On 20 August, Iranian Defence Minister Ahmad Vahidi announced that Iran had test-fired a new surface-to-surface missile, the Qiam (Rising). Vahidi did not say when and where the test-launch took place, though state-run television showed images and video of the new Iranian missile later that same day. Assuming the test was recent, it was in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929, which was adopted on 9 June and explicitly states that: 'Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using ballistic missile technology.'
Despite the scarcity of detail about the Qiam, the launch reveals much about the status of Iran's missile development efforts and the direction they may take in the near future.
Vahidi made his announcement of the missile one day before Russia was scheduled to begin loading fuel into the Bushehr nuclear reactor, and two days before Iran unveiled its long-distance 'stealth' drone Karrar (Striker). The minister said the Qiam 1 was 'part of the new generation of the Islamic Republic's surface-to-surface missiles' and 'completely designed and built domestically'. He added that the new missile 'enjoys enhanced agility due to the scrapping of its fins' and was guided by a smart navigation system that enables the missile to hit targets 'with high precision'.
Photographs of the Qiam published by the Fars News Agency and other state-run media show a liquid-propellant missile with overall dimensions consistent with Iran's existing Shahab-2 (Scud-C). The new missile's acceleration profile, as measured from videos of the launch aired on Iranian television, also matches that of the Shahab-2. The Qiam, however, has a newly designed nose-cone, or re-entry vehicle (RV), and the aerodynamic fins at the aft end of the missile have been removed. While these modifications were undoubtedly of local origin, undertaken by Iranian engineers, the original Shahab-2 missile, from which the Qiam is derived, is most likely imported, casting doubt on Vahidi's assertion of independent, domestic production.
The Shahab-2 has a very simple, cone-shaped warhead section with a base that attaches to the missile's main body. The Qiam's nosecone has a smaller diameter conically-shaped forward section, behind which is a short, 0.6m-diameter cylindrical section. The cylindrical section is mated to a conically-shaped flange that attaches to the airframe. The 'baby-bottle' shape appears to be a copy of Ghadr-1(and Sajjil-2) nosecone, although the conical flange that connects the warhead to the airframe has been truncated for the Qiam to account for its smaller airframe diameter. The Qiam airframe is 0.88m in diameter, while the main body of the Ghadr-1 is 1.25m. An interesting point, however, is that the Ghadr-1 warhead, when it detaches from the main body before re-entering the earth's atmosphere, separates at a point about half-way up the cylindrically shaped flange. The diameter of the flange at the separation point is 0.88m, the same diameter as the Qiam's airframe. This means that any warheads designed for the Ghadr-1 and Sajjil-2 can also be used by the new Qiam missile. The consolidation of warhead and re-entry vehicle design is economical and efficient.
The removal of the aft aerodynamic fins is more difficult to explain because their absence degrades the missile's aerodynamic stability during ascent. Consequently, Iran's decision to fly the Qiam without fins strongly suggests that engineers replaced the antiquated, Soviet-built guidance unit used in the Shahab-2 with a more modern one, most likely a strap-down unit capable of continuously making course corrections during the boost-phase. While the addition of a more capable navigation and guidance unit will certainly improve the accuracy of the Qiam relative to the Shahab-2, the new missile is still too inaccurate to conduct military missions effectively when armed with a conventional warhead. Indeed, without the incorporation of precise thrust-termination mechanisms or a post-boost control system, Iran's missiles, including the Qiam, will continue to fall short of Vahidi's boasts of precision.
The rationale for removing the aft fins is difficult to determine, but one possible explanation centres on Iran's probable desire to launch missiles from a canister. Placing the Qiam -- or future missiles -- in a launch-canister, as is done with American, Russian, Chinese and French ballistic missiles, would protect it from the sometimes harsh external environment experienced during storage, transport, and deployment. The launch-canisters could be housed in the silos Iran is reportedly constructing near Tabriz and Khorramabad, or on a new transporter-erector-launcher.
Testing the finless missile configuration using the Qiam may be part of a larger, more ambitious programme aimed at the Ghadr-1 and Sajjil-2, both of which presently have aerodynamic fins. While the Ghadr-1, and especially the Sajjil-2, which is powered by temperature-sensitive solid-propellant, would benefit from the environmental protection provided by launch-canisters, developing finless technologies using these larger missiles would be expensive. If supplies of these systems are limited, a test programme using them would consume Iran's most important strategic assets. The Shahab-1/-2, which Tehran has in large numbers, is a more practical platform for developing technologies. Lessons learned using the smaller, less expensive missiles could be subsequently applied to the more valuable missiles with minimal testing. The Qiam development efforts should therefore be monitored closely to determine if the missile is a precursor to future modifications of the Ghadr-1 and Sajjil-2. Undoubtedly, the use of launch-canisters will result in new deployment concepts.
The appearance of the Qiam is not surprising. It is consistent with Iran's sustained, long-term efforts to enhance the technical knowledge and wherewithal of the country's missile engineers, while at the same time improving the performance and reliability of its ballistic missile forces. The emergence of Iran's robust and disciplined engineering culture, which is roughly on par with India's capabilities two decades ago, shows that sanctions and export control regimes have not been able to halt progress . Any effort to destroy Iran's missile production and testing facilities would not prevent Iran from becoming a missile power in the future; it has the knowledge and experience to resurrect the physical infrastructure as needed.
