The Manama Dialogue, hosted every year in Bahrain by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), is a good opportunity to check the climate in the Gulf States. 2007 was the security conference’s fourth year. The situation in Iraq, the significance of Iran for the Gulf Cooperation Council States (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Oman) and the role of America in the stability and security of the entire region are recurrent themes. The conference covers a complex set of issues affecting the international political landscape. Two thirds of the earth’s oil and a good third of the world’s gas reserves are in the Gulf. To this extent, security in the Gulf is actually, as the Bahrain foreign affairs minister Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmed put it, a “global public good”.
12 December 2007: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
Safety in the Gulf and initiatives towards Arabian self-criticism
By Günther Nonnenmacher
MANAMA, December - The Manama Dialogue, hosted every year in Bahrain by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), is a good opportunity to check the climate in the Gulf States. 2007 was the security conference’s fourth year. The situation in Iraq, the significance of Iran for the Gulf Cooperation Council States (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Oman) and the role of America in the stability and security of the entire region are recurrent themes. The conference covers a complex set of issues affecting the international political landscape. Two thirds of the earth’s oil and a good third of the world’s gas reserves are in the Gulf. To this extent, security in the Gulf is actually, as the Bahrain foreign affairs minister Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmed put it, a “global public good”.
Nevertheless, the conference gave only a partial picture of the current climate. The Iranians, who had been represented in Manama the previous year by their Minister of Foreign Affairs, Manouchehr Mottaki, withdrew their delegate at the last minute. Bilateral grievances in relations with the Kingdom of Bahrain were cited as the reason for this. Perhaps, however, a possible encounter with American defence minister Gates was the real difficulty – on both sides.
By not attending, the Iranians passed up the opportunity to garner a propaganda victory. It is true that Gates had been trying to capitalize on some publicly-expressed praise from President Ahmadinejad about the “National Intelligence Estimate” (NIE), recently published by the American National Intelligence Council, in which Teheran is acknowledged to have stopped its nuclear weapons programme in 2003. Gates points out that if Iran praised the quality of the American intelligence services in this way, it would also have to acknowledge the other assessments contained in the report. These include the statement that Teheran continues to finance and train Shiite militia in Iraq; that the Mullahs continue to support terrorist organisations such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Palestinian regions; that Iran is developing medium-range missiles that only have a strategic military purpose if they carry a nuclear warhead. Nevertheless, the defence minister’s irritation at the untimely publication of the report could not be overlooked and its effect could not be ignored: Gates has reiterated over and over that Washington is committed one hundred percent to a peaceful settlement to the Iranian nuclear conflict, even if all options do remain on the table so long as Iran remains the troublemaker in international relations and in a regional context.
Although the Arabs know that American military might is essential to strategic equilibrium in the Gulf, the directness with which Washington expresses itself on (and sometimes also tackles) problems in the region sits ill with a culture of the indirect, in which problems are circumvented, rather than taken by the horns. When Gates brushed aside the question by one Arab delegate as to whether the Israeli nuclear armament was not a threat to security in the region with a curt “No”, a murmur rippled through the room. It was not until later that the defence minister added the justification that Israel did not, after all, want to erase any other state from the map and did not support any terrorist organisations in Arab countries.
The tendency to relate all their problems immediately back to the unresolved Israel-Palestine conflict is widespread among Arabs. This is supported by complaints that the Americans do not mediate impartially in this conflict but, in cases of doubt, always come down on the side of the Israelis. The question of to what extent a peaceful solution for the Middle East could concretely affect the situation in Iraq – for instance the relationship between Shiites and Sunnis – or whether a settlement in Palestine would change any aspect of the military situation in the Gulf, usually elicits an evasive response. One Saudi delegate admitted that a solution to the conflict in the Middle East would finally force the Arabs to face up to problems of their own making, such as the lack of democracy in the Arab world, the poor infrastructure for training and education, and high rate of unemployment as a consequence of abortive economic policies.
This list of failings should also include the insight formulated by one Jordanian delegate. He said that the states of the region had not resolved the Arab identity crisis. Basically, they do not know whether they should be loyal to “their” national state, or to the “Arab nation”, whether they should define themselves by their religious affiliation or whether – as is the case in Iraq – tribe should not be the ultimate point of reference for the individual. If one dares to pose such far-reaching questions, it soon becomes clear that, for instance, the conflict between Shiite and Sunnis in the states of the region is not rooted solely in religion alone. It only becomes raised to the level of hostilities where it is fuelled by an accumulation of social and political issues. This was the case in the Lebanon where the Shiite Hezbollah were able to establish themselves as representatives of the social underclass (that became the most powerful group). The same applies to Iraq where the Shiite majority, after decades of repression, are reluctant to share political power with the Sunniis who had dominated in the past.
The fact that the situation in Iraq – despite continuing tensions between the religious communities (and within the Shiite majority) – has significantly improved, has been generally recognised. Defence minister Gates was able to cite figures as evidence of this: since American troop reinforcement and the deployment of new tactics, the civilian death rate has fallen by around 60%, and in Baghdad by 75% whereby, as the Iraqi national security advisor Mowaffak Al Rubaie added, a no smaller proportion of the dead were victims of ordinary crime – such as would occur in any other major metropolis in the world. The political reconciliation process in the country is progressing even if it doesn’t appear to be moving along as fast as Washington might wish. Al Rubaie spoke with unusual frankness about “interference from outside”. He said that a competitive quarrel was being fought out on Iraqi soil between Iran and Saudi Arabia. His country could not achieve security, reconciliation and stability as long as these things did not exist in the region as a whole. Many times Washington had been invited to play its part in this by taking up direct talks with Teheran.
The fact that America, even if it is not loved, remains the region’s “stabiliser” is undisputed. The government in Baghdad is negotiating a “Strategic Partnership Agreement” with Washington which should be ready for signature by the middle of next year. The United States are once more talking with the Arabs states of the Gulf in a “Security dialogue” which includes defence collaboration between the Gulf Cooperation Council, to agree a stance vis-à-vis Iran and Iraq, encompassing energy security, the fight against nuclear proliferation and terrorism. The attempt, using bilateral initiatives, to achieve a regional missile defence system which will stem the drive towards a nuclear arms race in the region, should also be mentioned.
Once bitten, twice shy they may be, but the Americans in the Gulf are bent on multilateralism and discussion. Gates has reiterated that he has come to the region, above all, to listen. His warning not to underestimate America’s determination and staying-power and not to mistake restraint for weakness, was qualified by the intimation that in an emergency, this may not always be the case.
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