Nuclear scientist Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan during investigations at his house had revealed to former DG ISI Lt-Gen Ehsan Ul Haq that “every Army chief since Gen Ziaul Haq knew of his activities”.
Dr AQ Khan had also threatened to reveal national secrets and expose all those involved if he was indicted, revealed a dossier issued on the Dr AQ Khan network by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) launched here Wednesday.
By our correspondent
LONDON: Nuclear scientist Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan during investigations at his house had revealed to former DG ISI Lt-Gen Ehsan Ul Haq that “every Army chief since Gen Ziaul Haq knew of his activities”.
Dr AQ Khan had also threatened to reveal national secrets and expose all those involved if he was indicted, revealed a dossier issued on the Dr AQ Khan network by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) launched here Wednesday.
It said when the ISI started investigations into the nuclear scams after the Americans handed over solid evidence to President Musharraf during his Camp David visit in 2003, even two former Army chiefs, Gen Aslam Beg and Gen Jahangir Karamat, were also questioned.
The dossier in one of its conclusions claimed: “Khan probably had some signal, if not explicit permission, from his ‘superiors’ for nuclear cooperation with Iran”. It has been claimed that at one stage even the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) was given the task to investigate Dr AQ Khan, but the idea was dropped that it might expose foreign parties, and may also “implicate” past or current governments and military officials. So, no action was taken.
The dossier, “Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, AQ Khan and the rise of proliferation — A net assessment”, was launched in a formal ceremony that was attended by the international media. The copies of it were distributed among the journalists.
The dossier revealed that the issue of Dr Khan network was raised at June 2003 Pak-US summit at Camp David. But it was taken off the agenda because of the concerns that doing this in a bilateral context might disrupt secret UK-US disarmament negotiations with Libya.
However, in New York on September 24, 2003, the then CIA Director, George Tenet, had revealed to Musharraf the evidence of Dr Khan’s illicit dealing, including the transfer of P-1 centrifuge technology to Iran, while on October 6 deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage again met Musharraf in Islamabad and repeated the necessity for immediate action against Khan, reportedly presenting “mind boggling” evidence.
The dossier said Musharraf ordered heads of the military’s Strategic Plan Division (SPD) and ISI to investigate the new American evidence against Khan. Immediately, after the September 11, DG ISI Lt-Gen Ehsan Ul Haq had overseen the removal of pro-Taliban officers from the organisation.
The ISI, which previously had been tasked to protect Khan’s procurement network, now became the eyes and ears of SPD. When the heads of ISI and SPD met AQ Khan at his house, they confronted him with allegations based on US revelations and their own internal investigations.
Khan protested that he was being “insulted” and at first denied every allegation made against him. When they pressed, he is reported to have said “every Army chief since Gen Zia knew of his activities and that if indicted, he would reveal every national secret and expose all those involved”.
The ISI also intercepted two letters Khan had tried to send secretly to Iran, asking Tehran not to reveal anything new to IAEA. With typical hubris, Khan wrote of the future proliferation activities, claiming he would soon be back in business after the current crises subsided.
In December 2003, investigators detained two directors at KRL, Mohammad Farooq and Yasin Chauhan. This was followed by the detention of Maj Islamul Haq, a former personal assistant to AQ Khan; Brig Iqbal Tajwar, former head of security at KRL, DR Nazir Ahmed, Saeed Ahmed, head of centrifuge design at KRL, and Brig (Retd) Sajawal Khan Malik, KRL security director.
Businessman Aziz Jaffrey, stated to be chief financial manager of the network, was brought in for questioning over suspicions about trips he had made to Dubai and Iran in the aftermath of Khan’s arrest. Also detained were Ahmed Naseemuddin, head of missile manufacturing at KRL.
Several of those captured were kept in solitary confinement in what they claimed were small, sweltering rooms. In all, at least 26 individuals including three KRL directors general and two retired Brigadiers were interrogated.
The questioning went beyond KRL and included two PAEC draughtsmen, who had drawn up sensitive nuclear blueprints. The investigations even led to questioning being posed to former Pakistan army chiefs Baig and Karmat.
However, less than half of those detained were formally arrested and with the exception of Farooq, most of them jailed were released by July 2004. The dossier pointed out that details of the investigations, the charges and laws under which Khan associates were detained, the grounds for their release, and the identities of those who were put under a form of continued “house arrest” have not been made public. None were prosecuted as far as it is known.
While the investigations were at peak, Libya made a shocking acknowledgement and renunciation of its nuclear weapons programmes, the details of which deeply involved Pakistan. The dossier said after Musharraf took over power, the government had set up the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) to recover the plundered national wealth. The Musharraf government also began to look more carefully at Dr AQ Khan but often only in response to US pressure, particularly following Bill Clinton’s visit to Islamabad in March 2000, the intelligence agencies conducted comprehensive investigations into AQ Khan foreign procurements and entrepreneurial activities.
This effort resulted in a secret 120 pages report dealing Khan’s irregular financial practices, his $8 million in various bank accounts and his $10 million hotel in Timbuktu. In 2000, US intelligence information was passed on to Pakistan, which reportedly included photographic evidence of centrifuge transfers to North Korea, resulted in directives to the ISI to raid an aircraft charted by KRL and bound for North Korea. Nothing was found during the raid, apparently, because of a tip off.
In autumn the same year, the ISI reported additional foreign contacts and travel plans by AQ Khan, including attempts to arrange a secret flight that include refuelling stops both ways in Zahedan, Iranian city close to Pakistani border noted for its smuggling activity. This was a clear violation of new procedures required Khan to obtain formal approval for all foreign travel and business.
Given the accumulation of so many questionable incidents, along with his growing resistance to military authority and oversight, Khan outright refusal to discuss Zahedan trip plans was the last straw that convinced Musharraf to remove him.
