PYONGYANG'S attempted nuclear test is first and foremost a failure of US statecraft. Many have debated whether US diplomacy was culpable for North Korea's burgeoning nuclear weapons capability and, if there were any remaining doubt, it appears to have been atomised on Monday.
Paradoxically, the United States' hardline stance on nuclear proliferation has fuelled further proliferation. President George W. Bush's decision to seek a bold approach and tell Pyongyang to give up its nuclear arsenal before diplomacy could commence spurred rather than deterred North Korea's nuclear and missile programmes.
To be sure, Pyongyang's weapons of mass destruction pose a clear and present danger. The North Korean nuclear test, on the heels of dramatic missiles tests three months earlier, is a direct challenge to regional stability and global security. The international response was appropriately enough an outcry in unison.
The flaw in current strategic planning is that while it is imperative, it is unlikely that major powers will forge an effective alliance to reverse North Korea's nuclear aspirations.
Fears that North Korea's test will provoke a new phase of global proliferation may be overblown. Although Japan has recently reconsidered whether it needs a nuclear deterrent, it has wisely decided to show restraint and eschew an independent nuclear option. The one country to have suffered from an atomic bomb will not lightly cross that threshold, especially provided its alliance with the United States remains intact.
The gathering danger in the next five years lies in the possibility that nuclear weapons or, more likely, material or technology, will leak from states such as North Korea and fall into the hands of non-state terror groups which are less susceptible to the self-discipline of deterrence than nation states.
The ultimate conclusion to be drawn from the nuclear and missile tests is that Kim Jong Il is a better student of coercive diplomacy than President Bush. Washington has been speaking loudly but waving the small stick of more sanctions.
North Korea has been responding quite methodically, saying: Talk directly to us or watch us proliferate. Which threat has been bigger and more credible? If the United States does not talk, Pyongyang tests and enhances the 'threat' that requires North Korea to hunker down and build more nukes. If Washington offers talks, suddenly the US is negotiating about a nuclear test rather than eliminating Pyongyang's nuclear programme, and Mr Kim has been bestowed the credibility rendered by having forced America to the negotiating table.
Now hardliners in the United States hope that the nuclear test will unify the outside powers to face a clear and common menace. But individual nations' positions are grounded on long-term national interests and those interests are often in conflict with one another.
China and South Korea favour long-term stability on the Korean Peninsula; Japan and the United States favour short-term pressure in pursuit of concrete diplomatic progress towards a verifiable dismantling of nuclear programmes. Russia appears to prefer little more than tactical opportunity.
Notwithstanding President Roh Moo Hyun's condemnation of the test, it would be misguided to believe that most South Koreans will have an epiphany, retrospectively seeing themselves as naive for having pursued a 'Sunshine' policy of engagement with the North. Politically, the chances are probably enhanced that a conservative coalition will win the Blue House in December next year, potentially resulting in a more hawkish policy towards the North.
However, South Koreans are more likely to be convinced that their long-term engagement and integration strategy is preferable to pushing the North over the brink and into war, especially given the heightened stakes and the absence of better options.
While there is no quick fix to the problem of North Korea, it might be better if the United States were to follow a true 'bold approach' - following the lead of its South Korean ally rather than the rigid line imposed by non-proliferation theologians. Results matter. If we were playing baseball, America would have struck out. But if we were playing baseball, this would only be a game; the stakes are much higher in the real-life action of nuclear brinkmanship.
There are interesting signs from within the hermit kingdom. The pre-testing news from Pyongyang noted that military leaders in North Korea vowed to fight to the death for their 'Dear Leader'.
Was this inspiring loyalty or a precaution by a paranoid ruler who wants to keep his generals in check? After all, since Mr Kim has nuclear weapons, he can hardly have a better insurance against an external intervention.
Mr Kim is no doubt cognizant that he has more to worry about from an internal coup, and he uses the discourse and imagery of an external threat to prop up his rule. What would he do if the United States sought to deny him the threat that is the glue to his regime?
Washington is too focused on the day-to-day, tit-for-tat negotiations rather than the overall strategic direction of the peninsula. There is too much talk about quick options to set back Mr Kim's nuclear programme and not enough resources and thought devoted to thinking about the long run. But it must take care not to repeat the lack of civil-military capabilities seen in Iraq.
The pivotal question for America is whether it can overcome its constant fascination with decisive operations to stem North Korea's proliferation and instead better prepare for the inevitable collapse of this regime.
When that day comes, the United States will need every bit of cultural, linguistic, political, economic and social expertise it can muster for the inevitable stabilisation operation that will have to be conducted on the Korean Peninsula.
South Korea will play a leading role, and China's role will be a major challenge.
Seeking Chapter 7 United Nations sanctions is an appropriate means of expressing outrage and global condemnation. But better for all would be to retain a posture of poised deterrence and containment mixed with active diplomacy by surrounding powers. Within this set of policies, however, the United States must find a way to establish direct negotiations with Pyongyang.
Talking is not the same as caving in, and adroit diplomacy directly with North Korea will make it difficult for Mr Kim to portray the United States as an evil empire.
North Korea's nuclear test offers a possible catalyst for a sea change in American leadership during the twilight of President Bush's tenure.
We cannot afford to wait two years for diplomacy to tame America's confrontational approach to international relations. Do not measure diplomacy in kilotonnes, but by a dogged, long search for peace.
The writer served in the Bush administration and is director of studies at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. He can be contacted at cronin@iiss.org 
