By STEPHEN FIDLER
North Korea has earned over the past two decades a reputation for peddling its missile capabilities around the world. Many governments are worried not so much that it will use the bombas that it will shop its nuclear expertise around, to earn foreign exchange for its stricken economy.
"The real risk, as we and others see it, is of onward proliferation from North Korea to other countries of concern," said a British official yesterday.
A US draft of a United Nations Security Council resolution, circulated yesterday, calls upon member states "to undertake and facilitate inspection of cargo to and from (North Korea)" to ensure that no arms, nuclear or missile-related items or luxury goods could be shipped there.
That paragraph, if agreed by the rest of the Security Council, raises many practical and legal questions about how such inspections would be carried out. To work, it would almost certainly need the backing of China, not only in the Security Council but also as a practical matter because many of the sea lanes out of North Korea pass close to China.
"Chinese co-operation would be essential to any such measure," said Mark Fitzpatrick, a former State Department official at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Even if China did not board North Korean ships, it would ease the practical difficulties of enforcing the policy if it made its ports available for inspections, he said.
Chinese officials have indicated that Beijing would contemplate punitive measures against Pyongyang, but it was not clear yesterday whether they would back such an embargo.
As interpreted by most countries, the law of the sea prevents the boarding of ships on the high seas unless permission is given by the master of the vessel or by the government of the country whose flag it is flying.
The US usually permits itself a liberal interpretation of that law and any Chapter 7 Security Council resolution would presumably be deemed to give it and other countries the right to board North Korean vessels.
Though it is early for any such move, some thought may be given to the development of an international patrol similar to those deployed in the Gulf and off the Horn of Africa. Though both are dominated by the US Navy, the presence of other nations' vessels confers international legitimacy to the patrols.
Still, the likelihood is that any attempt to board a North Korean cargo ship would be refused and the interdiction force would have to contemplate shooting across the ship's bows and mounting an opposed boarding.
Such an event would probably be interpreted by North Korea as a hostile act, potentially leading to a significant further escalation of tensions in the region.
The Bush administration has led the formation of a coalition of countries, now numbering more than 70, aimed at preventing their waters or ships from being used to transport weapons of mass destruction.
Yet the Proliferation Security Initiative has no explicit basis in international law. It operates mainly in the coastal waters of its members and on vessels sailing under the flags of members.
A number of bilateral boarding agreements also permit the legal boarding of ships flying flags of convenience, such as Liberia.
"The PSI is a method of handling this kind of thing and could be adapted, if needed, to the North Korean case," said a former US official.
