28 February 2009 : Financial Times
The twin scourges of piracy and maritime terrorism have filled thousands of newspaper column inches and hours of news broadcasts over the past decade. Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money by Martin Murphy, an academic at King's College, London and a Washington think-tanker, is a valiant effort to put those stories into perspective.
Despite the febrile efforts of some commentators to link the two, the issues are separate legally and practically. Legally, because the Law of the Sea draws a distinction between acts committed for "private ends" and those committed for political purposes. Practically, because there are no proved links between pirates and terrorists: the most that can be said is that pirates can create or exacerbate an environment of lawlessness in which terrorists can hide and that the two groups may use similar methods.
Piracy, it suggests, is a global phenomenon but not a global problem. It is a threat to seafarers in certain areas: an arc running through the Philippines through Indonesia and the South China Sea, up the Malacca Straits, and the Bay of Bengal; in the Indian Ocean off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden and the southern Red Sea, and in one or two other areas, such as off the coasts of Nigeria and parts of Latin America. But the larger the vessel, the smaller the risk of piracy though as recent incidents have shown large ships are not immune. But those who bear most of the cost of seaborne banditry are coastal communities, fishermen and local shipping. It thrives where geography is propitious - Indonesia has 50,000 miles of coastline - and where political authority is weak.
There has been no systematic study of piracy's cost. As a result, some guesses appear wildly exaggerated. One estimate in the respected periodical Foreign Affairs suggests an annual cost of $16bn, which would mean that every reported incident cost $38m, an incredible figure even given likely underreporting of incidents.
Maritime terrorism is another phenomenon prone to extravagant claims. The idea of the bomb in a box, that terrorists could place a crude nuclear weapon into a shipping container and send it into New York harbour, has alarmed many. Murphy makes it clear that this is a highly remote risk.
In fact, terrorism at sea has accounted for just 2 per cent of all terrorism incidents in the past 30 years. The book breaks down the possibilities for terrorism at sea into four categories: ships as iconic, economic or mass casualty targets and ships as weapons. Each presents its own logistical problems.
Today, few cargo ships have iconic status because most ships are registered in jurisdictions offering owners tax or other cost advantages. Warships, such as the USS Cole, nearly sunk in Aden harbour in October 2000, and some cruise ships such as the Queen Mary fall into that category. Oil tankers are obvious economic targets. But when al-Qaeda hit the Limburg, carrying 400,000 barrels in 2002 of crude oil, the economic effects were mainly limited to Yemen, from where the attack was mounted.
Attacking ships to cause mass casualties "is the category of attack that few people want to talk about", Murphy says. Cruise ships and ferry boats are obvious possible targets.
Meanwhile, using large ships as weapons is constrained by the special skills needed to steer and navigate vessels. Terrorism at sea, he concludes, is a minor threat to the international order, but one with the capacity to develop if weak links in the system are exploited.
This is not a sensationalist book - Johnny Depp doesn't even get a look-in. Though not a difficult read, it will appeal only to the most interested of amateurs. But its sobriety and scope should make it essential for professionals in shipping, insurance, risk management and security.
Stephen Fidler, is a former FT journalist and a consulting senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies
