The dossier “Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, AQ Khan and the rise of proliferation networks” with a big picture of Dr Khan on its title page, will be distributed among the international media. All the media men based in London have been invited by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS).
Researched and documented by the widely respected British think tank, the IISS, and priced at 20 pounds sterling (Rs 2,200) the dossier is presumed to contain a lot of evidence to establish the “crimes” of Dr Khan and his “collaborators” within the Pakistani establishment. This is expected to be an authentic document against the juicy and mostly unconfirmed stories about Dr AQ Khan and his nuclear network published by the Western media in the past.
By Rauf Klasra
LONDON: After hectic diplomatic efforts the Pakistan government has been able to procure a copy of a dossier on the 30-year secret activities of Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan and the covert links of his network with Iran, Libya and Korea.
This was done by the government to avoid being caught “off guard” and facing embarrassment of coming to know of the details only through the international media after the dossier is launched and distributed today (Wednesday).
The dossier “Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, AQ Khan and the rise of proliferation networks” with a big picture of Dr Khan on its title page, will be distributed among the international media. All the media men based in London have been invited by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS).
Researched and documented by the widely respected British think tank, the IISS, and priced at 20 pounds sterling (Rs 2,200) the dossier is presumed to contain a lot of evidence to establish the “crimes” of Dr Khan and his “collaborators” within the Pakistani establishment. This is expected to be an authentic document against the juicy and mostly unconfirmed stories about Dr AQ Khan and his nuclear network published by the Western media in the past.
The Pakistani Foreign Office in Islamabad has formally got the copy of the dossier from IISS - London and the country’s top military and diplomatic officials are minutely reading its contents. Observers apprehend that after the distribution of the dossier Pakistan might again be in the eye of the storm.
In Islamabad, FO spokesperson Tasnim Aslam might be assigned the job to reply to many of the points raised in the dossier for the face-saving of the country and its nuclear scientists.
Sources say that the dossier will give new details about the international gangs running nuclear black markets and Pakistan will not be the only target. The sources believed that Pakistan could at least have a big consolation from the fact that the dossier would expose some other important countries and groups at international level believed to be active in selling nuclear weapons and secrets to different countries around the globe.
Meanwhile, ahead of the launching of the dossier, the British think tank has said that the arrest and public confession of Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan in 2004 had confirmed the existence of a global proliferation network that had, over almost two decades, provided nuclear technology, expertise, and designs to Iran, North Korea, Libya and possibly some other countries.
The dossier is expected to establish that Dr AQ Khan was not the only nuclear arms merchant and Pakistan was not the only country implicated in the shady network. It spanned three continents and eluded both national and international systems of export controls that had been designed to prevent illicit trade. The discovery of the network highlighted concerns that nuclear technology is no longer the monopoly of industrially advanced countries, but possibly can be purchased off-the-shelf by both states and terrorist groups.
The IISS Strategic Dossier on nuclear black markets provides a comprehensive assessment of the Pakistani nuclear programme from which the Khan network emerged, the network’s proliferation activities, and the illicit trade in fissile materials. In addition, the dossier provides an overview of the clandestine nuclear procurement activities of other states, along with the efforts made both by Pakistan and the international community to prevent the reoccurrence of further proliferation networks and to secure nuclear technology. The final chapter assesses policy options for further action.
