13 June 2009 : Korea Herald
The following is the second in a series of articles analyzing the main issues to be discussed at the upcoming Korea-U.S. summit in Washington. - Ed.
By Cheon Seong-whun
North Korea conducted its second nuclear test on the morning of May 25 at Punggye-ri, Kilju in the northeastern part of the country. It has been two years and seven months since its first nuclear test at the same site on Oct. 9, 2006. The U.S. Geological Survey reported an "artificial earthquake" with a magnitude of 4.7 on the Richter scale, while South Korean Meteorological Administration reported one with a magnitude of 4.5.
Just after the test, the North's Korean Central News Agency confirmed that, "The current nuclear test was safely conducted on a new higher level in terms of explosive power and control technology, and the results of the test helped satisfactorily settle the scientific and technological problems in further increasing the power of nuclear weapons and steadily developing nuclear technology."
While South Korea clings to its nonnuclear policy by abandoning the development of nuclear weapons, North Korea's nuclear capability is a critical threat to national security that must be eliminated as a priority. The North's nuclear weapons are an obvious destabilizing factor that can stir up security concerns in Northeast Asia. In particular, pro-nuke voices burst out in Japan, which could have more profound effects on regional security than North Korean nukes in the long term.
Regarding the second nuclear test, the issue was not if, but when. Since South Korean President Lee Myung-bak came into office, North Korea has sharply criticized Seoul's policy toward Pyongyang, ratcheted up tension, and vowed to strengthen its nuclear deterrent. Early this year, a spokesman for the General Staff of the (North) Korean People's Army announced that it would not give up nuclear weapons unless nuclear threats from South Korea and U.S. forces in the region are removed.
North Korea became more determined to conduct a nuclear test when the U.N. Security Council condemned its long-range missile launch in violation of resolutions 1695 and 1718. The North announced on April 14 that it would continue its missile launches, withdraw from the six-party talks, and restart its nuclear facilities. Then on April 29, Pyongyang denounced the U.N. sanctions as a proclamation of war and declared that without an apology by the U.N, it would take further self-defensive measures including nuclear tests and intercontinental ballistic missile launches. On May 4, the DPRK criticized the Obama administration for being "no different" from the Bush administration and affirmed it would further strengthen its nuclear deterrent.
International consensus after the second test
The second nuclear test had some positive effects. It cleared away uncertainties about North Korea's real intention behind nuclear development. It also forced policy makers to reflect upon their negotiating strategy toward North Korea. The test called for new approaches based on new assumptions. In the international community, the following consensus has been built following the second nuclear test:
First, the Kim Jong-il regime regards nuclear weapons and long-range delivery means as critical assurances of regime survival and is resolute to complete their successful development. As the Korea Central News Agency praised the second test as "intensifying the drive for effecting a new revolutionary surge to open the gate to the Gang Song Dae Guk (powerful great nation)," nukes and long-range missiles are two military pillars guaranteeing smooth power transition from Kim Jong-il to his son and open the new era of the Gang Song Dae Guk in 2012. Kim would calculate that nukes and missiles would help legitimize his family's authority domestically as well as prevent foreign intervention during the critical succession period.
Second, North Korea will not bargain away nukes and long-range missiles. As long as the leadership regards them as critical for its survival, no matter what incentive or carrots are given, it is not possible to coax Pyongyang to give up these weapons. Of course, North Koreans will come to the negotiating table with the United States in the future. Regardless of their rhetoric, however, the real purpose would be not to dismantle nukes but to get American recognition as a de facto nuclear-weapon state like India or Pakistan. North Koreans well understand that once acquiring nukes, no foreign influence could take them away from their hands.
Third, recognizing the all previous efforts to cajole Pyongyang to abandon nukes failed, Washington comes to have a deep sense of reflection. Efforts by the Clinton administration to strike the Yongbyon nuclear facilities and then to entice the North to halt its weapons program by providing carrots were fruitless. Attempts by the Bush administration to push the regime to collapse and later to try to bargain away with incentives such as delisting from the list of terror sponsoring countries were unsuccessful as well. In particular, strong voices are raised to break off the old pattern of offering economic and political favor in exchange for ceasing provocations, suspending its nuclear activities and entering negotiations.
In fact, the second nuclear test will be a turning event in terms of reshaping the Obama administration's approach to North Korea. In a press conference with French President Nicolas Sarkozy on June 6, U.S. President Barack Obama remarked that "in fact, we are not intending to continue a policy of rewarding provocation." Recognizing it is time to call Kim's bluff, his new North Korea strategy will consider the following elements: (1) Kim's determination to acquire nuclear-tipped long-range missiles, (2) his chronic failure to fulfill promises, (3) his desire to proliferate nuclear technologies to the Middle East, and (4) the inevitable instability during his power transition to his son.
Finally, North Korea will maximize nuclear bluffing and threats against South Korea in the future. It has already raised threat level from "turning Seoul into sea of fire" in the 1990s to "incinerating all of South Korea" today. By ratcheting up tensions and threats, Pyongyang intends to demonstrate Seoul's North Korea policy failed and mobilize public opinion to pressure the Lee administration to change its current policy to be more accommodating to the North's demands. That is, the missile launch and nuclear test is a part of "South Korea bashing" of the Kim regime. This campaign will continue with the aim of replacing the current conservative government with a liberal one, preserving former President Kim Dae-Jung's sunshine policy.
Wrapping up the six-party talks
Since its beginning in August 2003, the Bush administration officials have defended the six-party talks by arguing that they need to find out North Korea's nuclear intention - that is, whether Pyongyang is willing to give up nukes and return to the international nonproliferation regime. In the aftermath of the second nuclear test, the North's intention has become obvious.
Despite all the compliments of the talks, North Korea quadrupled nuclear capacities during the talks, conducted two nuclear tests, and secretly provided Syria with an upgraded version of the 5MWe reactor at Yongbyon - a plutonium producing machine. Compared to the mid-1990s, the amount of plutonium the DPRK acquired has increased from 7-12.5kg to 28.5-49kg at the end of 2007. The possible number of nuclear warheads also has increased from 1-5 to 5-20, depending on various criteria and level of technologies. This is the end result of the six-party talks.
Unfortunately, Bush administration could not give up groundless hope of negotiating away North Korean nukes. During his summit meeting with Lee in April 2008, former U.S. President George W. Bush repeated his usual "wait and see" attitudes. When asked whether North Korea might not make full disclosure of nuclear programs, Bush said that "you just have to wait and see whether they're sincere or not."
The six-party talks also have major flaws in the agreed documents as well as its negotiating strategy. Original intention of the talks was to build a five-party coalition, exert pressure, and push North Korea to dismantle its nuclear programs. China was given a role of moderator and host of the talks. With hindsight, the six-party talks were no more than a setoff of the U.S.-DPRK bilateral talks. Major breakthroughs could be made only when Pyongyang and Washington made compromises. China scored high diplomatic marks as it convened the talks with little substantial avail. In the end, Beijing only displayed that it had limited ability to handle the Kim regime. North Korea tried to drive a wedge between the five parties, and created every opportunity to have direct talks with the United States, marginalizing the six-party framework. Five parties were supposed to lead North Korea, but in fact, were led by the North.
An important impetus on unraveling the six-party framework was Bush's political desire to build a legacy. At its final days, the Bush administration was trapped into passion for legacy. During his second term, Bush made a series of about-faces from its initial positions, and this trend was precipitated after the first nuclear test in October 2006. Bogged down in the Iraq War and isolated in the world stage, Bush began to regard the North Korean nuclear crisis as an opportunity to make his foreign policy legacy. And he gave up key principles such as the CVID in negotiating with Pyongyang. A highlight was a decision to rescind the designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism in return for its unfulfilled promise of accepting rigid verification.
As a founding document of the six-party process, the Sept. 19 Joint Declaration has inherent flaws as well. First, it was wrong to define "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" as its goal. Since South Korea already has been denuclearized, the goal should have been "denuclearization of North Korea." Based on this misplaced goal, the North has argued for a mutual nuclear disarmament talk with the United States.
Second, declaration should not have mentioned the joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which was signed between the two Koreas in 1991. It was persistently violated by the North from the beginning. It also is a symbol of South Korea's humiliation toward North Korea, exacerbated by the wishy-washy sunshine policy. To refer to a document which already was nullified by one party is no more than infringing on South Korea's sovereignty and national esteem.
Third, the declaration should not have brought up two incompatible ideas of offering 200 million kilowatts of electricity and hinting the provision of a light-water reactor at the same time. South Korea intended to supply electricity only if North Korea was to forgo the LWR option.
Finally, declaration had better not extend scope by introducing very sensitive issues such as peace settlement or regional security dialogues. Extending the negotiation agenda runs the risk of obscuring the primary objective of the six-party talks, which is North Korean denuclearization. It also has a danger of malicious linkage, where the North takes advantage of other issues as a pretext to stall or delay nuclear dismantlement.
Deterrence and coercive diplomacy
The future prospect of the six-party talks is bleak. As Pyongyang refused the four-party talks when former Presidents Clinton and Kim Young-sam, the initiators of the talks, stepped down, it is highly likely that Kim will reject the six-party talks now that Bush has left office. It might be that the six-party talks remain moribund and the U.S.-DPRK talks thrive. Other forums such as the old four-party framework or new three-party talks among Seoul, Pyongyang and Washington might emerge. In any case, the second nuclear test necessitates a new approach based on new assumptions. A fundamental basis would be that the international community should coexist with a nuclear-armed North Korea until a new leadership with sharply distinguished mindset from Kim would appear. And the new approach will consist of two major elements - deterrence and coercive diplomacy.
On the one hand, every measure should be taken that can reinforce the U.S.-ROK alliance and any measure be avoid that hints at weakening the alliance. In this regard, the United States should deploy a small number of tactical nuclear weapons on the peninsula until there is a significant progress in North Korean denuclearization. This is the most effective deterrent against North Korean nukes, and also reliable safeguards to calm down growing arguments for independent nuclear armaments in Seoul and Tokyo. At the same time, the OPCON transfer scheduled to be done by April 2014 should be postponed. Regardless of the military readiness, the transfer will send a wrong message to the Kim regime, running the risk of inviting its reckless provocation.
On the other hand, while there is a consensus that military option is not feasible, coercive diplomacy will play an active role in the future. Based on the U.N. resolutions, the United States will lead multilateral efforts to peacefully coerce Kim Jong-il to appreciate that nuclear programs can do lasting damage to his regime. As Defense Secretary Robert Gates articulated at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on May 30, Washington will not stand idly by as Pyongyang builds the capacity to wreak destruction on the United States or its allies. Economic sanctions such as import-export denial to and from North Korea and restraint of investment into the North should be firmly imposed. Sanctions to terminate financial flows for WMD development have to be enforced as well. Physical interdiction efforts to block North Korean proliferation activities need be thoroughly implemented. In this regard, South Korea's full participation in PSI will be a force multiplier to counter any proliferation attempt by North Korea.
