Incredible though it may sound, the exultant cry of “Rule Britannia, rule the waves” of the last century seems to have turned into the possibility of self-rule without troops in 21st-century Britain. Or else, how does one interpret the comment of Sir Francis Richard Dannatt,the head of the British army, that his force has run out of troops and that reinforcements for operations in Iraq or Afghanistan are now almost non-existent?
Dannatt’s dilemma is understandable, given the fact that most of the units of the British army are either training for wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, or on leave, or busy in operations. This has led Dannatt to confess that the army has almost no capability now to react to the “unexpected”. The word, “unexpected”, obviously points to the sudden mobilization of troops in an extreme case of terrorism at the heart of Britain, like the one in 2005 or the recent attempt to blow up the Glasgow airport.
One does not have to take Dannatt’s words for granted to feel alarmed. If we were to turn the pages of the directory of international military reports, we will be surprised to find that the number and strength of the British armed forces are no longer at par with what they were ten years ago. It appears that the army, which has long been considered as one of chief strengths of the United Kingdom, is on the verge of decline now.
Thus, in 10 years, the strength of the British army has gone down from 1,12,000 in 1997 to 1,04,980 in 2007. The number of army reserves too dropped from 2,46,900 to 1,34,180, while that of the Royal Navy fell from 44,900 to 40,120. The Royal Air Force also went down from 56,700 to 45,210 in the last ten years.
Going down
Since UK is a developed nation, one might think that the reduction in the number of men in its army is the natural consequence of scientific advancement, which works towards replacing manpower with military technology. However, a careful scrutiny of the military balance of the last ten years (published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London) reveals that even in combat hardware the decline in numbers is quite sharp.
The plight of the British army is possibly due to the deployment of about 3,500 troops in Iraq and of about 1,000 territorial army soldiers in overseas operations. To make matters worse, there is now a shortage of vehicles and the old equipments are suspected to be nearing the end of their utility period.
In short, therefore, the British army seems to be going through a phase of unanticipated turbulence, having overstretched the supply of its men in the battlefield. Moreover, it has been crippled by the lack of material and by the absence of trained men who operate machines.
One of the most critical roles in Afghanistan and Iraq in the global war on terrorism is being played by the parachute regiments, which perform from behind the lines. But, in this area too, the British general has reasons to feel dejected by the shortage of manpower, equipment and stocks. Also, no Royal Air Force planes are apparently available to drop the parachutes en masse.
The moral of the story is simple. Britain is at war. But owing to ‘unforeseen’ factors and ‘miscalculating’ actors, the Royal Army is unable to perform as desired. This is not an optimistic sign for the ongoing war against terror. Is it a prelude to a British withdrawal from Kabul and Baghdad? If so, this is bad news for Washington DC. The continued engagement of the British troops in the land of ‘no return’ and in an enterprise of ‘fatal result’ is surely proving to be dangerous.
