of the Cold War, the US tried to quickly spread this order to the rest of the world. In November 1990, US president George Bush Senior used the term ‘new world order’ to declare a new framework of American global strategy. He emphasised the ‘irreplaceable’ leadership of the United States.
As far as I can see, this ‘new world order’ has three components. One is the Western value system as its moral high standpoint. Second is the American military alliance system as the security base. Third is the American-formulated international economic and financial structure as the foundation for the world economy. According to the American conception of world order, the UN system is meant to reflect and follow through on the principles and terms of the US-led order.
Admittedly, the current order system has facilitated the progress of the world. Especially after the Cold War, economic globalisation has grown fully fledged. Capital, markets, technology and production have been able to diffuse to all corners of the world, allowing many developing countries that have long been in the periphery to have an opportunity to develop.
A country like China, which has a big population and was in poverty, grasped this opportunity and achieved leapfrog development. Two months ago, I visited India and I heard much talk of how to attract investment and how to be creative. I could feel that another big country is in the preparedness for economic take-off.
However, this order system is also facing challenges on all three fronts. The financial crisis of 2007 exposed flaws in global economic governance. In the political sphere, the promotion of Western values in other parts of the world failed to achieve its original aim. In the security field, it’s essentially still about bloc politics. In the Asia-Pacific, for example, the US seems to give greater care to the security interests of allies, at the cost of countries like China who are outside the alignment.
What is more worrying is that it has not provided good solutions to many new issues of the day, as many non-traditional and cross-border security threats are quickly dominating the world agenda. US leadership falls short of expectations due to domestic and international constraints.
During my recent visit to the US, I observed that many think-tanks are engaged in a new debate about who is the new strategic target and how to cope with the impact of the rise of China.
Dr Kissinger told me what he thought the most was how much time and space is left for the US to maintain the current order and to design the new order. He believed that China and the US needed to work together, but he also said that this could not come without challenges.
Obviously for the US who remains the strongest of all powers of today’s world, whether the world order is able to adjust to changes and to work with, instead of working against, the new arrivals on the world stage is going to be a major test.
China’s experience with the international order
Now, I will talk about China’s experience with the international order. You may notice that I am using the term ‘international order’ instead of ‘world order’ – because they, from my understanding, are not entirely the same.
The international order China supports and identifies with is the UN framework and its associated international institutions built in the wake of World War Two. It was built for maintaining world peace and security, and for providing principles and norms for fair and equal relations among countries, which gives it widely recognised legitimacy.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated, at the fourth World Peace Forum held in Beijing last June, ‘China was directly involved in designing and building the international order and system with the United Nations as the centrepiece.’ And China will always be a participant, a facilitator and a contributor in the international order.
In China’s long history under the feudal kingdoms, it maintained stable and yet limited relationships with the outside world, and developed its own understanding and concept of the world ‘under haven’, albeit constrained by its geographical knowledge. In the nineteenth century, Western gunboat diplomacy forced open China’s door and turned China’s view of the world upside down. Ever since, China started to integrate into the Western-dominated modern world – not without pains, hardship and setbacks.
It was in 1971 that the People’s Republic of China returned to the United Nations and embraced the international rules and norms based on the UN Charter. Mr Deng Xiaoping, when speaking at the UN General Assembly in April 1974, explained for the first time to the world China’s view on the modern international order. He talked about the importance for developing countries of gaining political independence.
He also highlighted the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (namely, mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; non-aggression; non-interference in internal affairs; peaceful coexistence; equality and mutual benefit).
These have been China’s consistent policy in the past 40 years. For example, the latest Congress of the Chinese Communist Party mentioned in its report a call to make the international order and international system fairer and more reasonable.
At the Asian–African Summit held in Indonesia in April, marking the sixtieth anniversary of the Bandung Conference, Chinese President Xi Jinping stress the importance of promoting a more just and equitable international order and system.
He also said that China is committed to developing friendship and cooperation with all countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.
Now China has grown into an active member of UN agencies and the international institutions. For example, China has become the biggest contributor of UN peacekeepers among the permanent members of the Security Council.
So, China has chosen to integrate itself into the international order, and indeed has greatly benefited from being part of international society. In the meantime, China also emphasises the principle of fairness, justice, openness and equality to the international order and support incremental reforms needed to adapt to new realities.
China, together with other emerging countries and other members of the international community, has actively promoted progress in this direction. The G20, RCEP, BRICS, AIIB, Silk Road Initiative, the list may go on, are good examples of such efforts. We stand for enhancing and deepening the current international system centred on the UN system – to improve its efficiency, its reach and its representation in order to bring about a healthier and more equitable global market and an environment conducive to development. The fact that the AIIB got support from more than 50 countries speaks to this.
For international security cooperation, China stands for common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security. We hope that the world will avoid going back to the old track of power politics and power fight. Instead of the exclusive security model, we hope that the region and the world will go for comprehensive and cooperative security, which is being promoted at the ARF, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia. They offer good examples.
A comparative analysis
Apparently, what the US is concerned about is that, sooner or later, China will challenge US world power and its dominance over international affairs. As we see it, what the US wants, paradoxically, is to continue leading the world order while being reluctant to change the exclusive nature of its system or part of the system.
For China, a concern on power fight really belonged to the twentieth century. China came from a different history and tradition, as I explained early on. China does not subscribe to the logic of power politics. It has grown a strong belief in the international order, and remains an enthusiastic supporter of its principles and purposes.
This is why, when the US talks about China challenging the existing order and US leadership, the Chinese often feel perplexed. The US and China seem to be talking past each other.
That said, I don’t think China and the US are at loggerheads about how the order should evolve. Rather, they share much in common in their views for the world: for example, the pursuit of world peace and prosperity, and the hope of strengthening and improving the UN system. The two countries also have a similar stance on nuclear non-proliferation, as well as on the need to manage crises and avoid conflicts among major countries.
Even on some important political issues, both countries have made it clear that they do not have a grand strategy to undermine the other side. For example, the US side insists that it has no intention to contain or blockade China.
So, both sides agree that there is the need to reform the international order to suit the new realities. The question is, are we going to work in the same direction or move in two directions?
An inclusive ‘global order’ for the twenty-first century
The twentieth century saw two major world wars, which brought huge suffering for mankind. Then, within less than two years after the end of the Second World War, the US and the former Soviet Union – once allies in wartime – were dragged into 40 years of Cold War.
Professor Nicholas Boyle analysed that the character of a century becomes very apparent in the second decade. In the past five centuries, the major event that changed the course of the century mostly happened in the second decade, like the Thirty Years War in the seventeenth century (1618–48), the Napoleonic wars in the nineteenth century (1803–15) and the First World War in the twentieth century (1914–18). Each ‘re-equilibrium’ was achieved through conflict or war.
Now that we are in the second decade of the twenty-first century, are we able to get out of this historical pattern and blaze a new model of major-country relations?
Dr Kissinger ended his book on the world order with a question mark. ‘Where do we go from here?’ he said. ‘A reconstruction of the international system is the ultimate challenge to statesmanship in our time.’ He also mentioned in the modern world there is a need for ‘a global world order’ and that leaders of major countries need to rise above the urgency of day-to-day events and think about bigger issues bearing on the future world order.
Indeed, driven by globalisation, the world today is more flat and countries are a lot more interconnected. But when it comes to order, different perspectives exist not just between China and the US. Divergent trends have also emerged in other parts of the world, like ISIS which claims to be restoring an Islamic Caliphate, and like Russian–US disagreement on Ukraine, giving rise to growing animosity.
Perhaps, at some stage, the world can think about a bigger and more inclusive framework of global order. We may compare such a framework to a mega-umbrella, each and every member of the international community shall find its place and have a say. Chinese President Xi Jinping himself talked many times about a community of common interests or a community of common future.
Naturally, any discussion about a common future will be a long process of consensus building. What is important is that in the twenty-first century, we need think beyond the old concept of power politics. And instead of getting entangled in power distribution, countries need to focus on development and finding solutions to common challenges, not just traditional ones, but also in more complicated new frontiers for which the mankind has little experience. We need novel means to meet the new challenges which defy sovereign boundaries and require creative and joint response.
China and the US are at the centre of the changes. We can get nowhere in this important process if these two countries continue to exclude each other in political, security or economic fields. They need to be aware of risks and avoid irritating or pointing fingers at the other. They should give stronger support to the UN and ASEAN for helping to shape consensus.
Be it order or system, at the end of the day, it’s about communication and understanding among peoples. Therefore countries need to engage in more extensive dialogues at all levels. China, as an emerging country, needs to learn how to better convey its policies and strategic intentions to the neighborhood and to the world, so as to gain more understanding and support.
So, in this twenty-first century, let’s hope that the mistakes that led to conflicts in the twentieth century will not be repeated, and let’s work together to ensure that this will truly be a century without major wars and of peace and prosperity.
A better global order can be built through intellectual crowdfunding, to borrow a phrase from finance, and ‘co-evolution’.
All countries need to pitch in.
Dr Tim Huxley
Madam Fu Ying, you have delivered an excellent, very sophisticated, and I think, very wise lecture in which you systematically talked about three aspects of this question. You talked about the existing US-led international order and the shortcomings and challenges that it faces. You talked about China’s view of international order and how that has evolved over time. And you talked about the way forward, in terms of how China and the US might collaborate in constructing a more equitable and fairer world order that can deal with the major challenges that the world faces and will face during this century. That was an extremely stimulating and I think, in some ways, challenging perspective. I’d like to ask our audience to come forward with their questions and points for you in a few minutes, but there are one or two things I’d like to ask you about first, if that’s alright.
The first question that occurred to me relates to the question of hard power. And it’s really about… my question is how does China handle the question of its own hard power and the usefulness of that hard power, particularly in terms of China’s developing military capabilities? Does China see that hard power in those military capabilities, which have clearly undergone very important transformations in recent years? Does China see that sort of capability as the necessary underpinning for equality with the United States, and therefore as an underpinning for a future more equitable and just international order, or is there some other rationale?
Thank you for raising it. I’ve learnt about the hard power and soft power in a relationship in the ‘90s when I paid a long visit; I was on a tour in the US, and the issue, the question for the delegation is US security policymaking. And in those ’94, ’93, and wherever we went – we went to the military institutions, the universities, think tanks and the defence factories, and our question was – it was a team of diplomats from developing countries, and our question was, what was the objective for the US hard power. The US was obviously the most powerful in the end of the Cold War. They had very strong hard power, so what was the target in the world? What did they want to achieve? And we were told repeatedly that it was democracy, freedom, human rights, all those soft targets.
I realised that the delegation, who are mostly from developing countries had great difficulties understanding how you are going to achieve all those soft targets, it’s very hard to set boundaries, and then with your hard power, which is so mightily strong in the world. And 20 years later, we could see what happened in the world. I think it’s a lesson for the US and for the rest of the world, setting the right target for your hard power.
Now coming back to China, this year also marks 100 years [since] the Jiawu War, and there are lots of reviews and articles. A deep lesson China has learnt is that China would suffer if it’s too weak. China’s big, it became attractive to the powers; if China was weak and couldn’t defend itself, is the lessons of the nineteenth and the twentieth century. So China should be able to defend itself, should have a strong enough hard power to make sure that these things would not repeat. But on another hand, the constitution of China has made it very clear that China’s defence capabilities are constrained to a defensive nature. It’s defensive in nature. So it is within the limit of defending its own interest, but having said that, China has grown a bit, with the encouragement of the UN, to take part in some of the international peace undertakings, but mainly, solely, within the UN authorisation to authorise the activities. That’s what it’s like now.
Do you think that maybe there is a danger of an arms race with the United States?
Well, who can race with the US for armament? It’s far, far beyond China.
OK; thank you. My second question is about the role of other major powers. You’ve focused very much on the role of China and the role of the United States, but in the development of the sort of new international order that you were talking about, what would be the role of what one might call the second world powers – Japan and Europe, and Australia and Canada, and other developed countries – and then, what about developing countries? How would their interests and concerns, particularly where there’s smaller countries with less power, how would their interests be taken into account in the evolution of this new international order? How would we avoid the danger of some sort of US–China condominium?
Before I left I read an article by a Chinese scholar, Wang Jing Si; he divided world into a few levels. One is the US superpower, and two is China–EU, and the third level is the countries you mentioned, and then the developing countries. I think in a way maybe that is right. But in today’s world, it depends on what we are talking about. I think if you talk about per capita GDP, the economic development, China falls far behind. In China, from any big city – Beijing, Shanghai – any big city, you drive 100–200 kilometres, you can see poverty, you can see underdevelopment. So this country which is on its way of development. And China came from – as you mentioned the other developing countries – China came from that history, and China shares a lot with them. Most of the principles China advocates are rooted in the relationship and interest of those countries. That is why we hope that if there is going to be a reform of the existing international order, the interest of those countries should be better taken care of.
Thank you very much. I think I’ve had my turn at asking questions, so we’ll now turn to our audience. If you’d like to ask a question, the microphone will come to you, if I recognise you, could you please say, when you get the microphone, please say who you are, and what your affiliation is, and then please ask your question as briefly as possible? Sir, just in the third row back here.
Dr Syed Mahmud Ali, East Asia Programme Associate, London School of Economics and Political Science
Thank you, Madam, for sharing your insights. I’m Mahmud Ali, a member of the IISS, and a student of US–China relations. I wonder whether you and your colleagues, Madam, recognise that a coalition, not so tacit anymore, has been forming around China’s periphery, particularly in the Western Pacific area over the last five, six, seven, eight years now. And if you do recognise that such a coalition is indeed forming around China, whether you see that as a failure of Chinese diplomacy, or whether you see that as a prize China must pay for its way in the world. Thank you.
Paul Supramaniam, Chairman, Law Asia
Thank you, Madam Fu Ying, for your very elucidating presentation. Paul Supamaniam; I’m a practicing lawyer. I wanted to ask you what view China takes about the newly emerging concept of lawfare (lawfare, as opposed to warfare; it’s a concept under which international laws are crafted and created, the historic rewriting of territorial boundaries, etc.), so it would be interesting to hear the Chinese concept on that, whether you see it as an evolving principle which big nations can now seek to use, as part of how they redefine the international order, and whether you would see the recent Chinese air defence identification zone in the East China Sea as a facet of lawfare. Thank you.
My name is Solvere. May I ask Madam Fu, whether China’s defence force is to defend Chinese or also defend other peace-loving people. In 1839 October, Chinese Qing navy failed to protect a peace-loving Quaker-owned ship, the Thomas Coutts, from British forces, because the Quaker-owned ship refused to carry opium. And both Qing- and Quaker-owned ships were sunk by British forces. So are Chinese forces to defend peace-loving people on their own land, or just defend Chinese interests? It is sad that this incident may impress Samuel Huntington to impress the world that the West won the world not by superiority in ideas, belief or religion, but by superiority of applying organised violence. I think this is sad because the West has a lot of contributions to the world. Is this wrong?
Okay, thank you. Madam Fu, a range of questions for you.
Thank you. I think I forgot to answer your last part of your question about the US and China. I think China would like to work with the US, but not in the way of G2, because probably many other countries wouldn’t like it, and China wouldn’t like being managed by G2, G3, above China, so there’s a saying in China that if you don’t want to have something done to you, you don’t do it on others.
About China’s neighbourhood, in China, I speak to the domestic audience, to different provinces, and this question comes up too. According to the media, if you read the newspapers, you think China has problems all around itself. And the Chinese audience would ask, why our neighbours all turn unfriendly? I have the same answer to them and to you.
I worked on Asia since the ‘90s and I’ve seen how our relationship with the Asian countries has grown. Now China is number one trading partner to almost every of our neighbour. And the people-to-people exchanges are huge. Last year about 100 million Chinese travelled abroad. And more than half of them are in Asia. So I wouldn’t say that the relationship with our neighbours is in crisis or are having problems, but the media may magnify one issue, and making it as if it’s a dominant issue. And for that one issue, I still think there’s a hope of coming back to the China–ASEAN way, keeping it under discussion, so I think China’s foreign policy has been successful in supporting China’s opening up and reform policy.
However, I also understand your point. I think China now is at a higher state. Though we still think we’re a developing country but the world looks up at China, expecting that China should behave more like a big power, and take more responsibilities, so that’s something China needs to grow into. China needs to learn, I think.
For the lawfare, I have to admit that I am not familiar with the term, but I understand law is not making war, law is for preventing conflict.
The air defence zone was, I think to myself, I was a bit surprised at the response, maybe as suggested by some American scholars, and in the neighbourhood, maybe it can be managed in a better way, like better notification, better explanation or explanation beforehand instead of afterwards. But for the Chinese, it’s uncomfortable to see that, for example, the US designed and set up the air defence zone for Japan, about 40 years ago, and how come when China is doing it 40 years later, it becomes a problem. So that’s a bit of a surprise for China too.
I think it is kind of a wake-up call, and maybe on the one hand, the region needs to understand that China is growing, China has an interest, and China would defend its interest the way international laws allow. On the other hand, China needs to communicate better with the region, as I mentioned in my speech, China needs to explain to its neighbour and to the world its intention, its strategies. There is a possibility; I think there is a need to improve as far as communication is concerned. And I think the neighbours and the US should also have a fairer attitude towards China. Because in China, most people feel that we are always the wrong guy, whatever we do.
Thank you for those good answers. I think we have time for two more questions.
The reason I keep on saying that ‘let’s move into the twenty-first Century’ is because the twentieth century and the nineteenth century are gone. And the world is not like that anymore. I don’t think now China can go to a country and say ‘OK, you can’t defend yourself; let us do it for you’. We don’t believe in it. And I think this is a new world, and let’s behave and set up a system which suits the new realities. But the lesson on history needs to be remembered, that I agree with you.
Thank you. I think we have time for two more questions, if you’d be happy to respond. Mr Suryanarayana?
P S Suryanarayana, Editor, Current Affairs, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore
I’m Suryanarayana, from the Institute of South Asian Studies, here at the National University of Singapore. Madam, you have spoken eloquently about the centrality of the United Nations in even the evolving international order. But there is no consensus now on the existence of P5; many countries don’t like P5 veto powers. Would you suggest that P5 should be done away with, or how should that be reformed? Thank you.
Aaron Wong, Director, Advisory, KPMG Services Pte Ltd
Hi, my name is Aaron Wong; I’m from KPMG. My question is, what is the significance of the political ramifications of China setting up a competing financial institution, and to that, traditionally spearheaded by the US, Japan and the Europe? And would China move into exerting its influence through economic might, rather than militaries, and what are your views on the unification with Taiwan, for instance? Thanks.
Hi, my name is Hiro. I’m a researcher from Centre on Asia and Globalisation, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. I have a question regarding alleged Chinese nationals who transit in South East Asia and eventually join terrorist groups. According to media reports, the Chinese Vice Minister of Public Security said there are more than 300 China nationals that have used Malaysia as a transit point to join the Islamic State. Meanwhile, we know that at least hundreds of Uighurs came to Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia to find their way to Turkey. So my question is, based on your assessment, do you believe they are, the majority of these Uighurs, are actually potential terrorists or are they simply seeking better lives outside China? My second question is, if they are indeed potential terrorists, what kind of additional counter measure should China and ASEAN countries take?
Thank you very much. Three questions.
Thank you. First about Perm 5; China has stood for reform, supporting the reform of Perm 5. And the emphasis China makes is about enlarging it, to take more developing countries’ voices. Because it is already very much dominated by the developed world. And in the current reform, it seems there is still a stronger support for the developed world to have more members. So I think China would prefer and will support the reform in the direction of allowing a greater voice for the developing world.
About the new institution, I think, Mr Wong, you are referring to AIIB. I’m glad that there is such a strong support, not only from Asia but also from European countries. When I was in US in May, many of the think tanks, the American scholars told me that the American think tanks tend to disagree with each other. But there is one thing they all agree. That US made a mistake not to join AIIB. So, if in the US, the general trend is toward support, [this] shows it’s the right thing.
There was some politicisation or some doubt expressed on AIIB. I think it’s mainly, it’s again what I said, the feeling in China, that whatever China does, there’s always doubt. I think we shouldn’t totally blame the outside world. I think we need to better explain ourselves. And for AIIB, it’s really aimed at providing financial tool to help the region. And there is the World Bank, there is ADB, IMF. All of them have supported China in China’s reformed development. We gained tremendously from their assistance. But there are things they are not doing. Especially in the infrastructure field.
So, China had experience of funding partly the highway from Yunnan to Laos to Thailand. It’s Kunman Highway. And it’s a very good experience and allows, they really think it has helped not only transportation, but also helped poverty alleviation. It’s a very good project. So the last, they wanted a railway to be built along the highway which cost hugely. And for China to build a railway entirely by Chinese funding outside its boundary was very much out of our way. But we did respond positively.
But with that experience, we think we’d prefer a regional financial structure which can better finance the regional development, at the same time with the Chinese investment as well. And also China itself, I think we are lacking experience, doing it by ourselves, so we’ll like to work together with the region, with the participation of other more experienced countries. And the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank actually are in support. And they are deeply involved in its design and its rule-making process. So I think the fuss over AIIB should serve as a lesson for the world and to avoid reading too much out of the good things. And China needs to be encouraged to do more things like that, to provide for the public good in areas China knows better, in areas [where] China is more confident and the superb connectivity initiatives, proposed in land and in the sea, [should] also be based on such thinking.
About the terrorism issue, it’s a big challenge. It’s a big challenge not only for us in the region but also for the developed world like the US, the UK; it’s a huge headache. And Prime Minister Cameron recently made a long speech in the UK to call for the young people to avoid taking the wrong path. So I think this is the area where the world needs to work together and the region needs to work together. But I think we shall avoid singling out an ethnic group in a certain country.
In China, we are a country of 56 ethnic nationalities. I myself, I’m from a Mongolian nationality. So, the Uighurs, we have a huge population of Uighurs who are Chinese, just like any other ethnic group. So the majority of them are very patriotic. I think they are a very important part of the country. Not only improving, but trying hard to improve their own lives and also contributing to the development of the country. So I think we should separate. We should not look at the terrorism issue, the ethnic issue or the religious issue. That will help us to better address these issues. To end my note, to end my answer, I think it shows that in this region, I think your questions have helped me to believe, to strengthen my belief that we have so many things to work together. And this is such a changed world. And we really need to grow out of the twentieth century as soon as possible and start thinking about the twenty-first century. Thank you.
And on that very upbeat note for which we thank you, Madam Fu, I’m afraid we need to bring the session to a close. I’d like to thank you very much for answering those questions so fully. And thank you to our audience for asking such a good range of diverse and sometimes challenging questions. Madam Fu, your Fullerton Lecture today and your discussion with us subsequently, I think have added substantially to our understanding of the debate about the future international order and the shape that it might take, and the roles of China and the United States and other countries in formulating that order. So thank you again for the really, really excellent lecture.
Madam Fu Ying is the Chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the 12th National People’s Congress. She formerly served as Vice Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China. Madam Fu Ying was also Ambassador to the United Kingdom (2007 – 09), Australia (2004 – 07) and the Republic of the Philippines (1998 – 2000). From 2000 to 2003, Madam Fu Ying served as Director-General, Department of Asian Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Participation in the Fullerton Lectures is by invitation only. For more information on forthcoming lectures, please email [email protected] or telephone +65-64990055.