Those seeking to describe what conditions are like for the 500 British troops at Basra Palace, the last coalition foothold in Iraq's second-largest city, liken them to the US Cavalry encircled in a wooden stockade. "It's the wild, wild west," said Kenneth Pollack, a foreign affairs expert at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank, who recently visited Iraq. A Labour MP, Kevan Jones, said the Basra Palace base was "surrounded like cowboys and indians".
This is scarcely an exaggeration. Troops inside the complex, built for Saddam Hussein on the banks of the Shatt al-Arab waterway, have told relatives and friends that they are being hit by indirect fire – rockets and mortar bombs – up to 60 times a day. It is no longer safe to sleep in tents, and all have been forced into "hard" accommodation. Every time a resupply convoy is sent from the Contingency Operating Base (COB) at Basra airport, the only other British outpost in southern Iraq, it comes under fire. As one military source put it: "People are getting killed just bringing in toilet rolls."
Although the constant bombardment is taking its toll of facilities and equipment at Basra Palace, the forces based there can still hit back hard: one recent firefight, in which a British soldier died and three others were seriously wounded, was unofficially estimated to have killed 30 to 40 militants. But senior commanders are telling the Government that this is not what British forces were sent into southern Iraq to do. They want to hand over the base to Iraqi forces without further delay and "reposture" the 5,000 troops remaining at the COB. That piece of military jargon obscures their real desire, which is to withdraw most of them from Iraq as soon as possible.
Last week Major General Graham Binns took over as commander of the multinational force in south-east Iraq for another torrid six months. But this was not how the script was intended to run. His predecessor, Major General Jonathan Shaw, was supposed to be the last general to hold the post, because it was expected that during his tour he would hand over security in Basra city and province to the 10th Division of the Iraqi Army, and pave the way for full political control by the Iraqi provincial council.
Instead, the fighting in Basra this summer has been more intense than at any time since the allied invasion in 2003. Already 41 British servicemen and women have been killed this year, more than in any other year since 2003. If losses were to continue at the present rate, they might exceed the 53 suffered four years ago, when some 45,000 British troops took part in a full-scale war. The question now is: are British soldiers dying needlessly in southern Iraq?
Some argue that even to ask this is distasteful when Iraqi civilians are being killed in much greater numbers. The death toll in last week's suicide bombings directed against the Yazidi sect in north-western Iraq, for example – as far as it is possible to get from the British zone in the south-east – may rise above 400 once all the rubble is cleared. Many who opposed the war feel Britain has a moral obligation to stay, and deal with the outcome.
Sir Michael Quinlan, a former permanent secretary at the Ministry of Defence, now a consulting senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, summed up this feeling, saying: "I think we ought to do what is best for the Iraqis, because we have made a mess of their country."
Toby Dodge, an Iraq expert at the University of London and IISS who recently visited Basra and Baghdad, is a strong critic of British policy. "Britain signed up for war with too few troops and too inactive a policy in the south," he said. "We have never managed to 'clear and hold' in Basra. The approach has been to muddle through and let the situation find its own level, which has resulted in anarchy, violence and criminality. Over the past four years this has become a self-fulfilling prophecy by the British top brass, who are responsible for much of it."
Dr Dodge does not believe that Britain would be justified in withdrawing. "There is a lot of criminality and inter-faction violence in the British zone, but you could argue that it would get worse if British forces left," he said. "In my view we can't cut and run from a problem we have created."
But in his outburst last autumn the head of the Army, General Sir Richard Dannatt, came close to implying that further British sacrifices in Iraq were pointless. He said the British presence was "exacerbating" the security situation and that the troops should leave "soon". Commanders argue that the majority of attacks in Basra are on British forces – between 85 and 90 per cent, they estimate – and point out that when Iraqi forces have taken over other British bases in Basra city, such as the Shatt al-Arab hotel, violence has fallen. "We are a major part of the problem," said one officer. "Without us the murder rate would be lower than in Washington DC."
Christopher Langton, a retired colonel and senior fellow at the IISS, said: "Commanders feel they have done all they can with the resources they have got. They are not dealing with an insurgency or intervening to prevent ethnic conflict, as the Americans are doing further north. The struggle is entirely Shia – a turf war among militias in which British commanders feel they should not be involved."
But in October General Dannatt expressed another concern: that the strains of fighting in both Iraq and Afghanistan could "break" the Army. When his predecessor, General Sir Mike Jackson, agreed to send troops to southern Afghanistan early last year, the assumption was that the British presence in Iraq would be cut to around 2,000 within six months. Eighteen months later there are still nearly three times that number in Iraq; in Afghanistan the initial deployment of 3,300 has more than doubled, and will increase to 7,800 by the end of the year. The casualty figures here are also high. According to reports in today's Observer almost half the 1,500 frontline troops in Helmand province have been treated on the battlefield for serious injuries since April. Official casualty figures are much lower as these only record troops that were treated in hospital.
Not only is this putting a near-intolerable strain on the Army's resources, according to commanders, but the tempo of operations is causing the manpower shortage to get steadily worse. And there are ominous signs that increasing numbers of officers and soldiers have had enough, and are leaving early. One Parachute Regiment officer has decided to quit after being faced with a second tour in Afghanistan in 18 months. "He has a young family," a friend said, "and he could not see that this scale of fighting was achieving what it is supposed to."
Last autumn General Dannatt warned that the Army was in danger of "running hot" with the demands of both fronts. The worsening situation since then has been underlined by the statistics for the 1st Battalion the Royal Anglians, who have been in Helmand province for just over four months. In that time the battle group of roughly 650 troops has lost 131, including five killed, two dozen seriously wounded, and some 60 from injuries including broken legs and arms.
In some of the vital forward fighting units, the infantry battalions especially, attrition rates are heading towards 20 per cent, including fatalities, injuries and sickness. Yet Louise Heywood, head of the UK armed forces programme at the Royal United Services Institute, said that even if thousands of troops were pulled out of Iraq soon, no plans exist to send them to Afghanistan. The aim instead would be to restore the normal 18-month break between six-month combat tours, during which troops would spend a year on home service and six months training. At least until next year, however, the forces are likely to remain at full stretch in both theatres, instead of being able to concentrate on Afghanistan, as commanders have long been seeking.
Gordon Brown, indicated a potential timetable for withdrawing from Iraq after he met George Bush at Camp David last month. "Our aim is step-by-step to move control to the Iraqi authorities, to the Iraqi government, and to its security forces, as progress is made," he said.
"And we've moved from combat to overwatch in three of the four provinces for which we, the British, have security responsibility." Britain intended to make the same move in the fourth and final province, Basra, he went on. Although he gave no date, British commanders and Iraqi officials assume it will be well before the end of the year.
Many obstacles may delay a reduction in British forces, however, not least US opposition from the likes of Vice-President Dick Cheney, who recently warned: "No one could plead ignorance of the potential consequences of walking away from Iraq now, withdrawing coalition forces before Iraqis can defend themselves." The desire of Mr Cheney and fellow Washington hardliners to confront Iran also worries British officials, one of whom said: "If they do go for Iran, then all bets are off for us."
Such political considerations aside, British military pride risks injury from the boasts of militias who will claim to have driven the occupiers out, and the scoffing of American critics such as Mr Pollack. He dismissed the British presence in southern Iraq as "meaningless", saying: "I am assuming the British will no longer be [in southern Iraq]. They are not there now ... Basra is out of control."
But Colonel Langton said this was a minority view. The Americans had been told several months ago that the British soldiers were going to leave, and realised that it was "no good looking at Basra through the same binoculars as Baghdad".
Plans have existed for some time to leave no more than 1,500 British troops in Iraq, carrying out a mentoring and training role in the desert, well away from the militias targeting the airport base with monotonous regularity – on some days by the hour. But Colonel Langton stressed that even if these were put in motion immediately, the withdrawal would be a massive logistical operation, involving vast stockpiles and heavy armour, which would last well into next year.
First, however, Basra Palace must be handed over. "It's likely to be very tough, a real fighting withdrawal, with our forces in contact all the way," said a recently returned veteran. But that is unlikely to trouble the beleaguered occupants of the base, who will probably feel like the inmates of a fort in the old West when they see the US Cavalry coming over the ridge.
Military covenant: The Government must deal fairly with Britain's troops
The Independent on Sunday has long campaigned for the Government to honour the Military Covenant. This provides that soldiers give up some of the rights of ordinary citizens and risk their lives, on the understanding that in return they and their families will be fairly treated. The covenant embraces such matters as housing, medical treatment, proper equipment to enable soldiers to carry out their duties and compensation if they are disabled or killed on active service.
Last week some other newspapers joined the campaign after the British Legion announced that it would call the Government to account over the Military Covenant. Below we update some the issues we have highlighted in recent months.
Medical treatment
Latest MoD figures show 490 soldiers wounded in action in Iraq and Afghanistan; 2,868 treated in field hospitals for disease or injury; and 1,684 flown out for medical reasons. Concerns continue over medical care of wounded soldiers, with just one military-managed ward in Britain.
Housing
The MoD is spending hundreds of millions on new barracks and married quarters, but much accommodation remains poor. A former British commander in Iraq has warned that "the quality work done by these courageous men and women only happens if these people are properly supported back home".
Families
Charities have been forced to help with transport costs and even accommodation for families visiting injured soldiers, with MoD assistance usually lasting no longer than 10 days. The Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Families Association is providing a house for visiting relatives near the Headley Court military rehabilitation centre in Surrey.
Equipment
Problems with inadequate or faulty kit have ranged from boots that melt in the desert heat to rifles that jam. The MoD was slow to replace vulnerable "Snatch" Land Rovers with better-armoured vehicles – something that would have saved the lives of numerous soldiers killed in roadside explosions.
Jonathan Owen
