For much of the past five years the US, with the strong support of the UK, has argued that the spread of democracy is not only an ideal but a strategic necessity. Democracies, the argument runs, tend not to go to war with each other and provide environments in which radicalism cannot flourish. In the long war on terror, realpolitik demands the diffusion of democratic values. Yet, while today’s democracies shun interstate conflict, those in the past have not always been so well-behaved. And while India can point to its democracy as a reason why its Muslim population is less prone to extremism, the well-rooted democracy of the UK has not prevented the development of home-grown terrorists.
The judgment as to the stability and potential friendliness of other states turns much more on how well they are governed than on how their leaders are chosen. From a strategic point of view, the key distinction is not between those states that are democratic and those that are not, but between those that are well-governed and those that are dysfunctional.
The US is beginning to accept this reality tacitly. In fact, the attempted merger between idealism and realpolitik at the core of American foreign policy has been laid to rest.
Of course the strategic language at the highest level still pays tribute to the ideal of the universal spread of democracy and the ending of tyranny. Presidential speeches tout the importance of spreading liberal values, and no policy statement is complete without a reference to electoral practices. But the diplomatic practice delivers much greater homage to the need to solve problems and deal with the world on the terms America finds it, rather than on the terms the US might wish to create.
This has become all the more so because the political, military and diplomatic imbroglio established in Iraq had, by 2006, sapped the entrepreneurial flair with which the first-term Bush presidency had sought to conduct foreign policy. Creating a “market need” for democracy and then selling it to as many “buyers” as possible was an impractical way to maintain and build alliances for the “war on terror”. Similarly, the electoral outcome in Palestine that saw Hamas take power was a sharp reminder that elections can be won and power secured by those with unpalatable agendas.
Different colours other than black and white – even a bit of grey – are therefore slowly being re-introduced to the American diplomatic palette. This is welcome, though it naturally means passing through a phase of apparent double standards and rhetorical contradiction. The US favours ending tyranny and promoting democracy, but finds itself supporting strategically important autocrats who shun elections. Democracy for all is not a realisable goal, and its unqualified pursuit would lead to more instability.
On the other hand, working with the status quo without regard for democratic values will only disenchant those abroad with liberal programmes and strengthen cynical usurpers of power.
The compromise between sticking to a distant goal, and making a full U-turn, is to adjust the aim. The US and its allies would be well advised to focus on good governance as a key foreign policy goal, one that if achieved would serve most of the security requirements putatively addressed by smooth democratisation.
Defining good governance to include many of the attributes enjoyed by modern democracies, while accepting that good governance can be practised by leaders with benign intent who owe their legitimacy more to consent than to poll results, permits a freer and fuller dialogue with developing societies. It need not mean abandonment of the goal that power be checked.
A society that allows the space for private institutions to flourish, the media to speak, parties to form, foreign direct investment to flourish, protection of private property and reasonable individual freedom to develop within the rule of law creates its own checks on the unbridled exercise of executive power. These are necessary steps on the road to full democratic practices.
Good governance without full electoral democracy is probably safer strategically than is democracy without transparent and effective governance.
In their own strategic interests, the US and its closest friends should work more carefully to strike the right balance between the advocacy of democracy, the promotion of good governance and the conduct of practical relations with strategically important actors.
The writer is director-general of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London
