This is the fifth installment of part five of our series focusing on threats from North Korea facing Japan and future tasks for the nation's security policy.
More than 10 Maritime Self-Defense Force personnel armed with guns quickly searched the ship cabin. They questioned the captain and had crew members line up on the deck for body searches. Before too long, a radio call came from the stern: "Suspicious material found."
This scene took place during the Proliferation Security Initiative maritime interdiction exercise conducted Oct. 13-15 in the sea around Izu Oshima, at Yokosuka Port and elsewhere. Hosted by the Japanese government, the exercise also involved the United States, Britain, Australia and four other countries.
The exercise involved searches for suspicious vessels, boarding and interdiction to prevent transport of nuclear weapons-related materials.
Put forward by U.S. President George W. Bush in May 2003, the PSI regime was established as a "coalition of the willing" to halt the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction. The number of participating countries has since increased from the initial 11 to 84. "It's a great success," a U.S. government official said proudly.
But a look at the lineup of PSI participants shows that it does not include littoral countries along sea lanes linking East Asia with the Middle East, such as China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia and South Korea. This is one weak point of the PSI as a coalition of the willing.
The factor driving nonparticipation by China and South Korea is North Korea. The two countries are afraid that participation would antagonize Pyongyang, given that the North Korean nuclear issue is under discussion in the six-party talks, which also involve Japan, the United States and Russia. The negotiations on abandonment of nuclear weapons by North Korea are ironically hampering the wider international efforts to promote nonproliferation.
For this reason, PSI maritime interdiction can only cover part of the black market in WMD.
According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, there were 252 reported cases of smuggling and illegal possession of nuclear-related materials over the two years from 2005. The number of cases in which suspected materials were halted totaled about 20 over the year from April 2005, according to a senior U.S. government official.
Wade Boese, research director of the U.S. Arms Control Association, says it is difficult to interdict North Korea's nuclear-related materials and missiles if they are shipped after being disassembled without the participation of China and South Korea in the PSI.
Japan, which supports the U.S.-led PSI, has many problems to overcome.
The MSDF played a major role in the October PSI exercise. But under the current law the MSDF is allowed to conduct interdiction only in cases of emergency in which orders for defensive mobilization and seaborne policing action are issued.
Moreover, even if nuclear-related materials or chemical substances are seized by means of interdiction, there is no law in Japan to deal with the seized materials.
"If Japan really wants to prevent North Korea's nuclear proliferation, Japan must expedite efforts to introduce PSI-related legislative arrangements," said Katsuhisa Furukawa, an expert on PSI and a senior fellow of the Research Institute of Science and Technology for Society at the Japan Science and Technology Agency.
How should the PSI be bolstered in the future?
Mark Fitzpatrick, director of the Nonproliferation Bureau of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, proposes enhancing the status of the PSI from the U.S.-led "coalition of the willing" to an international organization with its own secretariat. Fitzpatrick was involved in developing the PSI as U.S. acting deputy assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation.
If the PSI is formalized as an international organization with more participants than today, interdiction and information exchange will become more effective, Fitzpatrick says.
Moreover, if member countries ratify an amendment in October 2005 to the international Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, it will contribute to tightening inspection of maritime traffic.
If North Korea again turns its back on negotiations, then the PSI will need to show it can play its role, Fitzpatrick said in predicting the future role of the PSI.
