By Dr Tim Huxley, Executive Director, IISS-Asia; Senior Fellow for Asia-Pacific Security; Editor, Adelphi Papers
22 July 2008: Today
Asean’s credibility seriously hurt if Thai-Cambodian dispute escalates
SINCE 1967, Asean has certainly done much to foster a sense of community among its member states’ governments and elites, while at the same time, encouraging practical economic collaboration.
However, a failure to help resolve regional crises such as the current dispute between Cambodia and Thailand could undermine Asean’s achievements.
This week, Asean’s foreign ministers have convened in Singapore for their annual get-together. There is much talk about the Asean Charter, which when it is fully ratified — probably later this year :— will effectively provide a constitution for the grouping. There will also be discussion about blueprints for a :political-security community aimed at ensuring countries in the region “live in peace with one another” and based, among other things, on “effective conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms” as well as a socio-cultural community.
At the very time that Asean’s foreign ministers are meeting, a serious crisis between member-states Cambodia and Thailand, centred on the latest manifestation of their long-running territorial dispute over the frontier area around the Preah Vihear temple, poses a new challenge to the organisation’s credibility in political and security terms.
The latest crisis comes hot on the heels of two troubling developments in Myanmar :— the anti-regime protests last September and the massive damage wrought by Cyclone Nargis in May. Both these upheavals placed severe pressure on Asean, which at least temporarily shored up its standing by taking on a key role in facilitating international humanitarian assistance following the cyclone.
Not for the first time in Asean’s history, the latest bilateral dispute brings with it the possibility of armed conflict between two member states.
In the past, mutual restraint exercised by prudent leaders prevented military stand-offs over land and sea borders from escalating to outright military clashes between combinations such asMyanmar and Thailand over the former’s hot pursuit of ethnic minority rebels into the latter’s territory, and Indonesia and Malaysia over the islands of Sipadan and Ligatan. But luck may also have played a part in the avoidance of open hostilities.
There is little evidence to support the oft-mouthed platitude suggesting that Asean’s mere existence has “prevented war” among its members. And there is no guarantee that the usual combination of restraint and good fortune will always work to prevent inter-Asean conflict.
Given the linkage of the dispute over Preah Vihear to nationalist politics on both sides of the border, there is a danger of events getting out of hand. And if escalation did occur, the damage to not only the reputations of the two member states involved but also to Asean’s credibility could be serious.
Asean does possess conflict-resolution mechanisms :— such as the provision for a High Council and a Troika of the foreign ministers of the group’s past, present and future chairs :— but these have never been mobilised to manage inter-Asean disputes despite the aspirations to a security role embodied in the ASC idea.
So the resolution of South-east Asian conflicts has usually depended on the good offices of governments, international institutions and NGOs from outside the region, whether these conflicts have involved domestic problems within countries such as Myanmar, or disputes between Asean members. Such entities can play a valuable role in conflict resolution. But the point is that Asean needs to play a greater part itself if it is to live up to its own declared aspirations.
Asean has now been part of the regional scene for 41 years. Several of its members :— notably Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam :— are diplomatic heavyweights. Asean has achieved much in the economic sphere. Yet its role in managing South-east Asia’s security has remained weak. Unless its performance in this sphere starts to match its rhetoric, there could be serious consequences.
Over time, an inability or unwillingness to grasp the nettle of regional security problems could erode Asean’s status. But, equally importantly, the coming decades are likely to see a mushrooming of new security concerns internationally, as the global power balance shifts, conflicts over fuel, food and water supplies erupt and regional arms competitions (possibly including the wider proliferation of nuclear weapons) both reflect and exacerbate growing insecurity.
In this emerging strategic environment, the United Nations and other international peacemaking institutions will have their hands full. South-east Asian governments and citizens will need strong regional institutions to protect and enhance their security. The time for Asean to start exercising a greater security role has arrived.
Dr Tim Huxley is the Singapore-basedexecutive director of The International Institute for Strategic Studies — Asia
