According to Beyond the Dirty Bomb: Re-thinking Radiological Terror published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, "ingestion, inhalation and immersion (I3) attacks, in which radiation doses are delivered internally or by direct contact with the skin, can credibly kill in order of magnitude more people than a dirty bomb, are likely to incite considerably more fear among members of the public, and may require a much lower level of technical skill to execute."
30 January 2008: ISN Security Watch
The IAEA chief singles out Romania, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Ukraine for nuclear material trafficking incidents, but officials in Romania say the dirty bomb threat is being exaggerated.
By Anca Paduraru in Bucharest for ISN Security Watch
Mohamed ElBaradei, director-general of the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has placed Romania on a list of countries named as likely sources of "dirty bomb" material for terrorists. But Romanian officials tell ISN Security Watch that terrorists are unlikely to get their hands on nuclear material here, and point to other, much deadlier, threats.
In an interview with the Arab daily al Hayat on 10 January, ElBaradei stated that "many" of some 100 nuclear material trafficking incidents (no time frame was mentioned) had involved Romania, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Those incidents, the IAEA chief said, concerned only the smuggling of materials limited in capacity and power.
While admitting that terrorist groups might find it almost impossible to acquire an actual nuclear bomb, ElBaradei speculated that they could obtain nuclear material for tainting conventional explosives to build "dirty bombs."
Officials from the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI) issued a rebuttal to ElBaradei's statement, saying on their website that "neither its own sources nor those of partner-services abroad confirmed the fears expressed by the IAEA director."
According to the IAEA, radioactive materials that could be used in dirty bombs are also widely used throughout the world for a variety of purposes, from the treatment of illnesses to irradiating food. While most of these materials are too weak to cause serious radiological harm, industrial radiography, radiotherapy, industrial irradiators and thermo-electric generators use highly radioactive materials like cobalt 6, strontium 90, cesium 137 and iridium 192.
Romania currently operates two nuclear reactors at its power plant at Cernavoda - some 166 kilometers east of the capital, Bucharest - which uses natural uranium to fuel the Canadian-made reactors. The country previously had two nuclear reactors used for research purposes: One was decommissioned in 2001, the other was transformed in 2003 to operate using low-enriched nuclear material.
Anton Coroianu of Romania's supervising authority for nuclear activities (CNCAN) said the IAEA chief's 2002 call for "a cradle-to-grave control of powerful radioactive sources to protect them against terrorism or theft" was being fully enforced in Romania.
"If Romania is at fault, it is for over-reporting the loss or misplacement of radiation sources which are so tiny and weak that they do not pose a radiation threat," Coroianu told ISN Security Watch, giving the example of the loss of 10 grams of natural uranium pills, which was reported to the IAEA in the early 1990s.
"In other words, Romania does not have so-called orphan sources, meaning radiation sources, which are not on the radar screen of the regulatory authorities," Coroianu explained.
Dirty bomb threat exaggerated?
An EU study estimated that about 70 radioactive sources are lost every year from regulatory control in EU countries. Most of these, however, would not pose a serious threat in the form of a dirty bomb.
"For instance, tens of fire detectors may be reported missing every year, but that still does not make for a significant threat, as each such a device has radioactive material worth one micro Curie," Oroianu said. "It would take 10,000 such sources to build up a more significant level of radiation, of 10 mili Curie."
According to Coroianu, the danger of dirty bombs is exaggerated. "For one, their effect is rather psychological and economic, as areas tainted by the bomb fragments should be decontaminated before people are allowed back in and economic activities resumed. Then, it is such a hassle to obtain radioactive material from many tiny sources and so easy to use a virus or killer chemical instead," he said.
His views mirror those of US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) member Edward McGaffigan Jr, who was quoted in a July 2007 New York Times article: "Why would I not blow up a chemical tanker on a train with chlorine in it or other toxic materials, at a tiny fraction of the cost before doing this very elaborate exercise?"
To test the NRC's effectiveness, investigators from the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) set up a bogus company last spring with a postal box as its only asset, and applied for a license to handle radioactive material. GAO officials found that the Commission granted the license with no prior on-site inspection of the company requesting it.
Coroianu said "no such thing could occur in Romania," as local regulations made it mandatory for the CNCAN to perform on-site inspections prior to licensing companies and additional inspections every one, three or six months. As of November 2007, 98 Romanian companies have been authorized to handle radioactive material.
At the same time, however, the CNCAN is not accountable to any higher authority in Romania: The IAEA and the EU Euratom Treaty are the binding forces.
Focusing on the wrong threats?
More threatening to the public, says Coroianu, are alpha-emitting radioactive materials, which are difficult to detect at border control point in their liquid or powder forms. "To guard us against such dangers the CNCAN or the border authorities, for that matter, have no means other than to rely on the intelligence services doing their job," Coroianu said.
"Think of Alexander Litvinenko, the former KGB officer who drank polonium-210 in a cup of tea. That is a more effective way to kill than spraying low-level radiation material over a block, via a dirty bomb."
According to Beyond the Dirty Bomb: Re-thinking Radiological Terror published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, "ingestion, inhalation and immersion (I3) attacks, in which radiation doses are delivered internally or by direct contact with the skin, can credibly kill in order of magnitude more people than a dirty bomb, are likely to incite considerably more fear among members of the public, and may require a much lower level of technical skill to execute."
