16 December 2008: Financial Times
By Roula Khalaf
Iranians often create a stir at the Manama dialogue, a high-profile Gulf security conference attended by Arab and American officials, even from a distance. While the US delivers demands to its Arab allies, Iranian officials usually tell the Arabs to kick the Americans out of the Gulf because they are the source of all the region's troubles.
With a US president who favours diplomacy in dealing with Iran soon in office, many of the delegates this year had entertained the tantalising prospect of a behind the scenes US-Iran meeting at Manama. A senior US congressman was reportedly keen to travel to Bahrain for a one-on-one with Ali Larijani, the speaker of the Iranian parliament who had been invited to lead his country's delegation.
Alas, the encounter was not to be. A big US delegation - including David Petraeus, the Centcom commander, and Robert Gates, the US secretary of defence - attended the weekend summit. But neither Mr Larijani nor his deputy, nor any other Iranian official, turned up.
There is, of course, an Iranian presidential election next year and Mr Larijani might be a candidate. So consorting with a US congressman could have caused him a headache at home.
The symbolism of a handshake in this 30-year-old conflict cannot be underestimated, particularly when the Islamic regime's legitimacy has partly rested on defying the "Great Satan."
As John Chipman, head of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, which organises the Manama dialogue, says, it is much more challenging, in terms of domestic politics, for a senior Iranian to talk to the US than it is for a senior American figure to talk to Tehran.
Although Iran had in 2003 suggested a comprehensive dialogue with Washington, and has been insisting it will discuss its nuclear programme so long as no conditions are attached, the idea of US engagement seems to have unsettled parts of the Islamic regime.
"The Iranians are very hesitant, maybe because they're afraid of being seduced," said an Iraqi official.
The "how, when and what" of talking to Iran could take months to figure out. It will not help that the tone the new administration appears to be adopting - a tough line of carrots and sticks - is bound to irritate the Iranians, who want to be treated with the utmost respect.
True, one of the central messages that Mr Gates delivered in Manama was that the US was not looking for regime change in Iran but for a change in regime behaviour. The other, however, was that the Obama presidency has no intention of going soft on Iran.
One consideration for the US is whether to engage Iran before the presidential elections, as this could give Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad - likely to seek a second term - the chance to claim that he dragged Washington to the negotiating table. The US will also have to decide whether to talk only about Iran's nuclear programme or a whole basket of concerns to both sides.
And to whom will the US talk? Ideally its interlocutor would be in the office of the supreme leader and real decision-maker, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Most likely, however, it will be forced to converse with officials in the Ahmadi-Nejad administration (a most frustrating experience, according to Europeans).
One western official involved in Iran policy says the Obama administration will probably start with modest steps, leaving dramatic gestures until after the Iranian elections. It could quickly seek to open an interest section in Tehran, a move the Bush administration had been planning.
Whatever the strategy, the problem is that Iran is cocky. It has vigorously pursued its nuclear programme in spite of a raft of international sanctions, and has widened its influence considerably in the Middle East. "It's going to be very complicated," said the western official. "The US will have to play its cards carefully and it doesn't have many cards to play."
The writer is Middle East editor of the Financial Times
