By Shaun Walker
Russia Profile
No Love Lost Between Russia and Georgia
With negotiations on the Iranian nuclear crisis proving unproductive, and the pride and pomp surrounding Russia’s first G8 summit fading into memory, Russian foreign policy seems set to end 2006 in exactly the same way as it started it - with the international community berating the country for bullying a small and powerless neighbor that merely wants to democratize and move towards the West. As the Kremlin rang in 2006, the men working inside were being accused of using every dirty trick available to bring Ukraine to its knees; and as the year comes to a close, it is the south Caucasus republic of Georgia that is causing problems for President Vladimir Putin’s regime.
Opinions are sharply divided on where the blame lies for the rancor that now permeates Russian-Georgian relations. Izvestiya columnist Alexander Arkhangelsky wrote for RIA Novosti in October that Saakashvili’s government was characterized by “a cheap mix of theatrical gesture, games-manship, pettiness, myopia, and self-obsession born of a persecution complex.” The Georgian leader, charged Arkhangelsky, was guilty of “boorish behavior toward Russia cloaked in a fox’s smile.” Meanwhile, Alexander Rondeli, president of the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies in Tbilisi, said that Russia was guilty of xenophobia, and stated that while Moscow might have to back off from its heavy-handed tactics under pressure from the West, the Kremlin’s goal would still be to crush Georgia. “They tried to kill us by taking a hammer to our heads,” said Rondeli. “Maybe now they will try a more sophisticated approach - like trying to suffocate us with a silk scarf.”
Tensions between Russia and Georgia have increased throughout 2006. Certainly relations between the two countries have been strained since Mikheil Saakashvili came to power in 2003 and they haven’t been particularly good at any time since the breakup of the Soviet Union. But this year has seen a marked escalation in both rhetoric and actions from both sides. In March, Russia banned imports of Georgian wines, and in May, Georgian mineral water was added to the list of prohibited items. In both cases, Gennady Onishchenko, the head of Russia’s public health watchdog, stated that the move was health-related, citing the prevalence of pirated Georgian wines and waters on the Russian market, and branding them a danger to Russian consumers. Few doubted, however, that the move had political overtones, and within days of the wine ban, controversial Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili decried the action, stating that Russian consumers were exceptionally un-sophisticated, and that on the Russian market, “even feces can be sold.”
In late September, things got nastier, and the regional spat turned into a geopolitical clash that made the front page across the world, as Georgia arrested four Russian army officers stationed in the Caucasus on charges of spying and fomenting a coup against the Georgian government. As Moscow howled in protest, calling the Georgian actions “blackmail” and “hostage taking,” Georgia relented and gave back the officers in an OSCE-brokered handover. But Russia’s pride had already been wounded, and Moscow responded with harsh words, and a ban on all transport and postal links between the two countries, with threats of more to come. The Russian Embassy in Tbilisi, for all intents and purposes, closed down, with almost all staff evacuated and a complete moratorium on the issuance of visas.
An e-mail circulated by the Georgian Ministry of Defense outlined “acts of bigotry and xenophobia” against Georgians living in Russia, including the arrest and imprisonment of 300 Georgian citizens who had not committed any crimes, the demand that schools hand over lists of children with Georgian surnames to the police so that their families could be checked for proper documentation, and police storming the guesthouse of the Georgian Embassy claiming that the lease had expired.
Fortunately there were signs that the madness had not penetrated all levels of officialdom. One amusing article published in the liberal Moscow weekly Bolshoi Gorod featured an author horrified by the events and determined to prove a point with some hard-hitting investigative journalism. She spent a whole day dressed in rags, pretending to be “Nino Arziani,” a Georgian immigrant with no documents. Yet at every turn, despite her suspicious appearance, the police failed to stop her, and when she finally gave herself up as a documentless Georgian, she was told by a kindly police officer to go home, because the conditions in the holding centers were not too pleasant.
Still, a lot of the accusations were true. Across Moscow, Georgian restaurants and businesses were raided, with police going after “criminal elements” that quite possibly existed, but had not been subject to police action before the political confrontation. Georgians were rounded up, and deportation flights began to leave Moscow.
The escalation of the crisis can also be seen through the prism of domestic politics in the two countries. Many analysts found it just a little suspicious that the spy scandal, which was dealt with theatrically, and engineered to get as much media coverage as possible, came just a few days before local elections in Georgia. With many Georgians not noticing much economic improvement under Saakashvili, uniting the country against an outside enemy is an age-old trick that seems to have worked for the Georgian leader, at least for now.
Oksana Antonenko, senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, said that internal politics within Russia might also have played a part in Moscow’s response. “The Russian reaction was a demonstration of the domestic need for great power self-identity,” said the analyst. “It was very easy to consolidate the political elites against Georgia, because anti-Georgian feelings have been running so high in Russia. Georgia was a very easy target.” This was partly down to Georgia’s own failings, said Antonenko. “The Georgians have never made an effort to use their powerful diaspora in Russia as an interest group to put Georgia’s case to influential circles in Moscow,” she said.
Over a month after the economic blockade came into effect, while the countries stopped short of edging into outright conflict, there is no sign of an amelioration of relations on the horizon. South Ossetia’s referendum vote on Nov. 12 could prove to be a trigger for further problems, with Russia seen by many in Georgia and the international community as a destabilizing force in the breakaway region. Tensions in South Ossetia have not been helped by Gazprom’s recent announcement that it plans to build a pipeline directly into South Ossetia, which should start providing the territory with its own gas as soon as the winter of 2007. Georgia’s Foreign Ministry responded by saying that the pipeline was illegal, as it would enter Georgian territory without the permission of the authorities in Tbilisi.
On Nov. 2, Gazprom announced that it wants to raise the price that Georgia pays for gas from $100 to $230 per 1,000 cubic meters. And on Nov. 8, The Moscow Times reported that Gazprom’s deputy CEO Alexander Medvedev stated that if Georgia were to refuse the deal, the taps would be switched off, saying: “If there is no deal, there will be no supplies.” The scenario seems eerily similar to the standoff with Ukraine a year ago. Saakashvili said that he hoped to negotiate the price with Putin at a CIS summit in Minsk in November.
Gela Bezhuashvili, the Georgian foreign minister, visited Moscow on Nov. 2 to meet with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and reported that the talks had been constructive. “Our quest to build a free and democratic country is by no means is directed against any state,” the minister told journalists after the meeting. “At the same time this is something we, as a nation, cannot give up.” His words symbolized the fact that Georgia has learned to speak in language that the West understands, portraying itself as a democratic underdog fighting an imperialist Russia, despite the fact that Saakashvili’s domestic policies fall short of democratic norms in many areas.
“Gradually, I expect the sanctions to be eroded, and a return perhaps not to normality, but at least we should see the issue drop down the agenda,” said Antonenko. “But if Georgia decides to leave the CIS, it will give Russia another reason for a bout of anti-Georgian hysteria.” With the decision on the CIS, the South Ossetian referendum, and the winter coming with gas prices on the rise, nobody can be sure that relations between Moscow and Tbilisi will get any warmer in the near future. It might be some time yet before Muscovites can enjoy a glass of Saperavi wine, or Tbilisi residents can hop on an Aeroflot flight to Moscow.
