22 December 2008: MEES
MEES Research interviewed international specialists Browyn Bruton, Alain Gascon, Roger Middleton and Jason Alderwick on their insights on Energy Security in the Indian Ocean/Arabian Sea.
Piracy is a global problem although it has declined in Southeast Asia of late. What are the main reasons for the current surge of Somali pirate attacks on shipping in the Gulf of Aden and, more recently, further south in the Indian Ocean?
Bruton: Somali pirates are prone to liken their activities to unremunerated attempts by local fishermen and ex‐coast guardsmen, in the years following the collapse of the Siad Barre regime, to guard the coastline from the dumping of toxic wastes and illegal fishing by international firms. These sailors were indeed known to collect “taxes” from merchant vessels, but were popularly known to be acting in defense of their territorial waters. Modern Somali piracy, in contrast, has a cash motive. Though the pirates willingly spread the spoils of their crimes among the local community, and are widely revered by the local population for their generosity, the largess is more tactical than altruistic. Piracy has existed in Somalia for decades, and was at a low point under the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which largely succeeded in driving pirate activities out of south central Somalia during its six‐month regime in 2006.
Piracy now remains concentrated in the northern Puntland region, though it has begun to creep back to the south central ports of Hobyo, Harardheere, and possibly Kismayo. The surge in northern piracy is nevertheless connected to the deterioration of the political and security situation in south central Somalia.
This is primarily because there has been a collapse of the Somali economy since the Ethiopian occupation (in December 2006) and the takeover by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Counterfeiting, for example, has soared under the TFG regime; the Somali shilling was 19,000 to the US dollar in July 2007; it is now 36,000 to the dollar. Piracy is an attractive, relatively low‐risk alternative to militia work, and is tolerated by the al‐Shabaab (the main Islamist group fighting in Somalia), the Islamic Courts Union, the Puntland Authority (a breakaway region in northern Somalia) and the TFG, all of which are believed to receive a percentage of the ransoms obtained. The phenomenal success of the pirates has continued to attract new recruits and imitators, some of whom are now acting independently and opportunistically, and lack any support network on land.
Gascon: The main reason for this outbreak of violence and piracy is that since the fall of Siad Barre in 1991 there has only been chaos, famine and disorder in Somalia. Piracy, apart from the fact that it has constituted some sort of a tradition on a regional level, is a basic means for warlords to make money and finance their operations.
Middleton: The immediate cause for this big rise in piracy is the increase in ransom payments. There has been a doubling or tripling of ransom payments this year compared to what happened last year or the year before that. You also have the result of a cumulative effect: as the pirates have been successful over the years, they have been able to reinvest their money in acquiring faster engines for their speedboats, more powerful guns and rockets, as well as better GPS systems that allow them to threaten more ships and operate on a larger scale. Along with the enhancement of their physical capacity the pirates have also become more brazen, perhaps braver if you like, and are now prepared to attack ships that were considered too difficult before.
Alderwick: This is certainly not a short‐term problem in the Gulf of Aden. Piracy attacks in the region have been going on for years. What has happened more recently, though, is high‐profile attacks that have gathered international interest and media attention. Specifically the capture of the Sea‐born Spirit, the Sirius Star, and now more recently the Nautica cruise liner that was intercepted outside the Gulf of Aden. So we have to put this into perspective. As for the main reasons for the increase, I think there is a multitude, but they boil down to a lack of governance and control within Somalia itself and the dire economic situation there. What we have seen in the beginning is that seafarers have been conducting low‐level criminal activities against fishing vessels that are extortion‐oriented. This criminality has exploded over the years, cumulatively becoming the main means for collecting hard‐currency earnings for a lot of the communities involved there.
Why wasnʹt the November NATO‐led mission able to deter the 17 November hijacking of the Saudi Arabian supertanker Sirius Star, and what are the possibilities that these attacks could mutate into a more sustained maritime terrorist campaign against global energy?
Bruton: Attacks by pirates tend to take less than 15 minutes from the initial sighting of the pirate boats to the complete capture of the vessel. Therefore, unless NATO is in the immediate vicinity of an attack, it cannot successfully intervene. The Sirius Star was attacked off the coast of Mombasa, many hundreds of miles outside the safety corridor established by NATO. The pirates’ range encompasses an area of approximately 2.5mn square miles, an area far too large to be completely protected by the dozen NATO ships currently in the vicinity. Despite their UN mandate, NATO forces are also seriously hampered by various national and international maritime laws. This has heavily undermined the ability of the NATO force to deter attacks. Britain’s Royal Navy, for example, can only use force in self‐defense, when directly threatened by a pirate vessel – not in defense of a merchant ship. The French and Indian navies, in contrast, have responded with force to pirate attacks, and anecdotal evidence suggests that pirate ships now flee at the approach of French and Indian vessels. The most effective means of deterring piracy would probably be to establish some sort of blockade at the host ports (primarily Eyl, Hobyo and Haradheere), but issues of state sovereignty, as well as a fear of civilian casualties, may continue to impede this approach.
It should be noted that the EU, NATO and its member nations are currently working exhaustively to overcome this welter of legal barriers. There is certainly a high risk that a small minority of extremist actors, operating from within the secrecy of a terrorist cell, may seek to implement a maritime terrorist campaign. It is important to differentiate between these fringe elements – such as the Muhajideen and the Raskomboni – from Al‐Shabaab. Local sources attest that the Shabaab is also actively seeking to develop a maritime capability; but in my view the Shabaab would be most likely to use its maritime capability as a source of income‐generation rather than for a terrorist campaign.
Despite its calls for jihad, the Shabaab is not fundamentally a terrorist organization. It has wider governance aspirations in Somalia, and the vast majority of its rank‐and‐file members are motivated (like the pirates) by the desire for wealth and power. The Shabaab would be practically and politically constrained from committing large‐scale acts of terrorism, such as the sinking of an oil tanker, because that action could cause an environmental catastrophe that would inflict incalculable cost on the Somali population that the Shabaab claims to govern, and would certainly provoke a violent backlash from the local population.
Even the repeated capture of oil tankers for ransom may run the risk of displeasing the Shabaab’s patrons in the Gulf. Terrorist acts against non‐Muslim merchants may perhaps be more feasible. Finally, there is a worrisome potential that international jihadists will join forces with isolated local extremists and will “piggyback” on the Somali pirates’ activity; but it’s also worth noting that Somalia has largely proven to be inhospitable ground for such collaborations in the past.
Gascon: The chaos in Somalia constitutes good news for Islamist terrorist organizations of the al‐Qaʹida type who want to threaten some of the vital sea lanes that supply oil to Europe and to the NATO forces active in Afghanistan. Already some major oil shipping companies have decided to bypass the Gulf of Aden, thereby increasing the cost of oil delivery to Europe and beyond. The piracy in itself is important enough to create serious trouble regardless of any mutation into a terrorist operation, which to my understanding is a limited possibility.
Middleton: We need to understand that the NATO mission is operating in the Gulf of Aden, whereas the Sirius Star was attacked 400‐500 miles off the cost of Kenya, well out of the area that the mission is supposed to be protecting. By carrying out this attack the pirates have made any military response against them very difficult, because they operate in an enormous area, which you would need an enormous number of ships to cover. Certainly many people worry that the tactics used by the pirates could be adopted by terrorist organizations. For now that hasn’t happened at all and there is no evidence to that effect. But Somalia is seen by organizations such as al‐Qaʹida as a good breeding‐ground for recruitment as well as an operational base.
In the past, al‐Qaʹida hasn’t always been successful in Somalia for a number of reasons, including clan and cultural differences. Yet, yet it would only need three, four, 10 terrorists to capture another tanker and that could have a very worrying impact on international trade. How likely is this to happen? I don’t know. There is certainly a possibility, and it is one we should be very worried about. What we should keep in mind, though, is that the pirates are making so much money out of it as a criminal enterprise that they would not welcome any terrorist connotations. They know that if they become a terrorist enterprise they run the risk of their “business” being severely restricted and even destroyed by the concomitant international reaction.
Alderwick: Let’s get this into perspective. Five or six NATO ships and five or six EU Coalition Task Force ships are not going to effectively patrol the millions of square miles that they need to police, depending on where you draw the demarcation line of a potential security zone. That is why the seizure of the Sirius Star, for example, took place in an area far outside the traditional operating zone of the pirates. The reason NATO wasn’t there is that the Sirius Star was nowhere close to those ships, which are directly focusing on the entrance of the Gulf of Aden. NATO forces, and for that matter any maritime forces, cannot have an all‐pervasive presence there. As far as the terrorism nexus is concerned, we should be very careful about correlating piracy and terrorism, because at the moment the activity is criminal, it’s about gaining money, it is not about maritime terrorism. That said, there have been, since 2003‐04, relatively high‐profile terrorist attacks such as the case of the tanker Limberg in 2004 and the USS Cole in 2000. Yet these attacks have been predominantly limited. Again the key illustration here is that Sirius Star shows the vulnerability of both sea lanes and our energy security. So, if terrorists were to attempt to exploit that there are inherent vulnerabilities there.
What are NATO and the EU expected to do to neutralize the threat of maritime piracy, as they are primarily affected by the concomitant insecurity of supply?
Bruton: NATO has requested that merchant ships increase their own on‐board security and that they travel through theregion in convoys. Merchant ships have in some cases followed this advice; but owners have demanded increased protection from NATO regardless of any constraints. There seems to be a strong expectation of increased “action”; but there doesn’t seem to be a consensus on the precise form that the action should take.
Gascon: The EU has decided to take an active stand by deploying a significant naval force in the area with the purpose of escorting ships through the Gulf of Aden. Unfortunately its size and the area it has to cover are widely disproportionate – too few ships are available to guard too large an area. In addition to the vastness of the maritime areas, the morphology of the coastlines in Somalia and Yemen is adding to the problem of policing the area, since they offer dozens of natural ports for pirates to find refuge in. You need to have troops on the ground that would make the Somali coastline
inhospitable to the pirates.
Middleton: The EU NAVFOR Somalia was scheduled to take over from NATO by 9 December. The effectiveness of their response is dependent on a number of issues. One is the number of ships that are pledged by several EU member‐states and another is the way they will coordinate with other ships sent to the region from India, Malaysia, Russia and others.
At the moment, France is offering a close‐protection convoy system through the Gulf of Aden, where the commercial ships will be closely protected by one or two military vessels at a time. With 16,000‐22,000 ships going through the Gulf of Aden every year this is not going to be sufficient to deter piracy. If there is a large enough naval force, and if they have a sufficient number of air assets, helicopters and maritime patrol aircraft, there is a chance they can make life for the pirates very difficult. But overall there probably isn’t a military solution to this, given the resources available. Naval ships can make it safer, but they can never make it safe. However, a political solution to the Somaliaʹs domestic problems could resolve this symptomatic problem of piracy
.
Alderwick: What they realistically have to do is be committed to the region. NATO and the EU have both recognized that there is a significant problem they must face, and NATO has been particularly focusing for years on the military and maritime/energy security nexus and its potential responses. I think we will see an increasing commitment on the part of NATO forces to confront this vulnerability. Where appropriate, we are also going to see increased activity on behalf of the EU maritime forces from 9 December. In terms of their effectiveness, both organizations are bound to address the symptoms rather than the causes of piracy. However, if we are going to send naval forces there at all, what we must be very clear about is that they are able to provide a deterrent effect, and the only meaningful way for them to do that is to have very robust political guidance from the national authorities who designate and allocate the naval forces to a coalition, NATO or EU task force group.
It is also very important that the rules of engagement are robust enough to provide sufficient deterrence to the pirates, because at the moment the pirates understand that the opportunity (ransom) is very high and the risk (deterrence) is very low. So we have to make the risks to them much, much greater in order to deter them. At the end of the day you don’t want a situation where you interdict a pirate vessel and you let them go after confiscating their weapons, because you are not sure where the authority for their prosecution lies. That sort of situation, which has occurred in the past, must be avoided. We need an international legal authority that is capable of prosecuting them, and where that is not possible we need rules of engagement that will enable the NATO/EU forces to interdict and neutralize the pirates themselves.
Do you envision a major enlargement of the international naval deployment in the Arabian Sea and the Horn of Africa? To what extent should the regional states including Greece, the largest maritime fleet owner in the world, be engaged in combating piracy on their doorsteps?
Burton: NATO cannot provide a force large enough to police the entire area at risk; a change in tactics rather than an increase in the number of ships is required. Ideally, resolution of the pirate problem would come in the form of a negotiated political settlement in Somalia. Failing a political settlement (which is admittedly unlikely), the international community will be forced to impose costs – either on the pirates (through the use of force), or, in a worst‐case scenario, on the local population (preferably through individual sanctions on government leaders, but possibly through the disruption of trade and fishing activities). Only when the costs begin to outweigh the benefits that local communities and leaders currently derive from piracy will local authorities (traditional, clan and governmental) be forced to deal with the problem on land. It is not feasible to expect that the problem can be resolved through increased naval activism on the part of regional states.
Gascon: There is an important French base as well as a US base in Djibouti, but the US role is limited due to the ambivalence of the local population toward the American presence there. The EU can play an important role in stabilizing the region by using Djibouti as a stronghold, a base of operations, but in the long term the solution must be primarily an African solution, and on this occasion the African Union forces must take the lead.
Middleton: What we may see is the addition to the EU force of ships from Japan, from South Africa and maybe a few others, so you may see a total number of 3‐4 ships augmenting the EU force, but I don’t think anything on a large scale.
Alderwick: I think we will see more forces. We have already seen the Japanese reviewing the legal considerations that would allow them to deploy forces in a maritime security mission to support the anti‐piracy effort in the area. We are seeing South Korea do the same. We’ve had Malaysia send warships to the region as well as Singapore. We now have a more robust presence on the part of the EU. In terms of those countries that have large numbers of vessels registered to them, such as Greece, most of them are already involved via contributions to both NATO and the EU. What we should also look at is that we get more active engagement from the neighboring littoral countries, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and determine what role their maritime forces can play, because thus far, they have been very reluctant to get involved in the maritime security efforts in the Gulf of Aden. I think we will see a change there in a positive way and they will start to contribute forces. Whether they will be under coalition command is questionable, but nonetheless they would still be making a contribution to the stability of what is, at the end of the day, their own region.
The African Union (AU) peacekeeping force in Somalia has failed and probably contributed to the piracy crisis. Would a Somali settlement demand a more robust peacekeeping force from the UN and would member states be willing to contribute forces in the light of the failure of Operation Restore Hope in the early 1990s?
Burton: The presence of UN forces at Somali ports could possibly cause a short‐term decrease in the level of piracy but would not address the root cause of the problem (the collapsed economy and the lack of any economic alternatives). The United Nations, despite active support from the United States, has so far failed to obtain a sufficient contribution of forces; and in the absence of a significant change in the situation on the ground, it is highly unlikely that nations will be persuaded to contribute. In the absence of an inclusive political settlement (one that incorporates the majority of actors, including the Shabaab), it is doubtful that a peacekeeping force would contribute to resolving Somalia’s crisis. The presence of foreign troops in Somalia is a lightning rod that has tended to feed the insurgency and fuel public anger against the TFG. There is no indication that a UN force would be better received by the local population.
Gascon: I think that the Somalis are fed up with this condition of permanent war and insecurity. The people have been exhausted by this situation. The warlords are making war on the people. A UN commitment is necessary. Piracy is just a manifestation of the greater internal illness created by the Somali chaos. If this illness is not destroyed, it will infect the whole of the Horn of Africa, including Yemen and probably Ethiopia. Both the UN and the African Union must share the responsibility for stabilizing Somalia and enforcing some sort of a peace settlement, as they are already doing in Darfur.
Middleton: I don’t think there is any realistic prospect of a UN force being deployed in Somalia. It is very difficult for peacekeeping forces to operate where there is no peace to keep. We would be sending forces into an impossible situation. Given the experience of the 1990s and the difficulties of the African Union mission, it is very difficult to envisage anyone going in.
Alderwick: I think you’ve hit the nail on the head. You are absolutely right that the AU forces have been pretty ineffective and if we see what has happened with the TFG and the effective proxy support it has been receiving from the Ethiopians, the idea of creating some wider political consensus within the respective clans in Somalia seems very unlikely at this stage. We need to try and build, either through the Djibouti peace process or other channels, a more inclusive political process that basically approaches the more moderate Islamic parties within Somalia. Somalis have a very effective clan‐based, chief‐based system that can actually deliver order.
Browyn Bruton is a Senior International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York and an expert on Somalia. Ms Bruton is currently a Visiting Fellow at the Africa Program of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington DC.
Dr Alain Gascon is Professor of Geopolitics specializing in the Horn of Africa at the Institut Francais de Geopolitique (AFG) of the Université Paris VIII.
Roger Middleton is Consultant Researcher with the Africa Program at the Royal Institute for International Affairs (RIIA) in London.
Jason Alderwick is a former officer of the British Royal Navy and currently the Maritime Security Fellow of the Defense Analysis Department at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London.