For the people of Japan, the world's only country to suffer atomic-bomb attacks, the existence of nuclear weapons in any form is unacceptable. Regrettably, however, nuclear proliferation is continuing outside the framework of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).
The nuclear arms of North Korea, which has deployed 200 Rodong missiles capable of hitting Japan, pose an immediate security threat to the country.
The latest session of the six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear-arms development ended Feb. 13 with Pyongyang agreeing to shut down and seal its nuclear reactor and accept inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency in exchange for energy supplies in two phases.
The question is: Will North Korea abandon all its nuclear arms and programs? Past experience suggests the answer is probably no.
A joint statement issued at the end of the six-nation talks made no reference to nuclear arms and highly enriched uranium, leaving open the possibility that North Korea will continue to possess and develop such weapons. In the medium to long term, security uncertainties in Northeast Asia are likely to increase
Japan and the rest of the world must renew efforts to have North Korea abandon all its nuclear arms and ambitions. North Korea has developed a certain strategy in negotiations: It creates a security crisis, reaches agreement on resolving the nuclear issue in return for compensation, then reneges on its promise before creating a new crisis. It accepts a new agreement, forcing the other parties pay a higher price. Meanwhile, Pyongyang gains time for nuclear-arms development.
The first crisis on the Korean Peninsula started in March 1993, when North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT. In October 1994, the Clinton administration in the United States and North Korea announced conclusion of the Agreed Framework. Under the deal, Washington promised to build two light-water reactors for Pyongyang, with output of 2 million kilowatts, and supply 500,000 tons of fuel oil a year until the reactors were completed. In return, Pyongyang promised to freeze its graphite-moderated reactor.
To implement the agreement, Japan, the U.S. and South Korea established the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization. In October 2002, however, a new crisis erupted over North Korea's uranium-enrichment program. The Bush administration criticized the Clinton administration's policies toward North Korea, and suspended KEDO activities.
To denuclearize the Peninsula, the U.S., Japan, South Korea, Russia, North Korea and China launched the six-nation talks, with Beijing serving as chair.
In September 2005, the six nations announced their first joint statement, which included a promise that North Korea would abandon all its nuclear weapons and programs and return at an early date to the NPT and the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
The Japanese Foreign Ministry at that time praised North Korea's promise to abandon its nuclear arms and programs in a verifiable way, saying it was an important basis for peaceful resolution of its nuclear problem.
Last October, however, North Korea announced a plan to conduct a nuclear test and went ahead with it despite international protests. Touting itself as a new nuclear power, North Korea demanded excessive energy aid in the latest talks as the initial step toward abandoning its nuclear arms and programs, resorting to its usual negotiating pattern.
John Chipman, director general and chief executive of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, said in publishing the "2007 Military Balance" at the end of January that North Korea had enough plutonium to build five to 10 nuclear bombs. He also said "there is little prospect" that North Korea will give up the weapons."
North Korea could use its nuclear arms as a deterrent against the U.S. and as a trump card to ensure the survival of the Kim Jong Il regime. Kim himself is no doubt keenly aware of that.
East Asia's strategic environment has dramatically changed since North Korea's missile and nuclear tests. To deal with the new situation, Japan needs to overhaul its diplomatic and security strategies.
First, Japan must strengthen its security alliance with the U.S. and expedite joint development and deployment of a missile defense system. Efforts must be stepped up to expand Japan-U.S. security cooperation by reorganizing U.S. forces in Japan and increasing the interoperability between U.S. forces and Japan's Self-Defense Forces.
Second, Japan must step up multilateral diplomacy in the region. As the peacekeeping mechanism on the Korean Peninsula, the six-nation talks are highly important. The group -- including China and Russia, which have been historically involved with Peninsula affairs -- serves as a barrier that contains North Korea's adventurism.
Despite its limits, the group is an important forerunner of a future regional security organization.
Third, Japan should take active steps toward international cooperation. It should play a major role in international crisis management by, for example, urging all member nations of the United Nations to make sanctions against North Korea more effective.
Keizo Nabeshima, former chief editorial writer for Kyodo News, writes on political and international affairs.
