29 August 2008: International Herald Tribune
DUSHANBE, Tajikistan: It was interesting over the past week to observe the escalating crisis between Russia and the West from Central Asia.
Regional leaders met the Russian military campaign largely with silence. In Tajikistan, state television gave no information. Other Central Asian states limited coverage to facts, adding few comments, though the press included variety of assessments both for and against Russia's policies.
Behind the silence is a real concern, or even fear, about the implications of the crisis for this volatile and strategically important region. Central Asian leaders are worried that they, too, might eventually find themselves having to choose sides between Russia and the West - a choice all of them have tried hard to avoid.
The prospect of being forced into a camp dominated by an increasingly unpredictable and aggressive Russia promises only major geopolitical losses for the Central Asian states.
The example of Uzbekistan, which several years ago switched from cooperation with the West to a closer alliance with Russia, has been less then encouraging. It has contributed to Uzbekistan's isolation and imposed high economic costs. Uzbekistan has been trying for some months now to mend relations with the United States and the European Union.
Yet there is a growing realization among the Central Asians that they will not be able to keep silent for long, as Russia has started to apply pressure on them to support its policy, including the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
I heard mixed reactions from ordinary people in the region. On one hand, there are concerns over Russia's military intervention to defend Russian minorities abroad. Many Russians still live in Central Asia.
On the other hand, the majority of people out here still side with Russia against the United States. Millions of Central Asians work in Russia, often providing the only major income for families back home. Many still watch Russian television, and the Cold War language reminds them of Soviet times when they not only had a more stable and prosperous life, but also were part of a global superpower. Some still hope for closer integration with Russia.
It was easier for Central Asian leaders to maintain a distance during the Russian-Georgian conflict since many governments here - like Moscow - perceived the "rose revolution" in Georgia as a direct threat to their internal stability.
Moreover, apart from Kazakhstan, which has invested heavily in Georgia, few Central Asian states have any real stake there. For Turkmenistan, the trans-Caspian pipeline remains an uncertain option, and its leaders might feel a degree of relief from Western pressures to sign up for this project while instability continues in the Caucasus.
Central Asian leaders who want to preserve their sovereignty and ability to use relations with the West to get more economic benefits to the region have to walk a fine line between angering Russia and maintaining relations with the West.
The summit this past week of the regional security group, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization - which groups Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and also includes Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan and India as observers - gave Russia only soft support and did not endorse the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia had hoped to use the SCO to demonstrate that it has support among states even while the EU is considering sanctions against Moscow.
In the SCO, however, Central Asians could hide behind China, which has made it clear that under no circumstances is it prepared to support any form of separatism. The SCO, in fact, was created in part to resist separatism in Central Asia and elsewhere.
Many here expect that Russia will soon get tougher on Central Asian. The upcoming summit of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) - a military alliance of Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Armenia and Belarus that includes mutual security guarantees and is built around Russian military power - could be where Russia says, "Are you with us or against us?"
The Central Asian states are trying to coordinate their positions, which is difficult because many have uneasy relations with each other. Some see the crisis as an opportunity to strengthen their bargaining positions with Russia. Tajikistan, for example, is keen to get Russian investment for its Ragun Hydropower station without giving Russia a controlling stake. Kyrgyzstan is in need of economic support.
Others are trying to mend relations with the West. On the day of the day of summit in Dushanbe, for example, the acting commander of the U.S. Central Command, Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey, arrived on a visit into Uzbekistan.
What can Central Asian states do to navigate the current tensions? Some experts here look to Kazakhstan, the most economically powerful and internationally integrated state in the region. Kazakhstan could offer to serve as a mediator between Russia and the West and to promote dialogue and hopefully some real solution to the current crisis.
With Europe increasingly at odds with Moscow, Kazakhstan - which has good relations with Russia, the U.S., the EU, NATO and Georgia, oil wealth and international stature - might be acceptable to all sides. Kazakhstan, moreover, would be the biggest regional loser from a new cold war.
Kazakhstan has been selected as the next chair of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and proposals it could make include a fact-finding commission on the Caucasus crisis and OSCE monitors in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It could chair a NATO-CSTO dialogue on confidence-building measures around the Black Sea, or convene informal Georgia-Russia talks.
There is a good chance such initiatives would fail. But this is a chance for Kazakhstan to play a historic role, and so worth the risk.
Oksana Antonenko is senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.
