05 February 2009 : Daily Telegraph
Current threats to the Non-Proliferation Treaty are daunting, says Simon Scott Plummer
After a long period of neglect, nuclear disarmament has re-emerged at the top of the foreign policy agenda. Barack Obama is seeking a dramatic reduction in global stockpiles over the next four years. The biggest holders, Russia and the United States, are committed under the Moscow Treaty to cutting the number of their strategic nuclear warheads from around 6,000 to between 1,700 and 2,200 by the end of 2012. But they are also looking to effect further reductions through a successor to both the 2002 agreement and the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which expires in December.
In Britain, too, the subject is in vogue. Last August, the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the world's pre-eminent military think tank, published a paper on abolishing nuclear weapons. This month it will host the launching of a book on the ultimate deterrent by Sir Michael Quinlan, former permanent under-secretary at the Ministry of Defence and a prolific writer on the subject.
Yesterday, the British Government made its own contribution to the debate by publishing a paper on creating the conditions for abolition. Introducing it at the IISS, David Miliband, the Foreign Secretary, spoke of a moment of opportunity and of the need to broaden the discussion beyond the narrow confine of experts. His remarks should be seen in the context of the impetus to nuclear disarmament given by the new American administration and the approach of the next review conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2010.
It is often forgotten that this agreement was based on a bargain between the recognised nuclear-armed states (America, Britain, China, France and Russia) and the other signatories. The latter undertook not to acquire or manufacture the bomb. In return, the five committed themselves to the goal of complete disarmament. In refusing to sign the NPT, India, which conducted its first test in 1974, has always argued that the recognised nuclear powers were not fulfilling their side of the deal. Since then, the end of the Cold War has brought reductions in the American, British, French and Russian stockpiles but not in those of China and the three "unofficial" nuclear powers, India, Israel and Pakistan. Further cuts by the first group will, it is hoped, persuade the second to follow suit.
A more urgent problem, however, is a third group, the would-be nuclear powers, of which Iran and North Korea are the most notorious. In each case, international efforts to curb their ambitions have failed. North Korea, an economic basket-case, sees its nuclear programme as the one lever which it has over the outside world. For Iran, the acquisition of at least a nuclear capability, if not an actual arsenal, is a goal which goes back to the time of the Shah. Mr Miliband was quite wrong yesterday to dismiss the argument that nuclear status is sought for prestige; it is precisely that which has propelled the Iranian programme, and the country will endure tougher sanctions rather than abandon it.
If the Iranians constitute the test case for a treaty which has at least prevented a massive break-out from its provisions, then one has to ask what can be done about their recalcitrance. Is Mr Obama prepared to order a military strike, or to assist Israel to do the same? If not, then we face a situation in which it may be necessary to attempt a deal with the clerics over not weaponising, in return for an easing of sanctions.
The long-term goal of ridding the world of nuclear weapons may be admirable. But the immediate threats to its main instrument, the NPT, are daunting.
