13 August 2008: Russia Profile
In the South Ossetian War, There Are No Winners
The latest Caucasus war has been brief but devastating. Destruction in South Ossetia has reached a scale not seen in Europe since the Balkan wars. Similarly to that conflict, an ethnic minority, mostly civilians, has fallen victim to inter-ethnic violence, reckless actions of a populist leader, the complete inability of the international community to intervene early in order to prevent the escalation of violence, and a media campaign that has nearly blurred the line between the truth and myths (or deliberate lies) about what has been happening and why. The consequences of this conflict will likewise be felt by generations.
As France’s President Nicolas Sarkozy tours Moscow and Tbilisi promoting his ceasefire plan, both Russia and Georgia have declared a victory. In reality, however, no side has emerged from the military phase of this conflict as a definite winner.
For Ossetians, this is the third time in post-Soviet history when the Georgian military indiscriminately targeted the civilian population in and around South Ossetia, and forced thousands of people to flee, most crossing the border to Russia. This time, their losses might be the highest in the entire history of Georgia’s attempts to force the Ossetians to accept their rule. Today, South Ossetia is left with little population, most of its infrastructure destroyed, and most of its people traumatised by Georgia’s attack. But one thing is clear--these people will never trust the government in Tbilisi, nor will they agree to live under Georgian control.
A different problem, however, is convincing people to return to their homes. It is clear that there could not be a South Ossetia without Ossetians. In this sense, Georgia’s actions during this conflict can be compared to an ethnic cleansing.
Russia’s military response to Georgia’s violence in South Ossetia has gone too far. Russia has failed to limit its intervention to a more legitimate aim of protecting the population and restoring security in South Ossetia. Instead, it went beyond what was necessary by targeting Georgian towns and regions far from South Ossetia, inflicting civilian casualties among many innocent Georgians and clearly violating Georgia’s sovereignty without any international mandate. Unsurprisingly, the Russian forces have inflicted a decisive military defeat on the Georgian army, but by doing so, they have consolidated strong international support for Georgia (only Cuba has recognized Russia’s actions beyond South Ossetia as legitimate) and provoked Russia's international isolation with many potential long-term consequences for its relations with the West and its neighbors.
But it is Georgia that has emerged as the biggest loser. President Mikheil Saakashvili has demonstrated his capacity to commit dangerous strategic blunders and actions which are not consistent with his declared Euro-Atlantic aspirations. His actions and the Russian response mean that he is unlikely to secure territorial integrity or achieve NATO membership in the foreseeable future. The economic consequences of the war might be too high for a small economy like Georgia’s, and internal political stability cannot be guaranteed as the real cost of war – human, political and economic – becomes apparent.
However, even Saakashvili has gained some points. On the one hand, he has acquired international support in the face of Russia’s extensive military offensive. On the other hand, he has transformed difficult bilateral relations with Russia into a new paradigm where the EU has been engaged as a mediator, thus internationalizing both the bilateral agenda and the format of the negotiations on the future of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Casualties on the diplomatic front
The Georgian-Russian military confrontation might be over, but the Georgian-Russian conflict is very far from having been resolved. In fact, it has been transformed into a new, much more complex “theater of operations”-- international diplomacy.
While in the military phase neither side has emerged as a clear winner, in the diplomatic end game there is much less room for ambiguity, since finding a political solution that balances the interests of all sides will be practically impossible. Moreover, while on the battlefield Russia had an overwhelming superiority and the Ossetians were the definite victims, on the diplomatic front Russia and Georgia hold almost equal stakes, with Georgia enjoying broad support both in the UN Security Council and among key Western allies.
Russia, on the other hand, will be undertaking this diplomatic struggle from the weaker position of “an occupier” – as seen by most Western powers and media – and a country that has a poor track-record of building and sustaining strong international coalitions in support of its policies. It was striking that while Ambassador Vitaly Churkin was on a diplomatic offensive during four consecutive meetings of the UN Security Council, Russia failed to secure support of any of the Council’s members. As an unrecognized entity, Russia’s key ally, South Ossetia, does not have a voice on the international arena. Russia’s policy-making process could be further complicated by the perceived divisions between the Kremlin and the White House as to the degree to which Russia should risk confrontation with the West over Georgia and its breakaway regions.
Finally, the OSCE – the key facilitator of the conflict resolution process in South Ossetia – remains deadlocked, divided, and increasingly supplanted in this role by the EU, which so far operates without a clear mandate. The U.S. role as a mediator will remain unclear until its elections are over.
In this complex environment, three issues have to be settled in the near future: implementing the ceasefire agreement and defining the terms for Russian military presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia; resolving the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; restoring essential relations between Georgia and Russia.
Who is to keep the peace now?
The ceasefire plan agreed between Dmitry Medvedev and Nicolas Sarkozy, later endorsed by Saakashvili, stipulates that Russia has to withdraw its troops to the positions they held prior to the start of the conflict. Although there are no specific timelines for this pullout, it is clear that at present, Russia has thousands of additional troops deployed both in Abkhazia and in South Ossetia. It is hard to envision a fast and full retreat. In the ceasefire agreement, there are no clear transitional provisions which could grant Russian forces within conflict zones any legal status.
At the same time, the Russian president also stated that Russian peacekeepers will continue to carry out their role in South Ossetia, in accordance with the 1992 agreements. This is complicated by the fact that peacekeeping forces in South Ossetia consisted of Russian, Georgian and North Ossetian units. If Russia excludes the Georgian unit, as was previously indicated, the status of other forces might be put into question. Georgia itself might choose to denounce Moscow agreements, as it has done in regard to the Joint Control Commission (JCC). In the absence of the Georgian component in the Joint Peace Keeping Forces, a new arrangement for guaranteeing security in Georgian villages within South Ossetia will have to be found.
Finally, Russia will now have to deal with the fact that for the first time, the EU has expressed interest in contributing to the peacekeeping force in South Ossetia, as stated by president Sarkozy. Until recently, Russia and South Ossetia have been firmly against the internationalization of the peacekeeping force. Now this internationalization could be hard to avoid. Yet there are many questions as to the way in which such a force could be structured, its mandate, and its relations with Russian peacekeeping forces. This is unlikely to be a joint EU-Russia operation. It remains unclear how many troops and how quickly the EU could deploy, and which mandate they are likely to receive within the EU itself. Here, unlike the OSCE, Russia will have no decision-making power on the issue.
It also remains uncertain whether Russia will continue to demand a legally binding no-use-of-force agreement between South Ossetia and Georgia. This requirement was first put forward by Russia as a precondition for a ceasefire, but later dropped. If such a provision is not in place, which other measures – a buffer zone, an extended zone of the conflict, demilitarization of adjacent areas – could be adopted as a credible guarantee against any future attempts by Georgia to implement a military solution in South Ossetia?
Finally, the most painful issue for Russia and South Ossetia has been Georgia’s demand to install an international observer mission near the Roki tunnel, recently backed by the United States. Russia’s commitment to withdraw troops will require monitoring, and the issue of Roki will be put back on the agenda.
A new status or a status quo?
Many observers take it for granted that the recent Georgian onslaught on South Ossetia has closed all doors to negotiations on either South Ossetia or Abkhazia going de facto under Georgia’s jurisdiction. While this is undoubtedly true in terms of attitudes among the populations of these de facto states, the prospects for international recognition of their independence remain as remote as they were before the war.
The problem is that these issues are decided on the basis of real politic rather than international law. While the war has strengthened the legal case of South Ossetians’ ethnic minority rights violations and attempted ethnic cleansing, the political case in support of Georgia’s territorial integrity among key UN SC members and all European states remains unchanged. Russia’s arguments regarding genocide against the Ossetian people have not been met with support at the UN. Now, the only place where individual cases could be considered is the International Criminal Court. Yet these decisions are likely only to award compensation, but not to create a basis for secession as was often implied by the recent statements from the Russian government.
In the past, an armed conflict involving an ethnic province – like in the case of East Timur or Kosovo – was used to create momentum for legalizing secession or prompting recognition. In the case of South Ossetia, any similar momentum has been overshadowed by the inability of the UN SC to pass a resolution condemning Georgia’s attack, and later by Russia’s own intervention against Georgia, which shifted the international focus away from the Georgian-South Ossetian dispute toward the Russian-Georgian conflict.
For Russia, the policy choices regarding the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia remain unchanged – reverting to the pre-war status quo (developing links with de facto authorities), proceeding with unilateral recognition, or helping to broker agreement between Georgia and South Ossetia on a mutually acceptable status. The war has made the agreement practically impossible to achieve in the foreseeable future. Unilateral recognition is more likely today, given widespread outrage in Russia over Georgia’s offensive against the South Ossetian population, and in line with Russia’s assertive policies. However, this recognition will not change the situation dramatically for South Ossetia or Abkhazia, as no other recognitions are likely to follow in the near future, while Russia’s position could lead to more international isolation.
Therefore, a more likely scenario will be the restoration of the status quo in terms of Russia’s closer ties with South Ossetia, its economic support and security guarantees. The only difference is that Russia’s engagement in the region will be supplemented by a more active EU role, with reconstruction money already pledged by many European nations.
Learning to get along
For a number of years bilateral relations between Georgia and Russia stopped meeting the criteria or normal relations between two neighbors. Recently, they were teetering on the brink of a “Cold War.” In the past few days, this has culminated in a full-blown confrontation. Moreover, Georgia and the United States have accused Russia of attempting to change leadership in Georgia, while the Russian foreign minister has stated that president Saakashvili has lost Russia’s trust, and from now on Russia will not be speaking to him directly. Saakashvili has responded with strong personal comments about Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and declared his intent to leave the CIS.
The fundamental issue in these bilateral relations, however, is not only that the top leaders do not speak to each other: there are practically no working relations across any other formal diplomatic channel. Creating such a channel is an urgent task for the next several weeks or months, as Georgia and Russia need to find a way to begin implementing ceasefire agreements and later work on resolving other fundamental military and political issues.
It is both impractical and dangerous to expect the international community to carry out continuous mediation between the two sides. For Georgia, such internationalization is a clear asset, as it is more likely to gain support from the international community on both military and status issues. Russia, in turn, needs to work with Georgia on a whole set of issues – from business interests to WTO – where bilateral mechanisms are important.
At present, there is no clear vehicle for bilateral dialogue. The right format should be to appoint high-level envoys on both sides, which carry political weight and are able to tackle complex negotiations with the authority of their respective leaderships behind them.
In addition to envoys, joint commissions should be created to promote stabilization in the conflict zone in and around South Ossetia, which could operate in the absence of a joint peacekeeping force. Their task should be to oversee demilitarization, crime, and other issues requiring joint action – such as freedom of movement along the TRANSKAM road, water supply and reconstruction work. It might be useful to return to the idea of establishing a Joint Coordination Centre proposed by OSCE a few years ago, involving regular meetings of law enforcement officials from Georgia, Russia and South Ossetia.
Oksana Antonenko is a Senior Fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
