THE International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) will bring together 26 government delegations for the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore from tomorrow to Sunday. The delegations will be led by defence ministers and other senior officials from the Asia-Pacific region and the wider security community.
But there might be an uninvited guest with a huge presence - an 800-pound gorilla known as Network Centric Warfare or NCW.
By Tom Quiggin, For The Straits Times
THE International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) will bring together 26 government delegations for the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore from tomorrow to Sunday. The delegations will be led by defence ministers and other senior officials from the Asia-Pacific region and the wider security community.
But there might be an uninvited guest with a huge presence - an 800-pound gorilla known as Network Centric Warfare or NCW.
NCW is the current central driver behind America's military 'transformation' and that of many other states. It shapes not only how militaries operate but, just as importantly, who and what they are operating with.
However, while the concept offers the possibility of true integration between multinational military formations, it remains in the early stages of operational and doctrinal development.
Right now, only the United States has the capacity to sustain any military activity on a global scale. Other states that take part in any US-led coalitions must be prepared to work in an 'interoperable' fashion.
This means that states must be able to spend heavily on technology, even to just operate in a specialist or niche mode within a US-led coalition. Military systems that cannot be networked or share information with others are not useful. Thus, many states are no longer considering military acquisition programmes that do not meet this requirement.
But is there something else going on behind this grand concept? Dr Paul Mitchell, a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at the Nanyang Technological University, has some serious concerns.
His publication*, Network Centric Warfare: Coalition Operations In The Age Of US Military Primacy, should be read as a warning by South-east Asian nations and others considering working within coalition operations.
Today's partner, tomorrow's enemy
DR MITCHELL points out the clear advantages of NCW. The speed, precision and reach of networked militaries make them difficult to counter on the conventional battle field. However, there are problems, especially in coalition operations. The information that makes NCW so deadly must be protected from damage and disclosure. It is also clear the contemporary nature of coalition operations means that today's willing partner may be tomorrow's observer.
Or worse yet, today's partner could be tomorrow's enemy. Under these circumstances, the release of information to coalition partners is not only an immediate operational concern; it is a long -term strategic matter.
As such, there is a triangular problem with NCW, he says. The NCW concept of warfare aims for perfectly efficient military operations based on both 'push' and 'pull' systems of information. The price of this is an operational environment based on trust, which will permit a free flow of information and allow creative applications of that information.
Coalition strategies, however, seek to increase political legitimacy and military resources. The price here is often the political compromise over the plans of coalition strategies. And lastly, information security seeks to guard national security. The price for that is tight control. The three factors work against each other, and security of information will no doubt trump the other two factors.
Dr Mitchell uses the Persian Gulf naval operations of 2002 and 2003 as an example. He says NCW-type operations worked well enough in the naval environment where the major partners (the US, Australia, Canada) had an existing relationship of trust. But he notes it was the 'human in the loop' that often made the systems work.
The circumstances that led to success in the Gulf are not likely to exist in other theatres of operations. Afghanistan and Iraq come to mind and the long-term nature of the ongoing operations there raises questions as well.
Overall, the book concludes that the US is seeking allies with the requisite technological capabilities and those it can trust with its information resources. Thus, the US may be heading into a secure, but rather lonely, digital corner. It may well find itself without help in future operations, or accompanied by 'allies' which cannot be part of the NCW concept because political considerations outweigh operational imperatives.
The writer is Adjunct Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU.
*Network Centric Warfare: Coalition Operations In An Age Of US Military Primacy, by Paul Mitchell, Adelphi Paper 385, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, UK, 2006.
