Pakistan might still be involved in "illicit trading and smuggling" to procure equipment from black markets to run its nuclear programme, claimed editors of a dossier on the Dr AQ Khan network here on Wednesday.
They warned that "Khan's associates appeared to have escaped law enforcement attention and could, after a period of lying low, resume their black market business". These British editors have also said that many questions still remained "unanswered" despite their research paper spreading over 170 pages.
By Rauf Klasra
LONDON: Pakistan might still be involved in "illicit trading and smuggling" to procure equipment from black markets to run its nuclear programme, claimed editors of a dossier on the Dr AQ Khan network here on Wednesday.
They warned that "Khan's associates appeared to have escaped law enforcement attention and could, after a period of lying low, resume their black market business". These British editors have also said that many questions still remained "unanswered" despite their research paper spreading over 170 pages.
Earlier, Mark Fitzpatrick and his research assistant Ben Rhode replied to media questions after the dossier on the Dr AQ Khan network, ‘Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, AQ Khan and the rise of proliferation networks — A net assessment’, was launched by the DG International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) Dr John Chipman.
When asked by a Pakistani journalist to what extent the support to other countries might have affected Pakistan's own nuclear programme, Fitzpatrick replied that it was true that Pakistan still needed the required support to maintain its present nuclear programme. But, he said, Pakistan was facing serious restrictions at the international level and might be involved in "illicit trade" of the equipment.
When journalists asked whether he meant Pakistan was meeting its requirement through the "smuggling" of such items, he simply agreed. Earlier, a press release issued by the IISS read out by Dr Chipman said the main questions still remained unanswered despite this research paper.
He said how much help Khan gave to Iran and North Korea and whether the Khan network had other customers are questions of intense interest to investigative agencies. Likewise, he said, what happened with the rest of the nuclear equipment the Khan network had but did not send to Libya is another major question remaining to be answered after the network was broken up, along with what other countries or non-state actors may also have received copies of a nuclear weapon design besides Libya.
He said the bomb designs were apparently digitalised and copied onto computer disks at one of Khan's offices in Dubai. One of the Swiss members of the network admitted to having atomic bomb construction plans in his own office. Swiss and American authorities, as well as the IAEA, have been trying to discover what other use may have been made of these bomb designs, including the alarming scenario of whether any copies were sold to terrorist groups.
Dr Chipman said, "Our new dossier retains the proliferation focus, analytical rigour and methodology of these previous publications, but differs in important ways. Most significantly, the focus of this study is not one country, but the global problem of proliferation networks and nuclear black markets.
In this dossier, the term 'nuclear black market' denotes the trade in nuclear-related expertise, technologies, components or material that is being pursued for non-peaceful purposes and most often by covert or secretive means. Often the trade is not explicitly illegal, but exploits loopholes in national export regulations. 'Black', in this case, often means shades of grey."
On the issue of Pakistan nuclear programme and AQ Khan, he said Pakistan's motivation to acquire nuclear weapons was sparked in large part by competition with India. Although the seeds of Pakistan's weapons programme can be traced back to the early 1960s, the major boost came in December 1971 after Pakistan's traumatic defeat by India. Embitterment over the loss of East Pakistan also provided a psychological motivation to Dr AQ Khan to offer his services to his home country by stealing enrichment technology from his workplace in the Netherlands. With that boost, it took Pakistan only ten years to reach the point where it could produce a nuclear weapon, despite the withdrawal of nuclear assistance from Western countries.
He said Pakistan has not been the only country to engage the private sector in nuclear technology to further a military programme. Others include Iraq, Iran, North Korea and, to a lesser degree, India. These countries have all relied on similar methods of black market procurement, including systematically using the country's foreign embassies, paying a premium over the market price, using multiple connections and buyers to search for a given item, using front companies, falsifying end users, and altering product specifications so they would appear to operate below the international guidelines. Iraq, Pakistan and Iran all made extensive use of free ports, some of which have since tightened controls, while others still have a long way to go.
On the issue of AQ Khan's onward proliferation activities, he said from the outset, Pakistani governments gave Khan a remarkable degree of authority and autonomy owing to his sensitive work. Concerns about foreign intelligence operations targeting Pakistan's nuclear programme, and the increased secrecy and compartmentalisation that resulted, allowed Khan to operate more independently. An unhealthy rivalry with other Pakistani nuclear organisations contributed to even greater secrecy and shady business practices. Unquestioned, Khan began to order many more components than Pakistan's own enrichment programme required.
The dossier said Khan's contacts with Iran date from the mid-1980s and extended into the following decade. Khan probably had some signal, if not explicit permission, from his superiors for nuclear cooperation with Iran. However, no evidence has yet emerged that a clear directive was ever given to Khan to provide nuclear technology to Iran. Khan provided Iran with centrifuges, technical designs, components and an "address book" of suppliers. Some details concerning exactly what Iran received are still uncertain. What is clear is that Khan's sales helped Iran to make significant advances in its clandestine nuclear programme.
In a written confession in 2004, Khan admitted to supplying North Korea with about two dozen centrifuge machines together with sets of drawings, sketches, technical data and depleted uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas. These items were probably transported to North Korea in unmarked containers on chartered Pakistani air force flights. This small number of centrifuges would have been insufficient to produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear bomb. Along with the centrifuge designs Khan provided, however, they gave North Korea a template on which to base their own centrifuge production plans.
Successive Pakistani governments have insisted that their country's ballistic missile cooperation with North Korea was based on a cash payment, and that there was no official nuclear-for-missile technology exchange. Khan may have acted largely on his own volition, for his own profit. The broad cooperation between Pyongyang and Islamabad, however, is significant reason to suspect state complicity, at least in terms of having knowledge of and thereby implicitly condoning the centrifuge deal.
The dossier said Khan cannot be characterised strictly as either a government representative or a businessman acting independently. He was in fact both, in varying degrees according to the circumstances. Pakistan's complicity in his proliferation ranged along a spectrum. At one end, his procurement for Pakistan's nuclear programme was state authorised, supported and funded, although he had great autonomy in making his own purchases.
It said light sentences meted out to nuclear scientists who met Osama bin Laden reflect a disturbing pattern reminiscent of the secrecy with which Khan was dealt. The understandable need to protect national security secrets conflicts with the government's desire to dispel hints of lingering corruption in the nuclear programme, notwithstanding the multi-layered internal security system that Pakistan has implemented since Khan's heyday.
International conclusions about whether the Khan case is truly closed will depend on the world seeing a sustained record of responsible nuclear stewardship that lasts for successive administrations in Islamabad.
The IISS director general concluded that past Pakistani government knowledge of and even involvement in AQ Khan's secondary proliferation activities remains open to debate. The connection between Khan and the Pakistani government does not lend itself to easy delineation.
Today, Iran remains the most active customer in the international nuclear black market and it has built a network equivalent to, if not larger than, Khan's. Iran has sought dual-use goods from some of the same people and firms previously linked to Khan, but has also turned to new technology brokers. Although supplier countries have heightened their vigilance, Iran still tries to evade export controls by repeatedly changing front companies and financing arrangements.
Today's black market suppliers are far less integrated than Khan's 'one-stop shopping'. His enterprise was unique in its ability to provide nearly the entire array of materials and services needed to produce highly enriched uranium. The supply side of the post-Khan market is comprised of individuals selling selected dual-use goods. It is the demand side, most prominently in Iran, that is centralised.
