IT TOOK an American, and an even-tempered one too, to disrupt the bonhomie of this year's Shangri-La Dialogue.
US Defence Secretary Robert Gates lambasted China's assertions that its military buildup was defensive in nature and a logical outcome of its rising economic prowess. He charged that China's long- range ballistic missiles were offensive in nature.
'I don't know what you use them for if it's not for offensive capabilities,' Mr Gates said. Rehashing questions raised by Washington recently, he expressed concern about the 'numbers and the nature' of the buildup.
09 June 2008: Straits Times
By William Choong, Senior Writer
IT TOOK an American, and an even-tempered one too, to disrupt the bonhomie of this year's Shangri-La Dialogue.
US Defence Secretary Robert Gates lambasted China's assertions that its military buildup was defensive in nature and a logical outcome of its rising economic prowess. He charged that China's long- range ballistic missiles were offensive in nature.
'I don't know what you use them for if it's not for offensive capabilities,' Mr Gates said. Rehashing questions raised by Washington recently, he expressed concern about the 'numbers and the nature' of the buildup.
The question of the ultimate intention behind China's military buildup is a critical one for many countries in Asia and beyond. Beijing's pet answer to this question has been that it pursues a wholly defensive policy.
A cursory look at Chinese strategic culture and recent history, however, would suggest a different, somewhat more nuanced, picture.
Mr Gates' attack was aimed at Lieutenant-General Ma Xiaotian, the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) Deputy Chief of General Staff. In a speech at the forum, Lt-Gen Ma said China's 'growing economy and fiscal revenue make the defence budget increase both a logical and imperative reality'.
'China is a peace-loving country and its people are a peace-loving people. Notwithstanding the vicissitudes of the international situation, China will always adopt a defensive military policy.'
To some extent, his claims were valid. Many Chinese scholars and officers have stressed this defensive mindset. They cite Mao Zedong's statement that China 'does not desire one inch of foreign soil', and the pacific nature of the Great Wall.
The famous voyages of Admiral Zheng He, they point out, unlike the voyages of Christopher Columbus and Vasco da Gama, did not result in colonies or the use of force against the peoples Admiral He came into contact with.
China has also consistently declared a 'no first use' nuclear strategy, saying it would retaliate with such weapons only if it was attacked first.
According to US-based Strategic Forecasting, China's nuclear arsenal includes 100 missiles capable of hitting Tokyo and 50 that can reach Washington. Such a small arsenal could be nullified by Washington's (and Tokyo's) growing ballistic missile defence capabilities. Therein lie China's concerns.
On the flip side, China's declarations of a defensive posture is a cover for a strategy involving defensive and offensive elements. Its strategy looks much like the Manchester United model, where a strong defence derives from a solid offence. And despite Chinese protestations to the contrary, certain elements of the PLA are inherently offensive.
As Mr Gates has noted, China's intercontinental ballistic missiles - weapons with a range greater than 5,500km - are inherently offensive. The same applies to Beijing's launch of an anti-satellite kill vehicle in January last year, and the array of ballistic missiles it has aimed at Taiwan.
In a paper on China's strategic culture, analyst Andrew Scobell argues that the military strategy is essentially one of 'active defence': While emphasising a defensive strategy, the principle effectively blurs the distinction between offence and defence.
Prof Scobell says active defence, the guiding principle in the Mao and Deng eras, is still vital in the 21st century.
In the late 1990s, PLA Senior Colonel Wang Naiming wrote that China sought defence by active offence. Strategic defence can, when conditions are ripe, lead to 'counter-attack and offence'.
'The tendency is for (Chinese) researchers and policymakers to broadly define defence as virtually anything, including a pre-emptive strike!' Prof Scobell writes.
Thus China's attack on Vietnam in 1979, and its wars against India and the former Soviet Union in 1962 and 1969 respectively could be labelled 'self-defence counter- attacks' or ziwei fanji.
China expert Alastair Iain Johnston characterises this strategy as one of 'absolute flexibility' (quanbian).
How would such an offence-biased 'defensive' strategy work in practice?
If Taiwan were to declare independence, China could launch pre-emptive strikes on American space and naval assets and label them 'defensive' manoeuvres. Similarly, cyberattacks against US military servers can be construed as 'defensive'. (Ironically, an interesting parallel could be drawn between China's 'active defence' and the Bush administration's doctrine of 'pre-emption'.)
Although such projections of China's intentions are at best speculative, they do highlight how China and the US remain locked in a classic security dilemma: One country's bid to acquire more security leads to the perception of diminished security for another.
This dilemma is the cause of the mutual suspicion pervading Sino-US relations. China frets that the US is seeking to 'contain' it, while the US worries about China's possible expansionism.
On the bright side, China and the US have softened somewhat their suspicions of each other over the past year. Their militaries have established hotlines; they have cooperated to rein in North Korea's nuclear programme; and their concerted effort to maintain their positions on 'One China' has dissuaded Taiwan from edging towards de facto independence.
US officials at the Shangri- La Dialogue were pleased China was participating in such fora, describing it as a sign that Beijing is gradually acknowledging international concerns over its military buildup.
'What they're quibbling over is how much they're complying with the norm,' an unnamed US official told the Los Angeles Times.
'That's very different (from) saying it's none of your business, which is what they used to say.'
In short, the mutual suspicion arising from the security dilemma remains. But prospects are looking up.
Go to Shangri-La Dialogue homepage
