By Oksana Antonenko
Special to Russia Profile
Beginning of the End or End of the Beginning?
For many foreign policy experts worldwide, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) represents something between a remnant of the Soviet legacy and a virtual institution known only for the elaborate ceremonies that surround its summits. Those who view Russia with suspicion tend to see the CIS as a way for Russia to assert geopolitical pressure on its neighbors.
These views are not unheard of within the CIS itself. Even Russian President Vladimir Putin recently characterized the CIS as a mere instrument “for a civilized [post-Soviet] divorce,” and has not excluded the possibility that the CIS might cease to exist in the future if it is unable to reform itself.
Post-revolutionary governments in Georgia and Ukraine face domestic political pressure on their role in the CIS and whether they should continue membership. So far, they have decided to remain part of the organization and push their agenda on political and economic discussions from within, while at the same time avoiding any institutional integration or participation in cooperative projects.
In contrast, other CIS member states such as Kazakhstan and Belarus have criticized the slow pace of integration within the organization. Along with Russia, they have moved to establish other regional groupings with more ambitious agendas, such as the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
With so many different member perspectives, it seems that the CIS is doomed unless it can reinvent itself.
Secrets of CIS survival
Despite the constant presence of skeptical voices both inside and outside the CIS, this regional organization has not only survived more than a decade of major geo-strategic turbulence, but has recently embarked on a search for a new identity. A package of proposals on CIS reform adopted at the group’s August 2005 summit in Kazan indicated that the majority of CIS members do not believe that the current status quo within the organizationis desirable, or even sustainable. However, these documents –and the lack of practical follow-up – raise many questions about reform and whether the CIS can effectively reinvent itself.
It is unclear what the organization means for its members today. The most common argument for its existence is that it was kept alive by Russia, which sought to recreate some semblance of the old Soviet system. But this simple explanation treats the former Soviet states as objects of Russian policy, rather than independent actors that have helped to shape the CIS, and as such does not provide a complete picture of the group.
Another explanation is based on the premise that the CIS was built on a number of complex bargains and pragmatic synergies of interests among all the member states. Some of the failures of the reasons given for the CIS’s existence have turned out to be forces that have kept the organization together. This helps explain why, despite diverging domestic political systems, persistent regional rivalries and the proliferation of alternative cooperation frameworks – all 12 CIS members remain within the organization almost 15 years after the breakup of the Soviet Union.
The CIS was initially envisioned as a neo-Soviet project at the time of its creation in 1991. This stage of development lasted until 1993, when membership in the group – which includes all former Soviet subjects except the Baltic States – was finalized. By the end of the 1990s, the objective of recreating a Soviet Union in a new non-ideological form had lost its appeal almost universally within the CIS. The political elites throughout the member states have embraced national sovereignty, which brought not only new opportunities for international engagement, but also some clear and immediate financial rewards. In these circumstances, the CIS has been downgraded to a convenient facade, behind which the newly independent states have negotiated and implemented their new national projects. As a symbol with little or no practical content, the CIS has helped the political elites in its member states advance their respective nation-building projects without losing support from those parts of their societies that suffered most from the Soviet collapse, and who hoped that national projects would be accompanied by the return of old Soviet economic and social standards.
Second, as was initially posited, the CIS has failed to become a regional mechanism for resolving practical and immediate problems in Eurasia, such as economic and political reform, and a variety of security problems – from conflicts in the Caucasus to the insurgency in Uzbekistan’s Ferghana valley. The fact that the CIS has not exhibited problem-solving ambitions of this type is linked to the fact that its members – whether individually or working together through the organization – lacked the capacity to attempt any practical solutions.
Instead, therefore, the CIS evolved into a platform where the key problems are identified and discussed not only at the highest political level but, perhaps more importantly, at inter-agency and inter-governmental levels. This is particularly true for regular meetings of CIS officials from the interior ministries and the customs, migration and security services. CIS anti-terrorism initiatives have promoted cooperation in the exchange of information, harmonization of legislation, and terms for the capture and extradition of terrorists. The CIS Parliamentary Assembly has also played an important role in providing a platform for members of legislatures from across the region to meet and discuss difficult and controversial topics.
While there is a high level of cooperation between the CIS nations, the organization has failed to preserve the region as a single geopolitical space. This objective is often described as one of Russia’s chief motivations in its support of the CIS. In reality, however, the existence of the CIS has yet to present a significant obstacle for regional states to develop closer ties with other influential players including NATO, through the Partnership for Peace program, the European Union and United States. In fact, the CIS has never been able to put forward strong
collective geopolitical demands to other powers in Eurasia, unlike, for example, the SCO and CSTO. But neither has this “geopolitical transparency” on the part of the CIS led to its disintegration. On the contrary, since its members were not placed in the position where they had to choose between membership and developing ties to other players, there was no need to contemplate pulling out. Any attempts to change these rules are likely to challenge the future of CIS and, in particular, its future as a comprehensive regional body.
Finally, the CIS has not become a vehicle for promoting a certain set of values, or even for encouraging a communality of political systems. In this respect, the CIS model for cooperation is much closer to that of ASEAN than that of the EU. The interesting fact, however, is that the democratic states in Eurasia do not view their CIS membership as being incompatible with domestic political reforms. In fact the first country that downgraded its status within the CIS from that of full membership to associated status was Turkmenistan, hardly a democratic state. Therefore, while the CIS has not been an active promoter of democracy, neither has it been a major obstacle to political reforms.
The Russia challenge and challenges for Russia
An important factor that has helped to assure the survival of the CIS is that, despite all the predictions and fears, it has not evolved into a mere instrument of Russian hegemony in Eurasia. There is no doubt that Russia was, and remains, the most powerful player within the CIS. To a large extent, Russia provides the key rationale behind the organization’s existence. Indeed, it would be hard to see how the CIS could have been established and preserved for so many years without Russia.
Russia, as the successor to the Soviet Union, has taken upon itself the responsibility to preserve and manage this legacy. Russia has significant interests in all CIS states and the resources to finance regional CIS projects. Its military is based or engaged throughout the CIS region, often without political or legal agreements with the host country.
Finally, it has a large and growing economy, a large number of CIS citizens within its borders – as well as a significant number of its own nationals living expatriate in the CIS – and significant political leverage. All of these factors make Russia an essential, if not a feared, partner for other CIS states. However, Russia’s preoccupation with internal challenges, its longstanding preference for closer partnership with Western Europe and the United States over CIS members, and its declining understanding of realities within the CIS have all helped to mitigate concerns about Russia’s power within the group.
Russia’s policy in the CIS has been in pursuit of a post-imperial, rather then a neo-imperial agenda. This agenda, with regard to the CIS region as a whole, is carried out primarily through bilateral, increasingly economic, deals with individual states, rather then through a complex multilateral forum.
In this post-imperial paradigm, Russia faces two sets of challenges. The first is its position as the single indispensable CIS member. For many years it was largely Russia’s responsibility and initiative that kept the CIS going, initiated ideas and promoted projects. Russia has been, by far, the largest contributor to the CIS budget and the sole contributor of peacekeeping troops for CIS sanctioned operations in Tajikistan and Georgia. Yet Russia’s interest in the CIS has long been declining as it sought to advance a more ambitious agenda under other auspices, such as the CES or CSTO.
The second challenge is that Russia’s involvement in the CIS underlines significant constraints on its power and influence in the region. Unlike the situation in the 1990s, when many CIS states were both weak and dependent on Russia, current circumstances mean that Russia cannot simply impose its vision or decisions on other CIS members. One example of this is the recent decision to close down the CIS headquarters for the coordination of military cooperation, despite initial reluctance from Russia’s side. Moreover, Russia has not been able to forge a complete consensus behind many of its proposals on CIS reform. During the latest summit in Kazan, none of the proposals initiated primarily by Russia was signed by all of the CIS members.
Future prospects
Today the CIS represents different things for different members and, as such, helps to reconcile – if not resolve – the complex set of problems and relationships currently facing Eurasia. For Russia, the organization is an instrument of its new regional projects; for Belarus and Uzbekistan, it is increasingly a collective instrument for protecting the current governments from outside pressure; for Georgia and Ukraine, it is a place to voice their concerns over Russian policies by way of a multilateral format that provides them with more leverage than is available in asymmetrical bilateral relations; for Kazakhstan, it is a vehicle for realizing its economic, and increasingly political, ambitions in its own sub-region; and, for Armenia and Azerbaijan, it is a platform for assuring that the current delicate balance around the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has not been distorted in favor of one party or the other.
The mini “multi-polarity phenomenon” within the CIS hinders Russia’s ability to dominate the group. New poles have emerged not only in the form of active and internationally supported governments in Georgia and Ukraine, but also due to the emergence of other strong players in CIS, such as oil-rich Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, with new regional ambitions. Even traditional strategic partners like Armenia and Tajikistan seek to balance their relations with Russia effectively with closer strategic dialogue, and even cooperation with other players, including the United States. Only Belarus and Uzbekistan, who have found themselves isolated by the international community, are ready to provide Russia with almost unconditional support within the CIS, and this is likely to change if there is a change in their domestic political situation.
A new pluralism of interests and objectives within the CIS represents both a challenge and an opportunity for the organization. If this pluralism is preserved and institutionalized, then the CS has a good chance to evolve beyond the end of its opening chapter and to emerge as a lasting player in Eurasia. If, on the other hand, the current healthy diversity is sacrificed for a new geopolitical project, with the CIS as its core instrument, we are more likely to witness the beginning of the end of the CIS, not only as an organization, but as a regional concept in general.
