29 October 2009: Webster University Seminar on Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Challenges & Opportunities
‘Successes and Failure of NPT or World without NPT?’
Keynote presentation by Mark Fitzpatrick, IISS
At 29 October 2009 Webster University Seminar on
Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Challenges & Opportunities
I. Successes
The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has been a remarkable success story. Established in 1968, in the crucible of Cold War arms race, the treaty has done far better than expected in slowing the spread of nuclear weapons. Rather than the 20-30 nuclear-armed states that President Kennedy famously foretold, the number has been kept to single digits: 8 or 9, depending on how one counts North Korea.
The number of states that gave up nuclear weapons programs during this period is larger than the number that crossed the threshold. South Africa, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus all rid themselves of the nuclear weapons that had been on their soil, and South Korea, Taiwan, Argentina, and Brazil, among others, all stopped their development of nuclear weapons. Others who were considering weapons development programmes decided to give up the quest from the beginning. Credit cannot be accorded to the NPT alone for these positive developments; great power persuasion, reduction in regional tensions and internal political changes were the primary factors. But the NPT set the non-nuclear norm, and imposed solemn legal obligations on the part of all adherents.
These non-nuclear obligations contributed mightily to international and regional security by giving nations a sense of trust that their neighbours would remain non-nuclear. The security that flows from this sense of trust is the least well advertised of the various bargains incorporated in the NPT, but it is not the least important. Security, after all, is the essence of the nuclear issue. Related to this security bargain, the treaty’s provisions bridged the impasse of the Cold War, drawing together the US and the Soviet Union, and their respective allies, in pursuit of a shared goal and in conformity with a common structure.
The most prominent bargain of the NPT is that states forego seeking nuclear weapons in exchange for receiving cooperation in the peaceful exploitation of nuclear technology. By containing the nuclear weapons terror, the NPT enabled the peaceful expansion of nuclear energy and nuclear applications for sustainable development throughout the world. Thirty countries today enjoy the benefits of nuclear power; and almost that many more are pursuing plans to newly introduce this form of energy. The NPT has also enabled a total of 56 nations to harness the atom in research reactors for various forms of nuclear applications for medical, industrial, agricultural and other scientific purposes.
With 189 signatories, the NPT is one of the most widely accepted treaties ever. Its place in history was further entrenched in 1995 when the signatory states agreed by consensus to extend the treaty indefinitely. Several did so with certain expectations, and these need to be respected. The bottom line is that its huge membership agreed that the treaty was essential to mankind, and that it would remain binding forever.
The kind of consensus that marked the 1995 NPT Extension Conference has also prevailed throughout much of the history of the institution most closely associated with the NPT. I am speaking about the institution that is considered to be the Treaty’s watchdog and principle champion -- the International Atomic Energy Agency, the most respected of the UN agencies. For most of its history, agency governance meetings were notable for an inclination to compromise – what was commonly called “the spirit of Vienna”. This spirit of cooperation allowed the inspired team of international civil servants at the IAEA to carry out their important work. In fulfilling the Agency’s mission of assisting nations to utilize nuclear technology in a manner that is safe, secure and non-threatening, the IAEA staff and its outgoing director general, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, rightly deserved the Nobel Peace Prize they were awarded four years ago.
II. NPT failures.
The picture of success that I have painted is clouded, unfortunately, by notable gaps and increasing threats to the NPT.
The treaty’s obvious failure is its lack of universality. Throughout most of its history, NPT membership steadily expanded. But particularly since 2002, when Cuba adhered to the treaty and the number of hold-outs was reduced to three, the momentum toward universality stalled, and in fact retreated. The nations that stand outside the Treaty are moving further away from ever joining, unless its provisions are amended to accept them as nuclear-weapons states, to join the original five states whose nuclear-armed status is recognized by the treaty. There is no prospect at all that the treaty could be so amended, because of the re-ratification process that would be required and the Pandora’s box that this would entail, with other states insisting on new and mutually incompatible changes of their own.
Consider the position of the hold-outs, who now number four:
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India solidified its nuclear-armed status by concluding a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States and winning agreement that other nuclear exporting countries would similarly exempt it from rules barring nuclear commerce with non-NPT parties.
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Pakistan, worried about India’s greater nuclear potential, is increasing its plutonium production capabilities and recently stymied efforts at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to open negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.
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Israel shows no hint of compromise on its policy of nuclear ambiguity and the robust nuclear arsenal the nation is presumed to possess. Prospects of a Middle East Nuclear-Weapons Free-Zone, which would require Israel to shed it nuclear shield, is further away than ever, given the violations that have marred the NPT in this region and undermined the confidence that would be required before a nuclear-weapons free zone ever could be negotiated.
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North Korea since late 2002 infamously expelled IAEA inspectors, withdrew from the NPT (whether legally or not is still unresolved), and tested two nuclear devices. It now rejects all agreements it previously made to dismantle its nuclear weapons program.
The NPT has also been under pressure by states that violate their non-proliferation commitments. In the early 1990s it was discovered that Iraq was working on nuclear weapons while purporting to be an NPT member in good standing, and in the 2003 Libya confessed to having done the same, though it deserves suitable credit for giving up that program. In 2007 it was learned that Syria had secretly built a nuclear reactor, in violation of the safeguards agreement required by the NPT, and it continues today to deny access to IAEA investigations to determine the nature of the violations.
Iran presents perhaps the greatest current challenge to the NPT because of its systematic violation of its safeguards agreement, its refusal to cooperate with IAEA investigations into serious claims about nuclear weapons development work, and its rejection of Security Council demands to suspend enrichment activity. It cannot be said whether Iran has made a decision to produce nuclear weapons, but it clearly wants to have that option. Why else would it continue to develop nuclear facilities in secret, like the one recently revealed near Qom?
Last week, after several years of increasingly worsening developments about the Iranian nuclear program, there shined a ray of optimism that the issue might be resolved peacefully. Negotiations in Vienna produced a very promising proposal by Dr. ElBaradei that could start, finally, to build trust between Iran and its negotiating partners: Iran would ship most of its stockpile of low enriched uranium to Russia and receive it back from France in the form of more highly enriched fuel for a research reactor to produce medical isotopes. The transfer would take place under the auspices of the IAEA, which would be the guarantor of the arrangement.
The plan entails real risks and significant compromises on both sides. The negotiators on both sides are to be complimented for coming up with this creative plan, which has been accepted by Washington, Moscow and Paris. Tehran’s answer might come today – or maybe not. I do not think they are just stalling. It’s a deeply contentious issues in a nation that is deeply divided. Some key figures in Iran insist on keeping on hand an amount of low enriched uranium that would be sufficient for one nuclear weapon when further enriched to weapons grade. The only reason Iran would want to keep that much enriched uranium is the same reason the IAEA and the major powers want to see it shipped out: because it could be used for a weapon in an NPT break-out scenario. The enriched uranium cannot be used for any other purpose today unless shipped overseas to be made into reactor fuel. The little understood reality is that Iran does not have the capability itself to make fuel for its reactors. If it did make fuel, it would not be certified as safe until after many years of testing.
Some might ask, why shouldn’t Iran have nuclear weapons, since several states in its vicinity have them. Fortunately, this is not an argument posed by Iran, which insists that its nuclear program will only be used for peaceful purposes. The Supreme Leader is said to have issued a fatwa against the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons. By signing the NPT, Iran also undertook a legal obligation. If Iran were to break that obligation and go nuclear, I fear that the NPT would not be able to stand the blow.
The NPT has survived other expansions of the nuclear club and other past threats. On top of North Korea’s defiant defection from the treaty, however, Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons in the face of concerted international efforts to stop it would expose the treaty’s weakness against a determined violator. It is impossible to predict how NPT members will react, but there is a real danger. If the combined structures of the NPT, the IAEA and the UN Security Council cannot stop Iran, it might be asked what rationale remains for these institutions. The security bargain of the NPT will be seriously imperilled.
A nuclear-armed Iran could also trigger a regional proliferation cascade. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and other countries that felt threatened would all be forced to re-examine their defence requirements. It is not inevitable that any of them would respond to an Iranian nuclear weapon by choosing to similarly equip themselves. Many, if not most, would likely opt for less problematic means of protection. Nevertheless, Iran’s nuclear arming would significantly increase prospects for a nuclear arms race in the region.
Disarmament
The NPT incorporates yet another bargain, and one that is also under question. It is the bargain that non-nuclear weapons states agree to stay non-nuclear in exchange for the five acknowledged nuclear weapons states agreeing eventually to disarm. Some critics argue that the fact that the five remain nuclear armed represents another failure of the NPT. I do not join this judgement. Article VI of the NPT – the disarmament provision – requires three undertakings: that parties pursue negotiations in good faith relating to: 1) cessation of the nuclear arms race; 2) nuclear disarmament; and 3) a treaty on general and complete disarmament.
The first of these undertakings has been accomplished. Among the five, the nuclear arms race largely has ended and been reversed. Nuclear arsenals, while still large, are a fraction of their size during the height of the cold war in the mid-1980s. But there has been little movement on the nuclear disarmament goal and none at all on general and complete disarmament. There is a strong sense in most parts of the world that the nuclear weapons states need to take the lead, to ensure that the two-tiered system of nuclear- and non-nuclear armed states does not endure forever.
Disillusionment over disarmament prospects contributed to a breakdown in the consensus that used to prevail at NPT and IAEA forums. Over the past decade, a tension developed between proponents of non-proliferation and advocates of nuclear disarmament. These are not incompatible goals. But what was seen as an exclusive emphasis by powerful states on stopping the spread of nuclear weapons created a backlash. In the developing world, it gave rise to an inflated sense of distrust that the imposition of new non-proliferation controls will result, if not by design then by consequence, in a diminution of their rights to nuclear energy and a reinforcement of the division between nuclear haves and have-nots.
President Obama clearly understands the need to overcome this tension, and he seized the zeitgeist when he pledged in his April 5th speech in Prague to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons. In that speech and in subsequent forums, he outlined several disarmament steps he would pursue: the negotiation of a follow-on agreement to START, US ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty with ensuing diplomacy to bring about entry-into-force, and a new treaty that verifiably ends the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes.
President Medvedev has also committed Russia to the nuclear abolition goal. Britain earlier led the way in re-stating this goal, most recently in Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s speech at Lancaster House on the 17th of March. France has been less keen on promoting the distant nuclear-weapons-free goal, but as President Nicolas Sarkozy laid out in his speech at Cherbourg in March 2008, France rightly claims a strong record with regard to nuclear dismantlement and transparency. China is less enthusiastic about nuclear transparency and limits on its arsenal, but strongly advocates global disarmament.
So I think it is fair to say that the disarmament train is finally on the right track. Each of the arms control steps that Obama laid out in Prague is meaningful in its own right. They also serve what might be called a ‘hidden agenda’ of non-proliferation. By addressing disarmament head-on, he hopes to focus global attention on the proliferation problem. In pledging to take the disarmament goal seriously and in taking concrete steps in that direction, he removes the charge of double standards from the non-proliferation debate. His message is that all responsible nations must undertake and fulfil obligations if the world is to be protected from the threat of nuclear weapons.
The question is, even if the nuclear weapons states do follow through with accepting additional limitations on their arsenals, will the non-nuclear weapons states be willing to accept additional constraints on their security options and potential nuclear industry structure in order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime? The answer so far is not clear, and some of the early signals are not promising. Privately, officials from some of the Non-Aligned Movement countries say that arms control steps put forward now by the nuclear weapons states were promised long ago and more than once, and have already been paid for, mostly recently by indefinite extension of the NPT. These states do not feel particularly inclined to pay for it again. I hope they will reconsider.
The problem is that if additional steps are not taken to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the security benefits of the Non-Proliferation Treaty upon which we all rely will be under increasing threat.
III. World without the NPT?
Envisioning a world without the NPT is a mental exercise that is almost thoroughly disheartening. Among the possible scenarios that come to mind, the most likely is a world with many more nuclear-armed states and ruled by the law of the jungle. It would not necessarily be a world without anti-nuclear norms, but these probably would be norms either reached through alliance management or imposed by superpower fiat. There would be little room for nonaligned states, or at least not for any nonaligned states that wanted any access to the benefits of nuclear energy. Because if there were not an NPT, there would be no basis other than bilateral deals or alliance mechanisms for ensuring that nuclear pursuits were entirely peaceful.
There is another non-NPT scenario. One can envision a world in which the NPT has disappeared but only because it has been replaced by a newer, stronger treaty, one that has far more intrusive inspection authorities under its verification regime, much stronger enforcement powers to punish and deter violators, and unequivocal controls on all forms of sensitive nuclear technologies. It would have no provisions for countries to work toward nuclear disarmament, because that condition would already have been met. In short, it would be a new nuclear treaty to govern a nuclear technologies in a nuclear-weapons free world.
It would be many years before I could foresee reaching such a new treaty and the nuclear-weapons-free world it would accompany. In the meantime, however, the world needs to work to strengthen the non-proliferation treaty that we already have. Such work is needed in several areas , including to strengthen the verification instruments of the IAEA, to enhance the enforcement measures of the non-proliferation regime, and to tighten the withdrawal provisions of the treaty so that states that are found in noncompliance like North Korea cannot withdraw from it and retain the benefits they acquired as members.
Fortunately there is an opportunity to strengthen the treaty at the NPT Review Conference to be held next spring. I do hope it will succeed.
