There are justifiable concerns in the Arab world that the current debate over a draft United Nations Security Council resolution could plunge Lebanon into a civil war. Because of Lebanon's structural weakness, Hizbollah's guns could be turned against its competitors in the country instead of against Israel. While this is alarming, there is a much larger danger: that similar confrontations could be triggered elsewhere in the Middle East.
The crux of the problem in Lebanon is that a political movement became bigger than the state - not far behind a state takeover in the manner of the Taliban in Afghanistan before 2001. The same syndrome - a perceived lack of legitimacy of governments that are being challenged by armed political movements - can be seen in many Arab and Muslim states. The challenge today is therefore not just to achieve a ceasefire and a sustainable solution in Lebanon, but to secure a more comprehensive framework for peace in the Middle East that prevents the "Lebanon syndrome" from spreading throughout the region. Otherwise, there will be many Lebanons.
Across the Muslim world, a civil war is raging between Islamic groups such as Hizbollah and modern states; between fundamentalists and moderates. The movements' strategy to undermine ruling elites has been to confront the outside world, especially America and Israel. Their message is that movements can do what states failed to do, and can restore the honour that governments have squandered. They can confront America as al-Qaeda did on September 11 2001. They can confront Israel in the same way that Hamas and Islamic Jihad do on a daily basis in Gaza. They can challenge Israeli military power as Hizbollah does in Lebanon. By taking action against the US and Israel, these movements gain popularity in the "Arab street".
In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood is capitalising on popular anger about the war in Lebanon. Like Hizbollah, it has a militia, although it is underground. In Jordan, Islamists are contesting the power of the king and criticising him on the basis of his supposed inability to stand up to Israel and the US.
The challenge from Islamic movements to the state extends from north Africa to the Gulf. In Algeria, there is a continuing risk of a return to civil war. In Tunisia, the Nahda Islamic movements remain extremely strong. Osama bin Laden's ultimate objective is to take over the Saudi state. In Palestine, Hamas won the election. In Kuwait, Islamists represent a majority of the Kuwaiti parliament. The Shia Muslims of Bahrain continuously rebel against the Kingdom. The Union of Islamic Courts has taken over in Somalia.
The Arab state is being weakened not only by internal dynamics but also by the changing strategic environment in the region and beyond. Rivalry between Iran and the US for regional hegemony produces two competing political projects that undermine Arab governments. Tehran undermines them from within by supporting groups such as Hizbollah, while the US undermines them from without: in the eyes of the ruling Arab elites, Washington's pressure for democratisation is regime change by other means.
Prince Saud al-Faisal, the Saudi foreign minister, complained that Washington had handed over Iraq to Iran and to Iran's allies inside Iraq. Hosni Mubarak, president of Egypt, suggested that the loyalty of Shia Muslims in the Gulf was more to Iran than to their own countries. King Abdullah of Jordan has warned against the rise of Shia power and the dominance of Iran over Arab politics, saying the Shia crescent is the most immediate threat to Jordan.
While Arab governments and their media stress the Iranian threat, political movements such as Hizbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood emphasise the US threat. What we see now in Lebanon and Iraq therefore could be the start of a war between Arab Sunni states and Shia Iran and its clients.
This broader context further complicates the situation in Lebanon. The Israeli attack on Hizbollah further marginalises the Lebanese government, thereby making Hizbollah more powerful - almost as the de facto state. The Hizbollah flag is being raised in capitals such as Cairo and Rabat. As a result, centres of moderation in the Middle East are undermined.
If fundamentalist groups continue to gain the upper hand in the Middle East, tribal and religious passions will become the main drivers of political life. The US and the rest of the world should take into account the concerns of moderate states and moderate elements within Muslim societies - or else Washington's desire to create a "new" Middle East may bring to the fore a very old one. To avoid this, the US and Europe have no option but to tip the balance in favour of moderate governments. One way would be to convene an international conference similar to the one in Madrid in 1991 after the first Gulf war to address the root of the problem, namely to solve the issue of Palestine and get the world behind the idea of the two-state solution. Only then can the world deny the Islamists their ultimate rallying cry, take the Middle East from the hands of the Islamist movements and put it back in the world of nation states.
The writer is director of the Middle East programme at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London
