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26 September 2011 - Pnyx Blog - Who's Afraid of an Iranian Nuke?

Dina Esfandiary

By Dina Esfandiary, Research Analyst and Project Coordinator
IISS in the press icon
26 September 2011: Pnyx

Two weeks ago, at the inaugural dinner of the IISS Global Strategic Review, I was wedged between the Director of a new think-tank in the US and a retired US army general, being questioned on ‘the situation in Iran’ and the ‘status of the Iranian nuclear programme’. There I was, giving my perspective, when I was suddenly faced with an aggressive rebuttal from a gentleman across the table: “So what?” he bellowed, “So what if Iran gets the bomb. Who cares?!” Eight expectant faces turned my way.

A whole list of reasons came to mind, none of which would have appeased my angry, jet-lagged opponent. But his outburst did make me think. When debating Iran’s nuclear programme, we don’t examine exactly why we think an Iranian bomb would be so frightening.


Most people – although clearly not all – agree that an Iranian bomb would be a bad thing. After all, we barely trust our democratically elected and legitimate leaders with the control of nuclear weapons, surely a brutally repressive regime with little or no respect for human rights and aggressive foreign policy rhetoric (to say the least), is not who we would trust with a weapon of mass destruction?


But, then again, Iran is unlikely to use the bomb. The Islamic regime’s sole purpose is survival; to continue running Iran. Using a nuclear device against its opponents would thwart that goal: Tehran would be facing a wide-array of retaliation strikes that would overturn the fragile political status quo. Of course it is impossible to say that they would never use a nuclear device (otherwise they would have no minimum deterrent, and may as well not build one), but it is highly unlikely.


So why do we care if Iran gets the bomb?


Most importantly, it would make the Islamic Republic a great deal bolder in its foreign policy. Iran’s regional aspirations of hegemony would no longer be a matter of trying to appear like a bully, it would be one. And rather than threatening the region with a nuclear weapon, the weapon would give them the confidence to activate their proxies to cause trouble. Americans stirring up trouble in the region? Well, let’s send Hezbollah to nab a few in Lebanon to teach them a lesson.  Or better yet, perhaps we can push Hamas to ratchet up their attacks on Israel, send them a few extra rockets and mortars. Memories of the eighties anyone?


Admittedly, this might be more difficult given the changes in the region in the past few months. But it is far from implausible.


An Iranian bomb would be bad for the region. In June, speaking to senior NATO officials, Saudi Prince Turki al-Faisal said that an Iranian bomb would “compel Saudi Arabia … to pursue policies which could lead to untold and possibly dramatic consequences”, something he reiterated at the IISS GSR conference in September. The same is probably true of other states in the region – some have made it clear that an Iranian nuclear device would be an incentive for them to start their own programmes. Although turning to nuclear power does not necessarily mean getting the bomb, national fuel cycles pose a considerable proliferation threat, and increase the likelihood of a regional nuclear cascade.


Finally, an Iranian bomb would deliver a significant blow to the international non-proliferation and disarmament agenda. Iran signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968 and ratified it two years later. Its programme has since been subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification. If the regime decides to get the bomb it will have abandoned the NPT.


Some people (presumably the gentleman mentioned above) would say, ‘so what?’ After all, India, Pakistan and Israel are not party to the treaty, and North Korea was, but in 2003 withdrew from it, after numerous violations. Although Israel, India and Pakistan pose a compliance problem because they have not acceded to the NPT, they have not violated anything per se and have been nudged towards the treaty regime through bilateral agreements over issues like nuclear security and export controls. These cases were all failures for non-proliferation and disarmament, but the treaties are there for a reason. Flawed though it is, it still gives the IAEA the legitimacy to set standards and verify the peaceful uses of such sensitive technology, so it can be available to all.


This is what my answer to the gentleman across the table would have been. An Iranian bomb is simply a frightening idea.