Indian strategists, ordinarily, should have been delighted at the recently concluded International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) conference held in New Delhi discussing the rise and apparent unveiling of India as the new global power. Except, Minister Kamal Nath in his opening remarks began by expressing his discomfort with the concept of power', a theme that dominated the rest of the proceedings. His reasoning, unsurprisingly for a trade minister, was based on economic grounds but it also reflected a mindset that looks confidently at the successes of the past and is hesitant of future challenges and opportunities. In some ways, this is disingenuous as the past, from an institutional perspective at least, is either misread or unknown.
08 May 2008: Indian Express
Indian strategists, ordinarily, should have been delighted at the recently concluded International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) conference held in New Delhi discussing the rise and apparent unveiling of India as the new global power. Except, Minister Kamal Nath in his opening remarks began by expressing his discomfort with the concept of power', a theme that dominated the rest of the proceedings. His reasoning, unsurprisingly for a trade minister, was based on economic grounds but it also reflected a mindset that looks confidently at the successes of the past and is hesitant of future challenges and opportunities. In some ways, this is disingenuous as the past, from an institutional perspective at least, is either misread or unknown.
Moreover, in terms of institutional capacities, and this perhaps explains the discomfort with the concept of power, India has yet to understand what rising power entails. Finally, what the conference failed to capture was the generational divide', with rising economic and political ambitions of a young India. One of the strangest ironies of the conference was witnessing foreign delegates hailing the rise of India as a new global power while Indian participants were quick to underplay this.
To a student of Indian history, this should not be surprising - attaining independence in a non-violent' manner and suffering from years of colonialism, the Indian political and intellectual class has traditionally been wary of the concept of hard power'. The internalisation of the non-aligned mantra - which essentially was a strategy of the weak to play a disproportionate role in global affairs while safeguarding India's strategic autonomy' - cemented this pattern. Hence, despite Indira Gandhi's liberation of Bangladesh, against the wishes of most global powers, India is still perceptually uncomfortable with the idea of power. Possibly, part of the explanation could be what was told to Peter Parker when he reluctantly launched his career as Spiderman - "with great power comes great responsibility". India's apparent unwillingness to take on this responsibility appears, to outsiders at least, as if it wants to be a free rider'. However, it also displays certain structural weaknesses within institutions that handle diplomatic, military, economic and political power. As highlighted by other commentators, India lacks the soft infrastructure' of foreign and defence policy.
Finally, the discordance between the military and the MOD was on display at the conference. It will be appropriate to keep in mind for the future that, "great power comes from great institutions." Part of the problem is that the past, in terms of institutional memory and knowledge, is largely unknown. Despite repeated calls for initiating a declassification procedure that opens up archives, a political-bureaucratic nexus has stymied all efforts. As a result scholars, institutions and the country as a whole suffer from a lack of self-knowledge. For instance, there is not one impartial or scholarly account of the functioning of the MEA, MOD, MHA, armed forces, paramilitary or even the police forces! Instead, what we have are self-serving accounts written by former officials who, then, emerge as experts' in their own domain. In effect, by not examining our past we are largely ignorant about it. This translates, directly, into not knowing where we are in the present in terms of our strengths and weaknesses and, as a consequence, are unable to plan for the future. In sum, India's so called lack of strategic culture' can be directly attributed to this problem.
What the IISS conference failed to capture was the generational divide in India. As India continues to do well in the corporate, economic and even cultural field, there is an emerging generation of young Indians who are increasingly confident and unencumbered by legacies of the past. This is the generation that is comfortable with the idea of power, and can be best illustrated by, now, the most Indian' of all sports - cricket. During the recent tour of Australia, India's cricket team, composed of mainly small town players, gave a fitting reply to the infamous Aussie sledging', and then some.
This Chak de generation, however, would do well to keep in mind Thucydides' observations in the History of the Peloponnesian War, where he warns against the dangers of acting hastily on democratic impulses. While debating the wisdom of launching what eventually proved to be the disastrous Sicilian expedition, Thucydides noted how a "passion for the enterprise and... excessive enthusiasm" drove the Athenians to the fatal decision. Reconciling this tension between a can-do' attitude that can defend the national interests, with democracy's proclivity for impossible projects will be the challenge for the next generation. However, this mission is impossible unless we know who we are.
The writer is a PhD candidate at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC
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