

18TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT

THE IISS SHANGRI-LA DIALOGUE

SECOND PLENARY SESSION – Q&A

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KYEONG-DOO JEONG

**MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, REPUBLIC OF
KOREA**

TAKESHI IWAYA

MINISTER OF DEFENSE, JAPAN

FEDERICA MOGHERINI

**HIGH REPRESENTATIVE, EUROPEAN UNION FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY;
VICE PRESIDENT, EUROPEAN COMMISSION**

Stephen Biegun, Special Representative for North Korea, US Department of State

Thank you Dr Chipman and thank you to IISS for hosting this excellent Dialogue this weekend. I want to thank the Ministers of the Republic of Korea and of Japan on behalf of the United States for their strong leadership and their strong partnership with the United States of America. Together we have made enormous progress and it is in large part because of the leadership of both of your governments. I should also extend that appreciation to the European Union and to High Representative Mogherini. There may be no issue of national security upon which the US and the EU are more closely aligned than the strategic risks that come from nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. I also want to extend credit to the ASEAN nations and other friends and allies in the region, in particular Singapore and Vietnam for hosting two excellent summits last year and this year.

I also want to credit the great work that the US has been able to do with China and Russia, two countries with whom we have many areas of bilateral disagreement, but we have been able to work cooperatively towards our shared goal of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and the elimination of nuclear weapons from the same. It is a work in progress; there is much more we could be doing. We have heard some examples of that today but through international cooperation on the enforcement of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions and through our strong commitment to diplomacy with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, President Trump is confident that Chairman Kim Jong-un will meet the commitments that he made a year ago at a summit here in Singapore.

I want to emphasise the commitments we have made to the North Koreans, and we have made these commitments directly and indirectly, privately and publicly: remain engaged, avoid provocations. The US is convinced that, through continued negotiations, we can continue to close the gaps that separate our two countries and make further progress on all the goals that we committed to in Singapore. Thank you.

Dr John Chipman, Director-General and Chief Executive, IISS

Thank you very much for that very authoritative statement which will help us as we continue these discussions.

Tadashi Maeda, Governor, Japan Bank for International Cooperation

Thank you, John, and thank you for all parties that made wonderful remarks. However, listening to the remarks of the defence minister of the Republic of Korea and also Defense Minister Takeshi Iwaya in terms of the tone of the current situation in North Korea, there is some difference. The defence minister of Korea showed us a more idealistic and long-term perspective, more focusing on the reconciliatory posture by President Moon and his administration. On the other hand, Mr Iwaya was more practical, on strengthening the countries among US, Japan and ROK in particular, to strengthen the enforcement of UNSC resolutions.

I have two questions. The first question is in the beginning of May North Korea launched a short-range ballistic missile, but the media reported that the ROK government showed hesitation to announce it – it took days to announce the missile. There was hesitation of its recognition. Why? This is my first question.

The second question is do you bring any agenda of the G20 to have a discussion between Japan and ROK on the Korean Peninsula? That is my question to both ministers. Thank you.

Amy King, Senior Lecturer, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University

In answer to a question in a previous session, Defence Secretary Shanahan implied that, apart from upholding UNSC resolutions, there was not a particular role for regional countries and US allies and partners on the North Korean nuclear issue. Do ministers Jeong and Iwaya agree, or do you see a greater role for Japan, Korea, China and others on this issue, or even a return to a more multilateral process as Representative Mogherini has outlined?

Andrea Berger, Senior Analyst, Privy Council Officer, Government of Canada; Associate Fellow, Royal United Services Institute; Associate Fellow, King's College London

Good morning. Thank you for some really clear and interesting speeches. We often talk about the threats emanating from the Korean Peninsula as being ones that have the potential to have much wider effects internationally, and I think you really clearly came to the point about the threats posed by North Korea's own nuclear programme. We often talk about their ability to proliferate weapons further afield as being in that same basket of concerns. But I would be really interested in your thoughts on the extent to which we have thought perhaps about room for more multilateral cooperation on the DPRK cyber issue, which is one that I think also has the potential to have much further-reaching effects, including undermining the sanctions regime and undercutting its effectiveness, but also just damaging the fabric that underpins the international financial system for example. Is that an area where the ability for multilateral cooperation has been under-exploited, and what could we do more in that area?

Ankit Panda, Adjunct Senior Fellow, Federation of American Scientists; Senior Editor, *The Diplomat*

My question is for Minister Jeong. In your speech you acknowledged the May launches of short-range ballistic missiles by North Korea and I believe in the next sentence you said North Korea continues to implement the CMA of 19th September 2018. Article 1 of that agreement prohibits both Koreas from engaging in hostile acts against each other, so my question is: were the launches of these long-range artillery systems and short-range ballistic missiles not in fact a hostile act under the understanding of the South Korean government's interpretation of the CMA? But are they a cause of concern for the future of that agreement? Thank you.

William Emmott, Former Editor in Chief, *The Economist*; Chairman of the Trustees, IISS

Thank you John and thank you to all the panellists, echoing what everyone else has said. I think it fair to say that the view of scholars of both non-proliferation and of Korea specifically is that the chances of North Korea agreeing to denuclearisation are approximately zero. In other words, the general consensus is that the whole objective still lacks realism, as Representative Mogherini described.

Therefore, my questions are two. One is, putting disagreement to one side, what intermediate goals do the panel think could achieve progress and achieve real steps to de-escalate on the Korean Peninsula? The second question, I wonder if you could read the minds of the Chinese government for us and tell us what you believe China's view is of this process and of the objectives that have been laid down by you?

Lanxin Xiang, Director, Centre of One Belt and One Road Studies, China National Institute for SCO International Exchange and Judicial Cooperation; Professor, International History and Politics, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva

I have a question for Madame Mogherini. You mentioned that the EU intends to increase its role in Asia-Pacific security; I just wonder if that is possible. The tension, let us say, between US/China today of course does not start with Trump. It started with Obama already. During that time the EU seems to have done almost nothing when Obama launched something called Pivot. The EU was not there with certainly the original six-party talks. The whole process with the Korean Peninsula, not to mention other issues – maritime, Taiwan – the EU never did anything. Today of course you have a situation where the US president says almost nothing good about the EU. What can you do to increase that level of participation, aside from the ASEAN process?

I have just one quick point to Mr Jeong about the Korean nuclear issue. Is it realistic now to retreat from the original idea of CBID? Maybe lower some level for the final deal. It looks increasingly impossible. Thank you.

Tim Huxley, Executive Director, IISS-Asia

My question is for the EU's high representative, Federica Mogherini. High Representative, you spoke in some very interesting detail about the EU's aspirations to play a significant role in Asian security. However, it strikes me that there are only two European countries capable of projecting military power globally, the United Kingdom and France. They are also the two European countries that are permanent members of the UNSC and the two European nuclear weapon powers. My question is what are the implications of Brexit for the EU's international security role, particularly in relation to this region? Thank you very much.

Jeong Kyeong-Doo, Minister of Defense, Republic of Korea

I know that a lot of the experts on national security are interested in securing the Korean Peninsula and that you sincerely want it. This is the sort of venue to really feel that, so for that, I thank you.

Currently there are progressing items and one of them is the short-range missiles. There have been a lot of questions in regards to that. On the short-range missiles and their launch, the Republic's government is in agreement to halt aggression against each other. We have been in an official position that states that acts to raise military tension is not the way to go forward with this process of peace; there are discussions on whether or not the short-range ballistic missile is or not. In one's perspective, there is a view that it is aggression, an Iskander missile, or it is a new tactical ballistic missile, but our beloved Korean government is currently undergoing our analysis. There are points of similarity between the missile and the Iskander, but there are also marked differences. There are data that we can verify and we are working off those data to make sure we have a verification. What is most important is that we support our diplomatic efforts through our military efforts and so that is where we find the most meaning.

In North Korea across all domains – air, land and sea – in accordance to the CMA, the North Koreans are in fact acting within the boundaries of the CMA. We evaluate that military tensions have been lowered to a significant extent. Currently the actions demonstrated by the North Korean regime have the intent to carry out the peace process through dialogue and talks, and it believes that that is the hidden intent behind lines in terms of their missile launches. In terms of the conversations that are

going on, there are items about the North Koreans and parts that we need to understand about North Korea and parts that we expect policy changes from with regards to North Korea, and for the Republic of Korea about North Korea. There is an expectation that we need to step up more as an interested player as opposed to a mediator or referee and participate more actively in the solution of the North Korean nuclear threat. There are requests for this.

In terms of the Hanoi Summit and its lack of agreement, there is that pressure to reach a certain agreement and make progress. When it comes down to the launch of the short-range missile in an international sense and internally, there are messages that we need to dissect and really analyse to understand where we stand on the Korea peace process. According to what everyone has been giving us in terms of their opinions, I will give out the answer. I will point out the meaning that this has to be done through a dialogue and conversation.

In terms of the multilateral involvement on the Korean peace process, our basic sense in terms of inter-Korean relations, as well as relationships between the US and North Korea, has to be that the solutions have to start from those relationships. As more interested players enter the arena, it becomes harder to reach a coordinated solution. In the most fundamental sense, it has to be the building of confidence between North Korea and the US and also the same process in an inter-Korean sense as well. I also know that I think it is also for Japan, China and Russia, interested regional players and also the international community, for them to give support, and the best wishes that these talks make solid progress on the Korean Peninsula for the denuclearisation of North Korea.

What is notable is that we are acting upon a foundation of aggression that has been existing for the last 70 years and we are looking to solve this in one year and a half. That is where a difference of opinion occurs between us and North Korea. But for North Korea, in terms of them looking at economic prosperity and looking into the future, it is important to convince North Korea that this denuclearisation process, the peace process, is the only way forward for economic prosperity, and the ASEAN community has to support that. Also, when North Korea does achieve complete denuclearisation, it is essential to support the possibilities and the stability of their regime on behalf of the international community. At the centre of that, the solution has to become an inter-Korean and also a North Korea/US solution. That would be my answer to that question.

Takeshi Iwaya, Minister of Defense, Japan

First of all, thank you very much for your questions, the first one being that there seems to be some difference of opinion or views between ROK and Japan. Perhaps seemingly so, but the ideals towards the future or what we want to have in the future is quite identical, in my opinion – that is, the peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula would be beneficial for not only Japan, but also for the entire region, for its development and prosperity.

President Moon Jae-in and his government made a great effort in making the first step forward, to which I would like to pay my deep respect. The US/DPRK summit meeting in Singapore was an important step forward, about which we have hope and optimism. However, if we end with the approach now, then there is a risk for us to be reverted to the past. That is a real concern on my side as well.

On 9th May missiles were launched by the DPRK, and Japan and the US have the same view. Apparently they were short-range ballistic missiles in violation of the relevant UNSC resolutions. If that is the case, then we need to make the appropriate response to that. Were the short-range missiles launched admissible? No. The DPRK should not have a mistaken view that we take a rather lenient attitude towards that.

Of course the DPRK and the North Korean issues will be part of the agenda at the upcoming G20 meeting, although the bilateral meetings have not been finalised yet. Anyway, we need to be clear what to take away, because we need to have a clear picture about these talks or about all the stocktaking of the nuclear capabilities of North Korea. Otherwise we are not sure what to take away. Thank you.

Federica Mogherini, High Representative, European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy; Vice President, European Union

Is it possible to increase the EU's role in Asia? First of all, in this last four-and-a-half years I have seen it has increased enormously. I do not know if this is related to a change in the US administration or not, but I am sure, I know, I see that EU/Asia relations – be it with ASEAN countries, with ASEAN as such or with other partners in Asia, the closest ones, the difficult ones – in all cases has increased enormously on I would say four different elements. One is trade – that is obvious – but we have concluded in this year some very important agreements, starting with Singapore, but Japan is another case in point. We are negotiating with Vietnam and others. Our trade agreements with Asia are increasing.

On political cooperation, again here we have concluded agreements, but our dialogue with our partners – again, both like-minded ones and the less like-minded ones – has increased already enormously. We just had a very successful summit with China in Brussels a couple of months ago or so.

Also on security – and security is not only defence. I know there are many militaries in the room, but I think we all agree that today security issues are related also to more soft security elements. Take counter-terrorism, prevention of radicalisation, take cyber-security, take even climate change or environmental issues; they are all linked to our security environment, and the EU is clearly a key partner for Asia in this field and is becoming one.

Last but not least, defence proper, because it is true that the EU has always been perceived and is always proud to be a soft power in the world. However, we have developed in the last two and a half years a defence capability, as the EU as such, that was not there before. This is also creating some anxiety somewhere, but we are doing it in close cooperation with our friends and allies, starting with the US, with our partners in NATO, with the UN system. However, we are developing our defence capabilities as the EU as never before to put this at the service of peace and cooperation, to the European way to security, I would say. Our partnership, our cooperation with Asia, is increasing also in the field of defence and I think I mentioned a couple of concrete examples in my introductory remarks that I will not repeat.

Our role specifically on the DPRK dossier, as the US special representative mentioned, is already excellent. I think we are cooperating very well. There are some issues – a limited number of issues –

on which we do not see eye-to-eye with the current US administration when it comes to some crisis management files, but you take Afghanistan, you take DPRK, definitely Asia is one of the places where our cooperation with the US is most effective and cooperative. Our willingness to be ready to support is not an ambition. We have enough to do also closer to home, but it is an availability to help. If there are elements that can be useful, that we can contribute with, we are ready to do so and we discuss this regularly not only in Washington, but also in Seoul, in Tokyo and other capitals in the region.

Let me say that, on Brexit, we will see when it happens what effects it will have. For the moment, I am afraid the effect is more on the UK than on the rest of the Union, but still the UK is the rest of the Union. I still share a council with 28 member states. We still take decisions by unanimity in foreign and defence policy issues at 28 where UK is a full member and a cooperative member, in particular in foreign and security issues. I would not comment on the internal domestic politics of the UK, but for the time being I do not see any effect on the capacity of the EU to work on foreign security and defence issues globally because of this process. I see – and I regret that it is happening – that this is weakening the UK's role in the world, but I think it does not affect the EU's role in the world.

I would not comment on the fact that only two EU member states have the capability to project military power globally, because I guess the other 26 might feel rather offended by this statement. I come myself from a country that I believe has some capabilities. Most of them are member allies in NATO and they definitely have some military capabilities, but again, this is a matter for member states to comment upon. The EU as such, again, we are proud to be a soft power. We are proud to focus on other issues as well, including human rights and economic prosperity and cooperation, but the coming from Venus, coming from Mars debate is long done. We are now also a defence player not only regionally but globally as well.

Alexandre Escorcio Deputy Director, Center for Analysis, Planning and Strategy, Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, France

Very brief indeed, Minister Jeong, and building on Mr Emmott's question: Minister Jeong, you said this time North Korea/US negotiations would be different. Could you tell us maybe – based on your insights on the North Korean system, you may know – why this time should be different? Thank you.

Dino Patti Djalal, Founder, Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia

On the question of sanctions, Mr Iwaya and Miss Federica called for greater sanctions. I visited North Korea last year and my observation was that the sanctions had a very limited impact. One is they were used to hardship and they were not able to compare this to a better life before, because they were really at the bottom of things. Secondly, there was the factor of great pride, and the sanctions reinforced the narrative of siege mentality that North Korea was surrounded by hostile forces.

My question is to the minister of South Korea. Your president has called for easing of sanctions very actively, so can you explain to us the logic behind this? Is this a matter of political expediency to maintain good relations with the North? Or do you see something that others, your allies, do not see – that easing of sanctions would help move forward the process so that North Korea would behave more according to what we would like them to do?

Euan Graham, Executive Director, La Trobe University, Australia

My question is also for Minister Jeong of the Republic of Korea. Minister, in your comments your framing of Korean security referred to East Asia, the Asia-Pacific and, interestingly, Eurasia. I did not hear the Indo-Pacific as part of that and I wonder if you can explain to us whether Korea does support the notion of a free and open Indo-Pacific and see itself as a member of that, given the statements that we have had at length from the US and your Japanese counterpart this morning?

Chung Min Lee, Chairman of the Council, IISS; Senior Fellow, Asia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

My question is to Defense Minister Iwaya from Japan. Thank you, Minister, for your excellent overview of what is happening on the Korean Peninsula. How confident are you in your government's intelligence on the domestic plays within North Korea today? We hear press reports that Kim Jong-un has ordered the execution of several members of the ministry who were responsible for the Hanoi Summit. Are you very confident moving forward that you have very good intelligence on what is happening within North Korea?

Dongxiao Chen, President, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, China

My question will be to Minister Jeong. I know that ROK has tried very hard to play the role of bridging and narrowing the gap of perception between Washington and Pyongyang in the past. How would you take the assessment of your role, whether it is successful or not, particularly following the Hanoi Summit? What kind of change or shift do you believe that such a role would have played by your side?

William Choong, Shangri-La Dialogue Senior Fellow for Asia-Pacific Security, IISS-Asia

I have one question for the Japanese minister. Thank you, Minister, for saying it as it is and saying that there is no essential change with regards to the Korean Peninsula. I have to ask you this question again: what has to happen on the Peninsula for Japan to actually think seriously about giving up its Three Nuclear Nos policy on nuclear weapons?

Toshiya Umehara, Editorial Writer, *The Asahi Shimbun*

My question is for the two defence ministers. The bilateral relations between the two countries are chilly and there is a lack of dialogue based on historical disagreement and territorial disputes. How can the Republic of Korea and Japan avoid these disagreements escalating into becoming an obstacle to the maintenance of unity vis-à-vis North Korea?

Antione Levesques, Research Fellow for South Asia, IISS

My question is for Higher Representative Mogherini. To what extent does the EU face a choice between engaging India as an Indian Ocean and Indo-Pacific power on the one hand, and engaging island states and regional Indian Ocean states on capacity-building and non-traditional security matters? Is there a choice here, or can both be carried out in parallel?

Jeong Kyeong-Doo, Minister of Defense, Republic of Korea

With regards to the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, with the conclusion of the Second World War there is imprints of the Cold War dynamic that has imprinted on the region. While it has been dissipated a significant amount since then, the Cold War regime still remains on the Korean Peninsula. The North Koreans cannot have diplomatic relations with Japan or the US and for the last one-and-a-half years – a short amount of time, in my opinion – it has been a significant challenge for us to make sure that we bridge together all the tensions that have happened over the last 70 years.

When it comes to the denuclearisation of North Korea, there are some efforts towards that. For the Hanoi Summit between the US and North Korea, while it has not reached an agreement at that time, for sure they have been able to prove where their interests lie. Between the two leaders there has been also an opportunity to establish more confidence and I believe that this was a good result for maintaining the momentum of dialogue, to maintain absolutely North Korea on the track towards denuclearisation. The Republic of Korea government will do our utmost to make sure that this happens.

Our government, especially President Moon, is absolutely doing our best to set us apart from the past policies to enact our current policies. For us, it is also a matter of sticking to the UNSCRs. However, it will be an effort to make sure we lead North Korea into conversation, away from going back to the ways of the past in terms of engaging aggression against us. In terms of doing that, humanitarian aid and lowering military tensions, those measures will also be considered. As far as that, when North Korea does launch short-range missiles, the combined defence posture of the ROK/US alliance is solid and it remains ready to defend our country. Therefore, the two countries, the two governments, are actively sharing our positions on the issue.

On the point of the Indo-Pacific region and our position on that, we absolutely support a rules-based order and the international legal system. I think this is not something that we are alone on; I think we join a community of nations in doing that. For cooperation and coexistence, I think that is the way we really need to go in terms of achieving peace and prosperity. The Republic of Korea government will continue our cooperation, especially with regards to the ROK/US alliance – the strongest alliance, in my opinion, in the world. We will continue our cooperation with various nations in the Pacific region, in Asia-Pacific and Northeast Asia, and make sure that there is a rules-based order with the interests of all individual involved nations guaranteed.

The Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense will work on lowering military tensions and maintain the momentum of dialogue. Thank you so much.

Takeshi Iwaya, Minister of Defence, Japan

Some said that the sanctions are not very effective or the sanctions might be counter-effective. I think that is the gist of the views that have been just shared, but we need both in order to solve DPRK issues: pressure and dialogue. That is our position. I repeat the importance of the measures against the ship-to-ship transfer. The modus operandi have been very complicated and sophisticated when it comes to the ship-to-ship operations, but we believe that the sanctions have been working effectively. At the same time, dialogue is important – inter-Korean dialogue, dialogue between the US and the DPRK, dialogue between China and the DPRK, and dialogue between Russia and the DPRK. As I said, the pressure will continue while several tracks of dialogue should also continue to be pursued.

When it comes to the internal situation of the DPRK, yes, I have been alarmed through the media, but apparently Kim Jong-un's strong grip on the domestic situation is very solid. He is the key; without him, nothing could be changed, nothing could be decided. That is why we need to engage and talk with him in order to go ahead. Japan's Three Non-Nuclear Principles remain the same: not to possess, not to manufacture and not to bring in nuclear weapons to the Japanese territories. If North Korea is liberated and to develop in the future, the strong support from many countries would be necessary. Any difference of tones, of views, must be talked over and overcome in order to address the future issues. Thank you.

Federica Mogherini, High Representative, European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy; Vice President, European Union

First of all, I owe a direct answer to the question that was asked. Yes, it is possible for us to carry out both in parallel – and thanks for mentioning India, because this is one of the countries with whom we have worked more in these recent years and will. Relations have improved enormously, so thank you for allowing me to remind of that also.

I wanted to come back and conclude the question that was posed in the previous round: 'the chances are zero.' I think, to quote Nelson Mandela, it always looks impossible until it is done. This is no exception. Every negotiation always seems to be leading nowhere until the day – sometimes the day after – the negotiation is ended and you realise that you have actually managed to get where everybody thought it was impossible to be.

It is indeed extremely difficult, possibly unlikely, but I think that the mix of three different elements could lead somewhere. First of all, the mix of pressure and dialogue from the international community, on the basis of, as the minister said, a cooperative, rules-based global order where every single player contributes to the implementation of the common decisions. Second, the awareness of the strong link between the inter-Korean dialogue and the US/DPRK process. I think this is probably the weakest element of the chain that risks being broken at every single step and it is probably the specificity of this negotiation that is making it so complex. Third, the role for the others in the international community because clearly here there is again, as I said, one specific inter-Korean dimension that belongs only to the two sides and can belong only to the sides.

There is a specific Pyongyang/Washington dynamic that we all see, recognise and needs to be there, but I believe that – and I close on that – if we increase the number of reasons for all the players that have a stake in the process to find it convenient to make it succeed, and we know the number of potential spoilers inside and outside of the process, then I think we facilitate and we create a better environment for success to come. This is why we insist on the multilateral framework: not because we aspire to any kind of specific role, but simply because we think it is more likely to succeed, a process as difficult as this one, if the number of players in the region and beyond that can contribute to creating a positive environment is bigger than two. This is why I believe that in practice we are already coordinating to a large extent in this process and this is why I would not say that chances are zero – they might be one, but you can still get it. Thank you.

Dr John Chipman, Director-General and Chief Executive, IISS

Thank you very much.

Let me close this session with two brief comments. First, I should say that the IISS, headquartered in the UK, will launch a new project, the Missile Dialogue Initiative with support from the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The aim of this initiative is to engage in an international Track 1.5 dialogue and to provide first-class analysis to enable government-to-government conversations on missile technology, regional security dynamics and trends in missile proliferation. We hope effectively to contribute to that wider international dialogue because questions of missile proliferation in Europe and Asia are diplomatically and operationally linked, as we all know.

Secondly, and before I thank our speakers, to remind all of you to return to the hall in 20 minutes for the third plenary, but you will only be able to get back in the hall if you take your name badges out of the microphone, re-clip them back on your neck and then come back for that purpose.

With that reminder, could I please ask you all to join me in thanking our three panellists for a tremendous presentation? Thank you very much.