What has been obvious for some time now became establishment orthodoxy on September 12. That was when one of the world's most prestigious international security think-tanks, the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, released its annual "Strategic Survey", a review of world affairs.
It found that during 2007, the US suffered a loss of international authority as a result of the failure to impose order in Iraq. Leadersand groups around the world sought to take advantage or to protect themselves from the consequences of this loss of prestige.
This was, despite the efforts of the George W Bush administration to present a new, friendlier face to the world, "far removed from the naked assertion of American power that had been urged on the president by hardline neo-conservatives following the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States".
However, restoring US credibility will not be easy. The report found that "the damage to American standing and credibility [is] likely to take years to repair - especially as problems such as Iraq's persistent violence and the Guantanamo Bay detention camp [cannot] just be wished away".
For those old enough to remember, the report echoes the condition of the United States during the Vietnam War, when president Richard Nixon warned of the US becoming a "pitiful, helpless giant".
For a country that has staked its geopolitical prestige on fighting a "global war on terrorism" or, more narrowly, defeating al-Qaeda, the news was glum. "The threat from Islamist terrorism remains as high as ever, and looks set to get worse," according to the report. A resilient al-Qaeda can still plan and carry out "spectacular" attacks in Western countries even if it is harder to stage one on the scale of September 11.
Specifically, there is increasing evidence that "core" al-Qaeda is proving adaptable and resilient and has retained ability to plan and coordinate large-scale attacks in the Western world despite the attrition it has suffered. Second, a number of regional jihadist groups, notably al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia and Qaeda in the Maghreb, have not only formally sworn formal allegiance to al-Qaeda but, more important, have begun to demonstrate ambition beyond their parochial concerns in support of al-Qaeda's global objectives.
Third, the large number of terrorist plots that have come to light in Europe, Canada, the Arabian Peninsula and the Maghreb region of North Africa point to a growing trend toward radicalization within the Islamic world.
In short, "The United States and its allies have failed to deal a death blow to al-Qaeda; the organization's ideology appears to have taken root to such a degree that it will require decades to eradicate." Or, as the report states, "The restoration of American strategic authority [seems] bound to take much longer than the mere installation of a new president."
As for Iraq and the surrounding countries, the report found that this has been a year of "unmitigated gloom in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region". There appear to be no strategies in place that can bring peace. Iraq remains trapped in a complex web of violence, with Washington apparently powerless to engineer a political settlement.
The risk of regionwide sectarian conflict seems to have risen, said the report. After conflict in Lebanon in mid-2006, the US made new diplomatic efforts toward Middle East peace, but gained little traction - and this June, Hamas seized control of Gaza.
In light of the recent congressional testimony by the US military commander in Iraq, General David Petraeus, and Ambassador Ryan Crocker on how the "troop surge" is working, the survey made the point that much of the presumed success was due to circumstances that the US had nothing to do with.
The survey found there was strong evidence to indicate that the initial decline in violence was largely due to a tactical decision by Muqtada al-Sadr's militia. Muqtada himself fled to Iran for the first five months of the "surge". His Mahdi Army took its forces off the streets, reducing its operations to avoid confrontations with the US military.
The tactical decisions to withdraw forces from US-dominated areas meant there was no mass disarmament of those responsible for the previous upsurge in killings. (Instead, the Mahdi Army chose not to fight the Americans and merged back into its host community, retaining the majority of its weapons and its coercive capacity.)
In regard to the eastern part of Asia, the economic rise of China and India dominated developments. While trade and investment ties between China and the US became ever closer, the relationship was characterized simultaneously by closer engagement and verbal fencing.
Although relations between Japan and China thawed, the conflict in Afghanistan showed signs of spreading into previously peaceful areas, and Pakistan faced multiple problems, including growing disaffection with the government of President General Pervez Musharraf. Sri Lanka's conflict worsened, while in Bangladesh the prospects for democracy were uncertain after the military acted to stem electoral chaos. The outlook for restoration of democracy in Thailand was unclear after last year's military coup.
And if the outlook for the present is glum, the future is worse. The report concluded:
The world in 2008 will be doubly consumed by the politics of parochialism - sectarian rivalries and religious disputes - and by the maneuvers of balance-of-power politics - alliance politics and arms races ... In Europe, the United States and Asia, big powers will talk to each other about role, status, alliance, deterrence, containment, and balance of power. In the meantime, groups around the world will fight those states and alliances ...
In this "non-polar world", the space for aggressive non-state actors to advance their particularist strategic aims has grown. In 2008, managing nuclear proliferation and terrorism will remain the priorities.
But the unsettled relations, rivalries and shifting strengths of the powers that see themselves as custodians of the state system will make the necessary coordination of approaches to these threats immensely hard.
David Isenberg is a senior analyst with the British American Security Information Council. He is also a member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, an adjunct scholar with the Cato Institute, contributor to the Straus Military Reform Project, a research fellow at the Independent Institute, and a US Navy veteran. The views expressed are his own. 
