For instance, even the dossier on the matter written and released recently by the International Institute for Strategic Studies based in London has credited the National Command Authority and the Strategic Plans Division with ensuring institutionalised custody of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. With such a mechanism in place, there is little possibility that non-state actors or other international terrorist groups could ever muster sufficient strength to gain access to the country's nuclear weapons or technology.
By M K Khan
This is with reference to the extract from a much-talked-about book on Pakistan's nuclear assets, Deception: Pakistan, the United States and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons, by British journalists Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, which was recently published on the front page on this newspaper. The fact of the matter is that the book contains hardly anything that hasn't been written about before.
The issues raised with regards to Pakistan's role in sponsoring terrorism, Dr A Q Khan's role in the international nuclear black market and the role of other former scientists and senior military officials in nuclear proliferation have remained under debate for many years in international media. The stories revealed in the book relate to the development of Pakistan's nuclear weapons during the 1980s and the position on this subject taken by Pakistan, especially during President Zia's regime. The information contained in this book has been repeatedly produced in other documents as well and hence there is nothing really new that could or should attract serious attention.
Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, the co-authors of this book, seem quite prejudiced in their approach, since the impression that one gets from reading the book is that they are trying to achieve some fame by raising an old issue at a time when Pakistan's domestic political/ security situation is under significant pressure. Their opinion and critique on the safety and security aspects of Pakistan's nuclear weapons is totally unfounded and seem at odds with reality. It would not be incorrect to point out that the line taken in the book is one drawn by many American think-tanks, much of the mainstream US media and also by the US intelligence community, as well as members of Congress. All these entities keep reinforcing each other's opinion on Pakistan, and which is that the country is the most dangerous in the world, particularly since it is in possession of nuclear weapons. The ultimate objective of this book might be to reinforce US perceptions and put more pressure on Pakistan for direct access to Dr A Q Khan, which would tie in with a long-standing demand of the US government. The selection of the timing for launching the book is also very critical, as it is likely to magnetise the attention of international community, not because of the essence of the book but because of Pakistan's current political and security situation.
As far as direct access to A Q Khan is concerned, Pakistan's position has been absolutely clear on this. The matter is sensitive for the Pakistani government on many valid counts: for example, with regard to sovereignty, safeguarding national secrets of its nuclear programme, domestic political sensitivities and the fact that the request implies a lack of trust in Pakistan's own ability to investigate the matter. Pakistan has acted responsibly and has shared all relevant information with the nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other stakeholders. Based on shared interests, Pakistan is likely to continue to cooperate with relevant stakeholders in the future as well.
With regards to safety and security aspects of Pakistan's nuclear weapons, the authors' assertions that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal are insecure and increasingly vulnerable to terrorists' threats are primarily based on reports prepared by Washington-based think-tanks such as the Centre for American Progress and the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, both of which have concluded that Pakistan poses today's greatest nuclear threat to the world. The authors of this book have failed to authenticate this report, as they did not take into account the steps that Pakistan undertook since 1998 to emplace an effective command-and-control structure to manage its nuclear weapons. Although the measures undertaken by Islamabad in this regard have been acknowledged by several governments, including those of America, France, Japan and China, this has been ignored in the book.
For instance, even the dossier on the matter written and released recently by the International Institute for Strategic Studies based in London has credited the National Command Authority and the Strategic Plans Division with ensuring institutionalised custody of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. With such a mechanism in place, there is little possibility that non-state actors or other international terrorist groups could ever muster sufficient strength to gain access to the country's nuclear weapons or technology. Those who look at the development of Islamabad's nuclear programme would do well to remember that the need for having a minimum nuclear deterrence emanates from India, and hence is hardly something on which there can be compromise. However, ensuring a minimum credible deterrence should not mean that the technology is going to end up in the wrong hands by way of an illegal transfer to a third party. The assumption in the book that, since Pakistan produces nuclear-related technology beyond that needed for its domestic nuclear programme, this technology may end up in another country is incorrect, for the simple reason that the authors are hardly in possession of information that would allow them to ascertain this conclusively. In any case, in line with policy statements on the matter, it is likely that Pakistan's indulgence in any dual-use technology trade in the foreseeable future will only happen, if at all, under a stringent export-control regime, which has been in place since 2004.
The writer is a freelance columnist who has an interest in defence and security issues
