Iran's nuclear option is not imminent as it appears to be at least several years away from producing enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon, an important strategic study suggested here Tuesday.
The survey by the respected International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) "Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes" launched this morning, also raises questions as whether Iran has the expertise to fabricate a nuclear weapon from this material.
It believed that the "worst case scenario" assumes that Tehran blatantly reaches for nuclear weapons without regard for international reaction.
LONDON, Sept 6 (KUNA) -- Iran's nuclear option is not imminent as it appears to be at least several years away from producing enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon, an important strategic study suggested here Tuesday.
The survey by the respected International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) "Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes" launched this morning, also raises questions as whether Iran has the expertise to fabricate a nuclear weapon from this material.
It believed that the "worst case scenario" assumes that Tehran blatantly reaches for nuclear weapons without regard for international reaction.
Summarising the study, IISS director Dr John Chipman and IISS director of studies Dr Gary Samore, editor of the dossier, said that up to now Iran has been more cautious.
It has been prepared to accept delays and limits in its nuclear activities in the interests of dividing international opposition and avoiding confrontation.
The assessment by this independent think tank also believes that rather than dash for a bomb, Iran may seek gradually to acquire a much more substantial nuclear production capability over a decade or more.
This could be done, for example, by completing a large-scale centrifuge plant for producing nuclear fuel, before it decides whether to exercise a weapons option.
Turning to international diplomacy, the think tank said that the challenge in these circumstances is "a delicate one".
On the one hand it will be important to apply pressure and create inducements to persuade Iran not to develop a fuel cycle capability that it could later turn into a weapons programme, the study reckoned.
On the other hand, it will be important to apply international diplomacy in a way that does not inspire Iran to abandon all restraint and seek a nuclear weapons capability.
The dossier provides a comprehensive technical evaluation of Iran's chemical and biological weapons capabilities, in addition to its nuclear programme.
In each case, the dossier includes a detailed history of Iran's efforts to develop strategic capabilities including political motivations, technical accomplishments and difficulties, and sources of external assistance.
Furthermore, the dossier provides an assessment of Iran's current capabilities, explaining what is known and what is unknown, and projects potential future developments.
The study also looks at Tehran's political calculations such as its willingness to risk international reaction and jeopardise other political and economic interests to obtain a nuclear weapons capability.
In answer to questions, Dr Gary Samore and Dr John Chipman said that Iran's nuclear issue would be referred to the UN Security Council if Iran does not comply with its obligations to the International Atomic Energy Agency and to the non-proliferation treaty (NPT).
One scenario, they suggested, would be that if Iran's nuclear issue would be referred to the Security Council then the Council would adopt a mandatory resolution calling on Tehran to stop enriching uranium.
This would lead later to the adoption of specific diplomatic and economic sanctions against Iran.
On the likelihood of the use of force, Dr Chipman and Dr Samore suggested that this is not an attractive option.
