"North Korea was willing to give up its plutonium production facilities because it already has the bombs it needs. Iran doesn't have any fissile material yet, and will be less inclined to stop until it does," said Mark Fitzpatrick, non-proliferation analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
By Mark Heinrich
VIENNA (Reuters) - A six-power pact to halt North Korea's atom bomb programme might spur Iran to a deal on its disputed nuclear activity but maybe only after it produces the makings of warheads to maximise bargaining power, analysts say.
North Korea agreed to "disable" nuclear facilities including plutonium production and readmit U.N. inspectors to verify this in return for 950,000 emergency tonnes of fuel oil and steps to lift trade sanctions and normalise ties with Washington.
But it has not committed to tearing down its Yongbyon nuclear complex or putting under International Atomic Energy Agency inspector controls fissile plutonium estimated to be enough for at least six bombs.
Iran, by contrast, is seen as at least 2-3 years away from being able to make a bomb. It denies Western claims that this is its goal, saying it is refining uranium only for electricity.
"North Korea was willing to give up its plutonium production facilities because it already has the bombs it needs. Iran doesn't have any fissile material yet, and will be less inclined to stop until it does," said Mark Fitzpatrick, non-proliferation analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
The deal to stop the expansion of Stalinist North Korea's nuclear arsenal, and restore non-proliferation safeguards in a country that threw out IAEA inspectors in 2003, could be a boon for international security, Western diplomats and analysts said.
But Iran, whose Islamist leaders' calls for the elimination of Israel and apparent aspirations to predominance in the oil-rich Middle East have unsettled the West, could draw unwelcome conclusions from the North Korea pact, they said.
"If I were an Iranian, I would notice that nuclear bomb capability can be sold for a very high price," said a European Union diplomat accredited to the Vienna-based IAEA.
"This deal may be a breakthrough, but North Korea's bomb tests were a crucial element," said another European diplomat.
"The danger is that Iran and other would-be proliferators may draw the lesson that testing a nuclear weapons is what gets Washington's attention and brings it to the negotiating table," Fitzpatrick told Reuters from London.
Tehran is cranking up efforts to enrich uranium in an underground plant ringed by anti-aircraft guns against feared U.S. attack. It has impeded IAEA investigations meant to clear up Western suspicions of a disguised atomic bomb project.
VOLATILE STALEMATE
Iran has been silent on the North Korean deal so far.
It has avoided negotiations with world powers who are offering trade benefits and potentially security assurances and restored ties with Washington if it shelves enrichment first.
The standoff led the U.N. Security Council to impose limited sanctions on Iran two months ago, with the threat of harsher measures to come if it has not shelved enrichment by Feb. 21.
But while calling the North Korea deal flawed in the precedent it may set, analysts also noted big differences between the cases that meant the Iran could bend to international pressure earlier than its Asian counterpart did.
Iran is a major oil exporter, prizing worldwide diplomatic and trade relations, except with Washington. It has a partially elected power structure sensitive to popular will.
North Korea is a proudly eccentric, almost hermit state, a one-man autocracy, one of the world's poorest and most backward countries with a record of famines and shortages of basic items.
Although Washington has less leverage over Iran than North Korea given the Iranians' energy wealth and commercial links to Europe, Tehran also has more to lose by inviting isolation through its defiance of U.N. resolutions.
"Iranians are very sensitive to the risks of being treated like an international pariah. They consider themselves worldly, very much part of international culture," said Gary Samore, head of studies at the Council on Foreign Relations think tank.
"The other big difference is motivation. North Korea has felt having nuclear arms is absolutely essential to the survival of the regime. The Iranians want that capability but don't have a particular urgency, feeling it's something they can achieve in good time, and in a way to minimise international reaction."
Samore said the North Korea accord could boost moderates in Iran favouring a temporary nuclear suspension to revive talks. They drubbed anti-Western hardliners in recent regional elections, reflecting growing concerns about economic neglect.
"They can point to the North Korea deal as a demonstration that these kinds of multilateral talks can produce an attractive outcome and the U.S. is willing to compromise on the maximal demand of total disarmament," he said.
"The Iranian situation is both more complicated and dangerous," said David Albright, a non-proliferation expert heading the Institute for Science and International Security.
"But the fact that Washington could actually do a deal with a state in its 'axis of evil' is a strong signal to Iran that 'regime change' is not Bush's only tool."
