"The real lesson Iran learned from North Korea is that high-stakes brinksmanship brings rewards," arms control expert Mark Fitzpatrick wrote in Survival, a publication of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Fitzpatrick, a former State Department official, noted that North Korea's pullout from the nuclear arms control treaty gives credence to Iranian threats to do the same, "especially when North Korea paid no discernible price for it."
SINGAPORE (AP) - Less than two weeks after world powers offered Iran an incentives package over its nuclear program, satellite images detected signs North Korea might be preparing to test a ballistic missile.
Was the timing a coincidence?
Or was North Korea, miffed at the offer of peaceful nuclear technology and other perks dangling before Iran, trying to extract similar concessions?
Any answer is speculative - North Korea has one of the most secretive leaderships in the world, and the missile has yet to leave the launch pad. But analysts believe Tehran and Pyongyang have learned from each other as they use defiance and diplomacy to deal with the international community, although there is no clear sign they coordinate policy.
"Iran has learned key insights from North Korea's negotiating and bargaining tactics, including the importance of maintaining strategic ambivalence over its nuclear program," Lee Chung Min, a Korean expert on Asian security, wrote in an e-mail to The Associated Press.
"Both are pariah states, fiercely nationalistic and mistrustful of the great powers. So, they probably share a common bond in terms of their world views, i.e., that nuclear weapons can provide prestige and power against a very hostile external environment," wrote Lee, a professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in Singapore.
The Islamic leadership in Iran, an oil-rich country that is hostile to Israel, and the reclusive dictatorship in North Korea, divided from South Korea and reliant on China for food and fuel, share little cultural or political affinity.
But Iran has been a longtime customer of North Korean missile technology, and both states were linked to the defunct network of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the founder of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program who admitted passing nuclear technology to other countries.
North Korea pulled out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003 after ejecting U.N. inspectors, resumed work at its plutonium-based reactor and shifted from denials or ambiguity to defiant affirmations that it made atomic bombs.
Six-party talks hosted by China stalled and the United Nations has not taken punitive action against Pyongyang. North Korea has enough nuclear material for four to 13 warheads, though little is known about its ability to make an atomic weapon, said David Albright and Paul Brannan of the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security.
The experts based their report, released Monday, on North Korean statements, commercial satellite images and information from officials and experts in Japan, South Korea and the United States.
Many analysts believe Iran, which says its nuclear program is intended to make electricity, is years away from making a nuclear weapon.
Tehran is considering a Western incentives package offered June 6 that would require it to suspend uranium enrichment, a process that can produce fuel for electric plants or the material for nuclear warheads. The offer is similar to one North Korea accepted in 1994, though that deal later unraveled.
Iran, which suspended uranium enrichment in 2004 to foster talks with Europe and avert U.N. sanctions, vowed to resume full-scale enrichment in February after the U.N. atomic watchdog agency referred it to the Security Council.
"The real lesson Iran learned from North Korea is that high-stakes brinksmanship brings rewards," arms control expert Mark Fitzpatrick wrote in Survival, a publication of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Fitzpatrick, a former State Department official, noted that North Korea's pullout from the nuclear arms control treaty gives credence to Iranian threats to do the same, "especially when North Korea paid no discernible price for it."
Analysts say Iran and North Korea recognize the benefit of delays, allowing more time to work on nuclear programs and gain leverage in talks. The nations are also aware a nuclear deterrent could prevent a fate similar to that of Saddam Hussein.
"Whether they are watching each other's situation is hard to know, but it is clear that one of Iran's key motivations for pushing ahead with its nuclear program has been that North Korea has not been invaded because they have possible nuclear and missile capabilities," Khalid Al-Rodhan, a visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, wrote in an e-mail message.
The United States has about 29,500 troops stationed in South Korea, a legacy of the 1950-53 Korean War. North Korea has heavy concentrations of troops and artillery along the border with South Korea, and the prospect of another conflict like the Korean War, however remote, is arguably as strong a deterrent as any weapons of mass destruction in its possession.
The U.S. has said it would join direct talks with Iran as part of the incentive package, a position that undoubtedly drew notice in North Korea. Pyongyang has long demanded direct talks with Washington, but so far has had to settle for meetings on the sidelines of the six-party talks.
Despite their differences, Iran and North Korea share a deep suspicion of U.S. intentions, and an instinct for survival.
"One key danger is that if Iran is cornered through sanctions or arms embargoes, North Korea is unlikely to comply and can sell Iran nuclear technology or the know-how to weaponize it," al-Rhodan wrote.
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Christopher Torchia was The AP's bureau chief in South Korea from 1999 to 2004.
