AT THE latest Shangri-La Dialogue - the yearly forum of top military and security officials hosted by Singapore - defence ministers adopted a set of guidelines which should govern their activities when offering help to disaster-stricken nations.
The guidelines were prompted by the dispute surrounding the international community's approach to the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar.
07 June 2008: Straits Times
A look at the key world events this week by JONATHAN EYAL of The Straits Times Foreign Desk
AT THE latest Shangri-La Dialogue - the yearly forum of top military and security officials hosted by Singapore - defence ministers adopted a set of guidelines which should govern their activities when offering help to disaster-stricken nations.
The guidelines were prompted by the dispute surrounding the international community's approach to the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar.
In 2005, states agreed they had a 'duty to protect' people from major disasters, even if this occasionally meant ignoring the sovereignty of a country.
This resolution, adopted by the United Nations, was initially understood to concern only the most extreme circumstances, such as genocide.
But some Western countries have recently argued that this 'duty to protect' should also apply to Myanmar's current circumstances.
As Minister for Defence Teo Chee Hean suggested, under the newly adopted guidelines, the primary responsibility for disaster relief remains with the government of the afflicted country.
But, if the task proves too large, national governments have the 'responsibility' to see 'what other resources they can garner to help provide for the people' including, if necessary, asking other countries to provide help.
It is a neat compromise, which seeks to reaffirm national sovereignty while upholding international humanitarian concerns at the same time.
But there is a further aspect to the problem, to which no clear answer is forthcoming: the role of the military in such situations.
As Mr Teo pointed out, the problem with international relief efforts is not so much the quantity of aid supplied, but whether it is delivered as quickly as possible.
The role of the armed forces should, therefore, be clear: They are the only structures with both the necessary resources and the manpower to act, and they are routinely trained to respond to emergencies.
Yet, international humanitarian organisations remain very suspicious of the military's pre-eminent role in relief efforts.
Dr Jakob Kellenberger, president of the International Committee of the Red Cross, neatly articulated this feeling when he argued at the Shangri-La Dialogue - held from May 30 to June 1 - that it is up to the military to 'prove that they are in a better position than humanitarian actors'.
Mr Kellenberger may have a point, for there are plenty of examples where military involvement started with a purely humanitarian purpose and ended up as part of a bigger problem, rather than part of the solution.
Take the case of Myanmar. Some of the military solutions offered by Western armchair strategists were downright silly - dropping supplies from the air is just about the worst possible way of helping victims.
Most of the aid would have either been seized by the authorities, or ended up in the hands of speculators. But the insertion of foreign troops against the wishes of the Myanmar government would have been much worse.
Even if one assumes - and it is a big assumption - that foreign forces would have encountered no opposition, once they were inside the country the clamour would have grown for them to do more, including removing a government which is blamed by many as being the source of Myanmar's problems.
As military commanders know only too well, it is relatively easy to intervene in any part of the world, but very difficult to get out.
While armed forces are very useful in the initial stages of a crisis, they are not particularly good in managing its aftermath.
During the 1990s, Europe's armies frequently intervened in the wars in the former Yugoslavia, usually with the best humanitarian aspirations.
But they ended up running everything, from schools to public transport, and even the municipal drainpipes. More than a decade after the wars ended, they are still there.
The same thing is happening in Afghanistan today, where Western military operations are bogged down, largely because what really needs to be done is to recreate a state from scratch, a job which the men or women in uniform simply cannot perform.
So, what is the answer? The military's participation in tackling the aftermath of any humanitarian crisis must be clearly defined and of a short duration.
It should ideally complement, rather than replace, the efforts of governmental aid organisations and non-governmental organisations.
It should also never be considered as either a panacea, or as an answer to the frustration of politicians running out of other ideas about what can be done.
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