By Bronwen Maddox
ON THE face of it, the nuclear deal that President Bush signed with India yesterday is outrageous.
It blows a hole in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), just as the world is trying to deter Iran from its nuclear aims. It gives India too much, and demands too little.
There is some truth in these fears. For good reason, the US Congress, which must approve the deal, will give Bush a very hard time as it scrutinises the terms.
Yet this protest is too stark. There is more good in the deal than the objections admit.
The deal answers one of the biggest problems of the NPT: what should be done about countries that already have the bomb, but have never signed the treaty?
It also delivers the message that for those countries prepared to engage with the West, all the bounty that they might dream of can be theirs: a warm welcome in Washington, trade and, yes, nuclear technology.
At the moment, the Iran threat is probably best dealt with through the letter of the NPT, and through threats. But in the end, it is surely the lure of engagement with the West that stands the best chance of winning it round.
These are the terms of yesterday’s deal:
- India will irreversibly classify 14 of its 22 nuclear power reactors as civilian;
- For the first time, they will be regularly inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog;
- The rest will be labelled as military sites and will not be inspected;
- India will continue to observe a freeze on nuclear testing;
- In return, the US will give India civilian nuclear help.
The key word is “irreversibly”. India had not wanted to make this concession, for fear it would put a cap on military work. But many would say that it makes little difference.
India is still free to expand its military programme. It probably has enough plutonium already for all conceivable needs. And, some sceptics say, “irreversible” is a slippery word in diplomacy, as the years go by.
The deal does offend the principles of the NPT. Under that treaty, apart from the five states that were first to get nuclear weapons (US, Russia, China, France and Britain), countries were to receive help with civil nuclear power only if they did not seek weapons.
India, which has never signed the NPT, shocked the world with its nuclear test in 1998. Pakistan promptly followed suit.
Critics say that this agreement sends unhelpful signals to Iran.
On Monday, the board of the IAEA will meet yet again to discuss how to put pressure on Iran to discourage it from its nuclear ambitions (which it insists are entirely peaceful).
For that reason alone, Congress will give Bush a hard time as it considers the terms. So will the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the 45 countries that trade in nuclear technology. The group includes China, which may threaten to withhold support unless the US says a similar deal for Pakistan could be in the offing.
But is the deal really that damaging? For years, those battling to enforce the NPT have had to grapple with one glaring fact: India, Pakistan and Israel all have nuclear weapons (assumed if not declared, in Israel’s case). Yet none of them has signed the treaty.
Mark Fitzpatrick, non-proliferation specialist at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, says that the “positive” part of the deal is that “it recognises that India cannot be treated as a pariah for ever” because it has the bomb.
How should the credibility of the NPT be upheld, in trying to lean on Iran? He argues that it can be, by spelling out why India is not like Iran: “It has a record of keeping its commitments, protecting its (nuclear) technology (and not exporting it), and it is an open and pluralistic society.”
This is surely right. The importance of Bush’s trip is that it acknowledged — much too late, in many ways — that India’s importance cannot be overlooked.
Critics will call him opportunistic for giving this giant help that he wants the world to deny Iran.
But this is one time when realism is justified. Yesterday’s imperfect deal is good news.
