What Kosovo Can Do for the Former Soviet States
Over the course of this year, the international community aims to complete negotiations over the final status of Kosovo, which has remained in flux since NATO’s 1999 bombing campaign. Since that time, Kosovo has remained territorially a part of Serbia and Montenegro, but has been governed by the United Nations Interim Administration for Kosovo. As a result, Kosovo remains a politically dysfunctional and economically devastated region, where unemployment runs at over 40 percent and relations between ethnic Albanians and Serbs are still defined by hostility. This situation provides the most powerful argument for granting Kosovo new internationally recognized status. In its current form, Kosovo has no prospects for progressing towards greater stability, democracy and prosperity. A new, internationally recognized status will allow the people of Kosovo to take responsibility for their own future, while introducing clear and strict conditions that will guide future international engagement and assistance. These conditions include the development of democratic institutions, including respect for minority rights.
While the United States and the EU have pushed for international recognition of Kosovo’s independence, Russia has traditionally supported Serbia’s territorial integrity, with Kosovo as an integral part. Recently, however, Moscow has indicated a change in its policy, opening a path towards conditional recognition of Kosovo’s independence. These conditions were advanced by President Vladimir Putin in January, when he said that any future recognition of Kosovo’s independence will create a precedent which could be universally applied to other unrecognized de facto states, particularly those that have emerged from the former Soviet Union.
Frozen conflicts
The dissolution of the Soviet Union ignited a number of violent ethnic clashes across its territory, and in the South Caucasus in particular. As a result of these conflicts, four self-declared states emerged in the early 1990s – the republics of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transdnestr. Abkhazia and South Ossetia seek independence from Georgia, Transdnestr from Moldova and Nagorno-Karabakh is torn between Armenia and Azerbaijan. All of these have now existed under such conditions for more than a decade, defying international isolation and economic, political and humanitarian constraints emanating from their unrecognized status. All of them have developed some form of functioning economy and security systems and have conducted referenda on independence and held several rounds of elections, none of which were recognized or properly observed by the international community. This situation has created a generation of “citizens” who are committed to preserving and defending their independence.
These republics see the Kosovo precedent as possible means to advance their aims of gaining recognition. The president of Abkhazia, Sergei Bagapsh, has said that the recognition of an independent Kosovo could accelerate the recognition of an independent Abkhazia. Eduard Kokoity, the president of South Ossetia, has described the change in Russia’s position as a symbol of the end of a “double standard” approach towards the plight of all unrecognized states.
However, Russia’s plea for universality, backed by heightened expectations from the unrecognized states themselves, is unlikely to be endorsed by the international community. The EU and the United States have already responded with statements that any decision on Kosovo’s status should be treated on its own merits, and not as a precedent for other conflicts, which must be resolved based on their unique characteristics and on existing international legal strictures. This response takes into account a number of pragmatic, strategic and geopolitical factors.
The pragmatists contend that there are major differences between the Kosovo case and those of the unrecognized post-Soviet entities. Indeed, while there are some clear similarities between Balkan conflicts and those of the former Soviet states, there are also major differences, mainly deriving from how the entities were formed. Post-1999 Kosovo was shaped by a broad international consensus, with major powers playing an active role in the development of its political institutions, as well as in guaranteeing security and order on the ground.
In contrast, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdnestr developed in isolation from the wider international community, with Russia playing the role of key mediator and sole guarantor of security and economic survival. Moreover, each of the entities differs in terms of d
