DOBELL: Now under house arrest in Pakistan, Khan started his nuclear trafficking in the 1980s and made sales to Iran, North Korea and Libya. The network was rolled up by the United States and British intelligence in late 2003. But still work is going on to find out how much damage Khan did. The International Institute for Strategic Studies has just released a dossier on Khan and nuclear markets. Its author Mark Fitzpatrick.
FITZPATRICK: The Khan case showed that proliferation is not just state to state anymore the way to used to be that private individuals, private networks can be the source of nuclear weapons technology. And in the future even if the exact one stop shopping that Khan provided cannot be replicated because governments, concerned governments today are very aware of the problem. Even if that cannot be replicated there are various ways in which individuals in the future might be involved in nuclear proliferation.
Australia says the world is at a new crossroads in dealing with the challenge of nuclear weapons. It is one reason why the Defence Minister, Brendan Nelson is pushing Australia's participation in missile defence research by the United States and Japan. Dr Nelson says it's not just a matter of more states getting nuclear weapons, but now there's a danger of individuals getting their own nuclear materials.
Presenter/Interviewer: Graeme Dobell
Speakers: Australia's Defence Minister, Dr Brendan Nelson; Mark Fitzpatrick, senior fellow for Non-Proliferation, International Institute for Strategic Studies
DOBELL: Australia's Defence Minister lists three key nuclear security challenges. To prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Asia Pacific, to guarantee the security of nuclear technology and materials as new countries consider nuclear power, the latest being examples being Vietnam and Indonesia, and the increased risk of individuals or rogue groups getting their hands on nuclear material. Dr Nelson.
NELSON: We consider very much that we are at a cross roads internationally in relation to nuclear issues. We worry very deeply about the nuclear enrichment programme in Iran. We worried greatly when we saw the nuclear detonation in North Korea in October last year. But it isn't just the threat and the possibility of regional proliferation. It's also nuclear terrorism, it's the nuclear relationship between the great powers of the world. And it's also the necessary security implications of the increasing search for and use of nuclear energy.
DOBELL: The privatisation of proliferation is most dramatically shown in the nuclear blackmarket created by the Pakistan scientist A.Q. Khan. Dr Nelson.
NELSON: Khan's network spread over a number of countries. The Asia Pacific and the Middle East, spanning three continents, eluding national and international export controls that were designed to prevent illicit trade in nuclear materials. Our fear is and we believe a very real one is that others may take up where Khan left off, exploiting vulnerabilities identified by Khan in the global non-proliferation regime.
DOBELL: Now under house arrest in Pakistan, Khan started his nuclear trafficking in the 1980s and made sales to Iran, North Korea and Libya. The network was rolled up by the United States and British intelligence in late 2003. But still work is going on to find out how much damage Khan did. The International Institute for Strategic Studies has just released a dossier on Khan and
nuclear markets. Its author Mark Fitzpatrick.
FITZPATRICK: The Khan case showed that proliferation is not just state to state anymore the way to used to be that private individuals, private networks can be the source of nuclear weapons technology. And in the future even if the exact one stop shopping that Khan provided cannot be replicated because governments, concerned governments today are very aware of the problem. Even if that cannot be replicated there are various ways in which individuals in the future might be involved in nuclear proliferation.
DOBELL: What sort of private networks?
FITZPATRICK: In the case of North Korea if the State control breaks down. There is already evidence of widespread corruption in North Korea, that some warlords or individuals could acquire some weapons technology or actual weapons, or frisson material and sell them. Even in the great case if the six party talks involving North Korea were to succeed and North Korea worked to disable its weapons programme North Korea would have a lot of excess material on its hands and it's quite easy to imagine that some individuals in North Korea or the State itself or some quasi State-identified person could try to sell some of that material. You could imagine Jihadi sympathisers in Pakistan being involved in quasi public proliferation.
DOBELL: So the new worries are in a sense the market response to proliferation or the globalisation response to proliferation?
FITZPATRICK: There is very much of a supply and demand mechanism at work here. The course of non-proliferation controls over history has been as States tighten up export controls those who really seek the technology find ways to evade, find the loop-holes and those loop-holes today very often will involve non-State actors.
DOBELL: So are you optimistic or pessimistic. What sort of lessons are truly being learned?
FITZPATRICK: I guess I'm optimistic in the sense that the world has realised that there is a real problem here, and there is a concern to try to stop proliferation. But I'm pessimistic in the way that even despite this realisation of the problem that there hasn't been effective implementation of many of the steps that have been taken. The proliferation security initiative the United States led, eighty countries are now signed on to it. But there are many countries in important parts of the world who are not participating, important literal States, that is States where ships are coming to or from North Korea would pass, China and South Korea. India and Pakistan are not participants, nor is Saudi Arabia or Egypt. And PSI has no legal mechanism to operate on the high seas yet. There is a legal basis, but it needs ratification and no State has ratified this legal basis for conducting actions on the high seas. So much more needs to be done.