30 March 2009 : Stimson Center
On March 4, 2009, the Stimson Center hosted the fourth in a series of meetings on Nuclear Trend Lines and Tipping Points. Our speakers were Mark Fitzpatrick, Director of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Program at the International Institute for Strategic Studies; Ellen Laipson, President and CEO of the Stimson Center; and Robert Litwak, Director of International Security Studies at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
Mr. Fitzpatrick stated that he was not optimistic that the international community would be able to reach a satisfactory agreement with Iran because of a fundamental mismatch of objectives: Iran desires the means to make nuclear weapons, which the United States and others oppose. Among other factors pointing to a military intention underlying the enrichment program, Fitzpatrick noted that the Bushehr nuclear reactor cannot use enriched uranium from Natanz because only Russia can supply the certified fuel for the reactor.
Mr. Fitzpatrick discussed the proliferation risks associated with the Iranian nuclear program and the downsides of legitimizing a uranium enrichment capability there, including that this would make it extremely difficult to prevent countries such as Egypt and Turkey from demanding similar rights. Iran’s defiance of U.N. Security Council resolutions mandating suspension of enrichment puts it in violation of international law. This illegitimacy cannot be wished away. Fitzpatrick stated that containment, deterrence, and constraining the program through sanctions remain the most likely near-term policy options. But moving from a latent weapons capability to weapons development would constitute a red line for the United States. More could be done to deter Iran from crossing this red line and to make it more difficult for Iran to do so.
Ms. Laipson discussed the regional context of the Iranian program. She painted a picture that was not entirely bleak: The Arab world subscribes to the NPT, and she noted a strain within Iranian opinion that viewed nuclear weapons as being contrary to Islamic beliefs. However, other elements are less positive. Iran’s neighbors are deeply insecure, but in a way that focuses on regime survival rather than national security in the Western sense. Discussions of deterrence, proliferation, and other relevant security concepts remain extremely limited in most Arab countries. And transparency continues to be seen as a sign of weakness.
Ms. Laipson noted that Syria might be an indicator of regional reactions to Iran's nuclear program. President Assad started down the path towards a covert nuclear program despite the associated risks; other states might consider hedging, as well.. She stated that the Iranian nuclear program has already achieved some of its most important goals: promoting an image of Iran as a regional power, gaining prestige and recognition, showing off Iran's resourcefulness, and demonstrating a path towards modernity without Westernization. Total denuclearization may not be feasible, as Iran’s profound distrust of outside institutions, including the United Nations system, would make this a very difficult task.
Mr. Litwak discussed the prospects of a regional proliferation cascade in the Middle East. He noted that the cascade hypothesis is typically supported by two rationales: that nuclear proliferation in one country poses a security threat to its neighbors, and that nuclear proliferation poses a threat to the norm represented by the NPT, lowering the obstacles to further proliferation. While the Iranian program could be a catalyst to further proliferation, he argued that a cascade is not a given. While the program could change the intentions of Iran’s neighbors with regard to nuclear proliferation, the actual capabilities implied by a cascade take much longer to appear. Israel’s program did not trigger a cascade, and it is not clear whether Iraq’s program was driven by general security concerns or factors specific to the regime of Saddam Hussein
Mr. Litwak noted the tension between a nonproliferation policy based on norms and one based on distinguishing between friends and foes. One approach emphasizes the value of security assurances; the other seeks regime change. There are several possible paths forward, all of which depend to some extent on whether Iran halts at a latent, ambiguous, capability or moves forward toward an overt nuclear weapons capability. Mr. Litwak highlighted the importance of reassuring U.S. friends and allies in the region. He suggested that U.S. policy toward Iran would need to live with some ambiguity about the status of Iran's nuclear program.
