10 August 2010: Russia Profile
Discourse on the War with Georgia Rarely Refers to the Price Russia Is Now Paying for Its Assertive Unilateralism in the South Caucasus
For Russia, the August 2008 war with Georgia is now firmly incorporated into its heroic history, at least rhetorically. Russian forces responded to Georgia’s attack against the Russian peacekeepers and its citizens residing in South Ossetia. Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to prevent any future conflict, which could be triggered by Georgia’s use of military force in either of the regions. And last but not least, Russia has demonstrated its “red lines” in the NATO enlargement process, by forcing the alliance to shelve its plans for Georgia’s membership in the foreseeable future. Moreover, Russia’s demonstration of force sent a signal to other post-Soviet states about the perils of attempting to challenge Russia’s vital interests in the region.
The main damage was done to Russia’s international reputation and its broader international agenda. Although the war did not provoke a sustained crisis in Russia’s relations with the West, it has weakened the chances of strategic rapprochement between them, by creating an issue on which Russia and the West (as well as most other states around the world) will continue to have irreconcilable differences for years to come. This issue will remain a serious obstacle for achieving progress on any priority issues on Moscow’s foreign policy agenda, from World Trade Organization membership to a visa-free regime with the EU, from creating a sustainable new paradigm in U.S.-Russian relations to revising conventional arms control in Europe and reshaping the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. What is worrying is that apart from Moscow’s assertion that “the West should recognize the new reality” – which clearly it won’t – there is no creative thinking on how to resolve the differences in either of these cases.
The absolute majority of states will not recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, not because of the merit of their case, but because their “independence” has been imposed by Moscow through the use of force and in clear violation of international law. The Kosovo case and the recent ruling of the International Court of Justice do not alter the context of this international position because the ruling concerns the legality of the unilateral declaration of independence by a sub-state entity, not the manner in which unilateral recognition has been imposed. Here the cases of Kosovo and Abkhazia/South Ossetia are remarkably different.
Hence, for the foreseeable future, the international community will continue to hold Russia responsible for dismembering the territory of its neighboring state by force, which the United States now calls “occupation.” This term, which was once applied to U.S. policy in Iraq, is not a simple value judgment, but a legal notion that entails responsibilities by an “occupying power,” as well as its limited nature.
Crisis management
Whether Russia accepts or rejects the notion of it being an occupying power in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it can hardly dispute the fact that it has become a party to these regional conflicts, as opposed to a mediator, as it was internationally recognized before the war.
Although the post-war Geneva Discussions have been constructed with elements of “strategic ambiguity,” which were necessary to get the political process going in the aftermath of the war, even this ambiguity does not hide the fact that all participants of these talks, except for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, treat Russia as a party to these conflicts, and perhaps the main one at that. Russian representatives, however, remain adamant that despite Russia’s military presence and its recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia should retain the role of “bystander” – a facilitator or a guarantor – and insist that the conflicts remain unchanged by Russia’s intervention, remaining essentially Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-South Ossetian in nature.
Therefore Moscow insists that “non-use of force agreements” should be signed between Tbilisi and Sukhumi and Tbilisi and Tskhinvali respectively, but not, under any circumstance, between Moscow and Tbilisi. Clearly such proposals – which are akin to the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia – are presently unacceptable to Georgia and other international mediators, none of whom intend to bestow any such recognition. Even Russia’s more constructive ideas about unilateral declarations on the non-use of force miss the important point. They ignore the fact that many international actors, not to mention Georgia itself, view Russia’s military presence in Abkhazia as a use of force – if only a benign one at present – which perpetuates insecurity rather than preventing a new conflict (as Moscow sees it).
This example of differences over the terms of the “non-use of force agreements” clearly demonstrates the difficulty that Russia’s unilateral recognition now presents for the long-term management of conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Both remain unresolved as long as no mutually acceptable political resolution is found, in regard to their status involving Sukhumi, Tskhinvali, Tbilisi and now Moscow. It is not hard to see that today, such political agreement is further out of reach than it was prior to August of 2008. Moreover, while the differences over status were easier to ignore in the first months and years after war – during the immediate crisis-response phase which focused on humanitarian concerns and putting in place ceasefire regimes – it will be harder to ignore during the next, more difficult and prolonged crisis-management phase, which is only just beginning.
The crisis-management policies will test the creativity of all the major players. For Russia, it will ultimately mean accepting the degree of international oversight over its policies in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, although the parameters of such scrutiny are yet to be defined. For Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it will mean accepting the fact that despite Russia’s recognition – and that of a handful of other countries – their position in reality remains unchanged. Moreover, Abkhazia – which was always more committed to achieving independence – might in reality become more dependent (albeit this time on a friendly Russia, not a hostile Georgia) in the near to medium-term future, and possibly more isolation. But perhaps the hardest test of all is faced by Georgia, which has to learn “strategic patience,” a skill to which it has been little predisposed in recent history.
Another important challenge created by the August War for Russia is the impact it has had on its role in the South Caucasus. For its small size and remote location at the fringes of great empires and their contemporary successors, the region has been remarkably divided ever since the fall of the Soviet Union. The August War has perpetuated old and created new divisions that pose serious challenges to Russia’s regional role. Today Russia finds itself in many ways in a similar position in the Caucasus as Turkey was in just a few years ago. Russia is now separated from the South Caucasus by its conflict with Georgia, its immediate neighbor in the region, which resulted in the suspension of political, economic and security ties between the two countries. Russia’s separation from the region has already had a negative impact on Russian-Armenian relations. Moreover, it made Abkhazia and South Ossetia a clear part of Russia’s North Caucasus policy, thus complicating Moscow’s relations with what is already a complex and unstable region, which already itself suffered from separatism. Finally, it has taken the South Caucasus region out of Moscow’s “region-building” mechanisms (such as the CIS), and increasingly now places the region in the EU’s “region-building” initiatives (such as Eastern Partnership), to which all three states now belong.
Some might argue that it is too early to judge the long-term impact of the new divisions on regional geopolitics in the South Caucasus. Clearly Russia remains an important player in the region, as was demonstrated when President Dmitry Medvedev recently spent six hours with the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan trying to push for progress on the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh “frozen” conflict.
Others argue that the fact that no progress has been achieved is more telling. At the same time, it remains unclear whether the delay in the ratification of the Armenian-Turkish protocols represents a temporary time-out for the parties, or a serious deadlock. If Armenian-Turkish reconciliation progresses, as is increasingly evident at the level of societies in both countries, and the normalization proceeds without provoking Azerbaijan, Russia’s role in the South Caucasus could wane.
Oksana Antonenko is a senior fellow and program director for Russia and Eurasia at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.
