According to the Pentagon, several aspects of China's military development have "surprised" US analysts, including the speed and scope of improvements to its strategic nuclear missiles. Another worry is Beijing's focus on ways of striking the US aircraft carrier groups that would intervene in any conflict over Taiwan. By coincidence, the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies released its latest assessment of the world's armed forces last week. It, too, used the word "surprising" to describe Chinese military advances.
At least once a year, China is accused by the US of furtively modernising the People's Liberation Army in order to extend its strategic influence. At least once a year, China denies the charge, dismisses US claims as exaggerated and says its aims are peaceful.
This ritual, celebrated again in Washington and Beijing last week, exists because the US defence department is required by Congress to produce an annual report on Chinese military power. It nevertheless has a certain value: the Pentagon's China reports are admirably dispassionate, and the un-expectedly rapid emergence of the next superpower is a legitimate concern for the US and for other governments.
According to the Pentagon, several aspects of China's military development have "surprised" US analysts, including the speed and scope of improvements to its strategic nuclear missiles. Another worry is Beijing's focus on ways of striking the US aircraft carrier groups that would intervene in any conflict over Taiwan. By coincidence, the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies released its latest assessment of the world's armed forces last week. It, too, used the word "surprising" to describe Chinese military advances.
Even so, no one seriously challenges China's right as a nation state with long borders and a heavy dependence on imported oil to invest in its armed forces as its economy grows. Although Chinese defence spending has soared in the past decade, the statistics do not suggest a country on a war footing.
The IISS estimates that total Chinese defence-related expenditure reached Dollars 39.6bn in 2003 at market exchange rates, amounting to 2.7 per cent of gross domestic product that year, compared with 3.7 per cent of GDP in the US and 2.4 per cent in South Korea. Using purchasing power parity numbers gives a more realistic Chinese sum of Dollars 75.5bn, making China the second biggest military spender, ahead of Russia but far behind the US with Dollars 456bn.
Chinese spending on the modernisation of its large but hitherto ill-equipped armed forces is therefore not wildly disproportionate or unduly alarming in the short term.
What is troublesome is the level of secrecy and deception that surrounds the process, as both the Pentagon and the IISS make clear. The IISS estimates real defence spending is about 1.7 times the official budget, while the Pentagon puts the true figure at two to three times the amount disclosed by Beijing's Communist party leaders. If they lie about the figures, who is to say they are not lying about their intentions?
In their report, the Pentagon's analysts sagely quote the "24-character" security and foreign policy strategy of the late Deng Xiaoping, China's paramount leader, which includes a phrase about the need to "hide our capacities and bide our time". On this score, Washington is right to worry about the world's emerging military giant.
