There is some substance to the threat. The Mehdi Army may be relatively small - the exact figure is not known, but there could be as many as 10,000 fighters with many more in reserve - but it has huge support in the Shia community. Its members are committed to a Shia theocracy and are violently opposed to what they see as the US occupation of their country. According to Iraq expert Dr Toby Dodge of Warwick University, the Mehdi Army fighters have nothing to lose as they come from "those young and desperate Shia in Iraq's urban slums who have not seen any benefit to their lives from liberation".
By Trevor Royle, Diplomatic Editor
With 10,000 fighters behind him, 32 Iraqi MPs under his sway and much of Baghdad in his grip, who can defeat Shi’ite leader Moqtada al-Sadr?
BACK IN the days when the US was planning its 2003 invasion of Iraq, little or no thought was given to a scruffy young Shi'ite cleric who appeared to enjoy a measure of support in an equally shabby suburb on the eastern bank of the Tigris in Baghdad. With his boyish face and wispy beard, Moqtada al-Sadr came across as just another unruly cleric and his name was never mentioned in the briefings given to the Pentagon and the State Department by disaffected Iraqis who hoped to benefit from the toppling of Saddam Hussein.
However, no sooner had the US forces surged into Baghdad than al-Sadr suddenly emerged as very important indeed. His black-clad troops of the Mehdi Army took to the streets and his neighbourhood, Sadr City, home to two million disaffected Shi'ites, quickly became a no-go area. Nobody seemed to notice that he must represent something if a suburb of Baghdad was named after his family, but as a senior US army officer put it: "Sadr didn't appear on the radar, he didn't figure at all, we didn't reckon he was going to emerge as a player."
Last week al-Sadr's real importance - and threat - was made clear with the announcement of president George Bush's new policy to send 21,500 troops to take control of Baghdad. At the press conference in Washington to announce the move the new defence secretary, Robert Gates, was pressed hard about the mission statement for the deployment and he was unequivocal on one point, insisting "all parts of Baghdad are going to be involved in this campaign, including Sadr City".
Gates's uncompromising attitude took many by surprise. In the years since the invasion, US military policy has largely been one of "live and let live" as far as it concerns Sadr City and the Mehdi Army, and the main effort in Baghdad has concentrated on the need to contain or crush Sunni militias. Apart from one inconclusive initiative against the Mehdi Army in the city of Najaf in 2005, the US army has been reluctant to square up to al-Sadr's highly motivated militias. Al-Sadr might have been described in a recent Pentagon report as being "the most dangerous accelerant" of sectarian violence in Iraq and a threat more potent than the foreign jihadist fighters who represent al-Qaeda in the country, but the young Shi'ite cleric has still managed to lead a charmed life.
With sectarian attacks peaking at around 1000 a week over Christmas and New Year it has become clear that the problem of the Shi'ite militias has to be addressed, but not just by sending in more troops. Al-Sadr's forces and the equally potent and extremist Badr Organisation are connected to Shii'te political parties whose support ensures prime minister Nouri al-Maliki stays in power and the administration has shown extreme reluctance to move to disband them. Not unnaturally, al-Sadr has always insisted he will resist any move to emasculate him militarily and has made it clear to al-Maliki that his own power base would be damaged if the Mehdi Army were disarmed or forced into a bloody battle.
There is some substance to the threat. The Mehdi Army may be relatively small - the exact figure is not known, but there could be as many as 10,000 fighters with many more in reserve - but it has huge support in the Shia community. Its members are committed to a Shia theocracy and are violently opposed to what they see as the US occupation of their country. According to Iraq expert Dr Toby Dodge of Warwick University, the Mehdi Army fighters have nothing to lose as they come from "those young and desperate Shia in Iraq's urban slums who have not seen any benefit to their lives from liberation".
Armed mainly with AK-47 assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenades and some heavy machine-guns, they have obviously been well trained - some may have served in Saddam's forces - and they have emerged as tough and difficult opponents in the street fighting in Baghdad and Najaf.
US intelligence has claimed that, far from being a rag-tag outfit, the Mehdi Army has a reasonable system of command and that some of its fighters have trained at Hezbollah camps in Lebanon. That claim is backed up by the CIA, whose director, General Michael Hayden, told Congress at the end of last year that "the Iranian hand is stoking violence in Iraq". As Iran is known to be the principal sponsor of Hezbollah through the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Ministry of Intelligence and Security, there is little doubt in the US intelligence community that al-Sadr has links to the Iranians and that that makes him a doubly dangerous enemy.
"As I see it, both Iran and Syria have everything to gain by providing support for Sadr and his militias," said a US diplomatic source. "By providing training and weapons they allow the militia fighters to become their proxies in a campaign against the US. Every time they engage US or coalition forces they enhance the Shia cause and embarrass the West. It's a win-win situation - Iran and Syria provide the means and the Mehdi Army provide the execution."
This interest in al-Sadr only serves to add to the Shii'te cleric's sense of importance in his role as a leader who could make or break Iraq. In addition to his Mehdi Army he controls 32 of the 275 seats in the Iraqi parliament, and has emerged as the spiritual leader to millions of Shi'ites in southern Iraq. His death squads have struck fear into Sunni communities - one reason for the civil strife in Iraq - and within the country's fledgling security forces thousands of policemen and soldiers regard him as their rightful leader. His bearded countenance is seen in posters all over Iraq and he enjoys the kind of demotic power that cannot be won at the ballot box. In short, this once- insignificant cleric is the key to what happens next in Iraq.
Al-Sadr's family background also plays a part in explaining his position. He is the third son of Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, a fiery Shi'ite cleric who was tolerated by Saddam until 1999 when his criticisms became so severe that he was arrested and shot, along with two of his sons. A cousin was Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr, a Shi'te visionary whose outspokenness saw him assassinated by one of Saddam's death squads. These relatives, and their fates, helped radicalise al-Sadr and led him to create the Mehdi Army in his own image - he was determined to avoid the errors made by his father and other relatives by creating a security force whose fighters owed him absolute loyalty.
The backing he enjoys in Tehran should not be overlooked. Although there is ambiguity in the relationship, al-Sadr has considerable support in president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's administration. He has offered to use his militias if Iran is attacked by the US, and while this is a symbolic gesture it might be reciprocated if the Mehdi Army is drawn into a fight with Iraqi and US forces. It would be difficult for the more extreme elements in Iran to stand by and do nothing. At the very least the Mehdi Army might be transformed into a Hezbollah-type guerrilla force, which is almost impossible to defeat - as the Israelis found last year. The dangers are exacerbated by Bush's refusal to offer any diplomatic solution and by recent heavy-handed hints from the White House that Iran might be next on the list for regime change.
In the shorter term, getting rid of the Mehdi Army will be an enormous challenge for the Iraqi security forces and their US allies. It is always possible there can be a negotiated deal, whereby al-Sadr orders his militiamen to disarm in return for political concessions, but it is a long shot. Al-Sadr has built his reputation and standing on the backs of his black-clothed henchmen and he is unlikely to play ball while internal security in Iraq is so fluid. Asked if al-Maliki's government expected the Mehdi Army to stand down, government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh said political consensus would win the day. However, he was uncertain how this might be achieved. "We expect from Moqtada's customary wisdom that he will restrain the Mehdi Army from confronting the security forces," he said. "These are expectations and commitments we have taken from Moqtada."
This is very far from a full-blooded promise to surrender, and the situation is clouded by the fact that in his eight months in power al-Maliki has done nothing to crack down on the militias or purge his forces of extremist Shi'ites. This inaction has given hope to al-Sadr that his cause is not lost. In purely military terms, he cannot hope for a victory in the field, although his militias will put up a fight. The US and its allies have overwhelming superiority and the firepower brought by reinforcements could be a decisive factor.
Where al-Sadr scores is in the allegiance of his Mehdi Army and the sheer size of Shia support. So far the Shi'ites in the south have been relatively quiescent - they have nobody to fight but themselves and have been unwilling to stage a full-scale revolt against the British presence - but all that could change if there is a bloodbath in Baghdad.
The scenario is all too believable. If the US backs al-Maliki's forces in going head to head with the Mehdi Army the shockwaves will extend beyond Baghdad. Given Iraq's present propensity for sectarian violence there is a real possibility of a Shi'ite backlash, with the south becoming embroiled at a time when the British are anxious to draw down troops from Basra to concentrate their efforts in Afghanistan.
For al-Sadr this is a powerful incentive, and the support he has in the wider Shia community drives him on. Whenever he is asked why he keeps fighting against what has happened in the past four years he invariably answers: "I do not care what the Americans have to say about this and I never did. Only the Iraqi people can choose who they want to protect their country."
