The Challenge for Defence in the Next Decade
May I begin by thanking you for your very warm and generous introduction. Now unless something untoward happens, this is very likely to be my last public speech as the Chief of the General Staff and given the valuable contribution that IISS has made, to stimulating debate and policy-making in the Defence and Security areas, it seems appropriate that I should be here making my final speech today. That said, I am not sure that, as his next Chairman, Michael Clark of RUSI quite agrees. However my comments today build on and underline what I have said earlier this summer at both Chatham House and at RUSI. So my aim today is to continue to contribute to that Defence debate. We, in Defence and across Whitehall, are all now agreed that a Defence Review or perhaps more appropriately what some are calling a Review of Defence is required, but we need to clarify what the outcome of that Review needs to be and, perhaps more importantly, how we get to and conduct the Review. And we need to do this in a way that prevents some comments being taken out of context, and becoming tomorrow’s headline. Frankly, defence of the realm must be the stuff of considered debate and not just of catchy headlines.
But to answer the questions that must be addressed in a Defence Review, I think context is all important. I believe we need to look back, to look around, and to look forward, at Britain’s role in the world yesterday, today and tomorrow and also conduct a proper analysis of the character of future conflict and thereby identify the challenges for our country’s overall security.
Now in looking back over our shoulders we could go back to the Duncan Sandy’s Review of 1957, but an immediate backward glance usefully goes back as far as the SDR of 97/98 and it is worth examining how the World seemed then. I will be brief but in summary I would suggest that the thoughts of those conducting that SDR included:
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Second, that while for some the first Gulf War was an aberration, for others it was a sign post - but we soon fell into a preoccupation with the Balkans and agonised not about war fighting, but about how to keep a peace within someone else’s war. This was a fundamental change.
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And third, as background noise, during the nineties and running up to 9/11, we believed that liberal interventions could be conducted on the basis of ‘Go Fast, Go First, Go Home.’ After all it seemed to work in Sierra Leone, East Timor, a small intervention in Macedonia and even after 9/11, with our first ISAF experience in Kabul.
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And finally, the run up to the 97/98 SDR was conducted in a period when UK Defence, while busy in Bosnia and Northern Ireland, was broadly in balance. Debate could be had and choices could be made, and were. A balanced outcome, foreign policy led, was the result – whether it was fully funded remains a moot point, to which I will return.
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But the balance identified in 97 / 98 had many facets: balance between Europe and the United States; balance between the maritime, land and air environments; and an equilibrium about Britain’s role in the World, still content to be P5, G8, and influential in the Commonwealth and NATO.
But I would suggest three signposts came out of the SDR:
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Firstly we saw an accelerated move towards centralisation in Defence – we saw the birth of the integrated Defence Logistics Organisation, experiments like the Joint Harrier Force, the Defence Estates Organisation and others were products of that Review – a significant extension of the shift in power and decision making in Defence that had begun with the 57 Sandy’s Review. But all these 97 / 98 decisions were influenced by the spirit of Jointery, essential, of course, in the battlespace but which has created a confusion between operational effectiveness in the field and financial efficiency in the business space. And what this has done is accelerate the trend toward pulling decision making ever more towards the top: Fine if the top can take decisions, but over-centralisation is the antithesis of Mission Command.
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Secondly, the SDR of 97 / 98 represented an ambitious outcome, but one not fully matched by adequate resourcing which has sowed the seeds of the current significant pressures in the Defence Budget. Despite headline cash growth in recent years, the reality of Defence inflation above other inflation has steadily diminished the affordability of the overall programme as the inevitable cost of some individual programmes has increased, and some quite markedly.
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And finally, with a budget under pressure there must be a willingness to make decisions – however hard they might be. But our practise in this country has only been to take the big decisions within the context of a Defence Review, and such a Review only conducted when the Government of the day determines that this should happen. I am encouraged that there is growing support, on the other hand, to take the politics out of this aspect of Defence, and conduct Reviews, by statute, on a quadrennial or quinquennial basis. I think that there is a lot of merit in that.
But that thought aside, what I have just described is where we were in policy terms as we entered the new millennium - but the events of 9/11 changed the dynamic.
The shocking events of that clear late summer day sent shockwaves around the world: it reinforced our relationship with the United States and strengthened our national resolve. Our national enthusiasm to stand shoulder to shoulder with the United States took us into Afghanistan with a degree of popular acclaim, and then to Iraq, albeit with much soul-searching. And then, with the Iraq campaign seeming to be progressing well in the early years, in the South at least, and with American eyes firmly focussed on the North and West of Iraq and on Baghdad, in particular, the then Prime Minister Tony Blair announced in the middle of 2004 that we would return to Afghanistan in greater numbers in 2006 – a strategic move to assist our senior partner in the coalition. This was a very reasonable decision at the time, but its strategic and operational consequences proved to be considerable.
So, ‘Go First, Go Fast, Go home’ as a mantra was history and the current decade has been characterised not by short, sharp interventions but by protracted campaigning in Iraq and Afghanistan, conducting operations ‘among the people’ ‘about the people’ and ‘for the people’. When I say among the people, Rupert Smith was right – people are the environment, they are the backdrop, much as ‘ground’ was the environment in conventional warfare. But the operations are also about the people for they are the focus, they are the object of our efforts, theirs are the hearts and minds we have to win, and we are also there for the people – the people not just of Iraq and Afghanistan or Pakistan, but also for the people of the United Kingdom, the United States and the West generally.
So in the context of war among the people, about the people and for the people, I have spoken extensively about Iraq in the past and I do not intend to repeat myself here. But it is critical that we, the Army and the country, understand that we should be proud of the contribution that we made in Basra and for the people of Southern Iraq. It was at times a bumpy ride and far from being smug and complacent we have learned lessons that have been incorporated into the way we do business today at all levels. But I am clear that had we not been there and had we not done what we did, Basra would not be the more stable and increasingly prosperous city that it is today; without the training and support that we provided to the Iraqi Army it would not be the capable, confident and credible security force that it is today; and without the hard work and sacrifice of our Armed Forces, including the 179 military personnel who made the ultimate sacrifice, Iraq as a whole would not be the significantly more stable nation that it is today.
However, if Iraq was an unpopular war, Afghanistan, at least initially, was a misunderstood one but I see Afghanistan both as a challenge and an opportunity, where we must succeed and, given the right commitment, we will succeed. Many of the lessons from Iraq can be, and indeed are being, applied in the South of Afghanistan. For Afghanistan is truly war among the people, about the people and for the people. And we are succeeding in spite of the tragic losses that we have suffered. For I sense, and I was there a couple of weeks ago, the beginnings of hope; hope from the politicians in Kabul and Helmand that governance is improving and elementary democracy is taking hold; hope amongst our soldiers and the Afghan National Security Forces that progress is being made; and hope amongst the Afghan forces and civilians that their lot is beginning to improve – their security, government and economy are getting better – they can see this and they are encouraged. But there is still a long way to go and critically this is not just a military campaign. Perhaps for the first time we truly understand that this must be an increasingly joint and inter-agency campaign, led by NATO, and that all across Whitehall have an important part to play. We should be under no illusion: we are at war and if we want to succeed, which we must, we must get onto a war-like footing – and as I said to the Officer Cadets being commissioned from Sandhurst last Christmas ”you enter an Army that is at War – even if not everyone in our nation realizes that”.
But against all this must be set a Defence Budget that is already under huge pressure – a pressure resulting from the requirements of the war we are involved in today, and the requirement to maintain a balanced force for future eventualities, albeit against the background of increasing defence inflation. All this has exacerbated the existing and significant financial pressures within the MoD.
So that is the look back and the look around – what about the look forward?
At some stage next year we will close with a Strategic Defence Review in earnest – the first for over a decade and I have already explained how fundamentally the world has changed in that decade. This Review is very welcome by all of us in Defence for it must address: our place in the world; what we want to achieve; and with what we need to achieve this. I believe that there must be three fundamental principles in the approach to this Review: it must be driven by Foreign and Security policy within a cross-Whitehall context; second, it must be threat led; and third, it must be conducted with a truly joint focus within the Armed Forces – there can be no purely Single Service agendas. I will address each of these in turn before commenting on some of the desired outcomes of the Review.
So, to look first at the ‘how’. This Review must be foreign and security policy led but resource informed- it must certainly not be resource led. Many of the problems we are experiencing now are caused by merely “filling in the pot holes in our immediate pathway” due to an increasing focus on the early years of our budgets and a requirement to balance the books in the short term, as opposed to adequately resourcing a dynamically changing policy that reflects today’s reality. We can no longer afford to do this: we may now be unbalanced by design due to current operations in the near term, and this may be a good thing, but we have become unbalanced by necessity in the mid to long term and this is not a healthy position to be in. Equally, the Review must be conducted with maximum participation from Other Government Departments – it must not solely be a Ministry of Defence internal process. Both Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated the vital importance and relevance of a cross- Governmental comprehensive approach. The military instrument of power has limited utility when used in isolation as conflict prevention and conflict resolution are ultimately political activities. All of us in uniform understand our Clausewitz, and his words are as relevant today as yesterday. Of course the military have much to offer but we, as a nation, have got to get better at integrating, projecting and delivering cross- Government effect into conflict zones. This will be the way to really succeed and encouragingly we are seeing the fruits of this approach in Southern Afghanistan now. The Review will need to institutionalise the Comprehensive Approach and fully align cross-Whitehall objectives.
Secondly, the Review must also be threat led rather than capability based, and this is a reversal of previous post-Cold War thinking. It is therefore critical that we develop a commonly held understanding of what we perceive to be the nature or character of future conflict. I have spoken extensively about this in the past – as have others – and it will and must continue to be the subject of intellectual debate because as Professor Michael Howard said “no matter how clearly one thinks, it is impossible to anticipate precisely the character of future conflict. The key is to not be so far off the mark that it becomes impossible to adjust once that character is unveiled”. But we must achieve understanding and consensus because this will dictate the roles and capabilities of our Armed Forces relevant to the UK’s needs.
And thirdly, the Review should be conducted with a spirit of tri-Service unanimity and unity of purpose. In spite of media speculation to the contrary, and it is just that, within the military we have become much more joint – after all we fight jointly: the maritime, air and land environments are all interconnected and increasingly interdependent. We accept and understand that we are part of a team and that the strategic vision that is developed in partnership within the corridors of the Ministry of Defence must be as joint as the tactical reality that we see every day in the Green Zone of Helmand – but let’s keep a clear understanding of the different requirements of the battlespace and the business-space – dogma and reality must be kept apart.
So if these are the key requirements of ‘how’ to conduct the Review, what are the desired outcomes of the Review in very general terms, and without getting into the specifics that the detailed analysis must develop?
Perhaps critically the Review must be underpinned by a clearly defined view of Britain’s global interests and our future global role - I sense no appetite from any of the major political parties to see a reduction in our global role. I am conscious that a previous speaker here, recently set his face against “strategic shrinkage”. I believe it is correct that we must assume that our history and the inescapable demographic legacy of our Empire, linked to our current status, our trading interests, geography, trans-Atlantic ties and our responsibilities as a P5, G8, NATO and commonwealth member – all these things are hardwired into our political and national DNA. With this comes the responsibility of international activism on the global stage. We should not shy away from this. This is not ”punching above our weight” but I would suggest it is “operating commensurate with our responsibilities”. And this global perspective must also be informed by a clear understanding of what capabilities our principal ally – the United States of America – needs and expects from us. We should not assume that the legacy of the immediate Cold War aftermath still remains and we must examine what capabilities would secure our continued influence and strong relationship with the United States – and to balance this with any leadership aspirations we may have in a pragmatic way with our European neighbours.
But critically – and I come back to this again - we must ensure that we succeed in the current campaign. Success in Afghanistan is not discretionary – it will set the agenda for the future – and we must do whatever is necessary to succeed. This must be demonstrated by a strengthened and enduring national, political, industrial, cross-Whitehall and departmental commitment to delivering success in Afghanistan – we need to get onto a war-like footing. It is very much in our national interest to do this. If this means an uplift in Afghan-specific capabilities, so be it. But nothing is forever, and a future Review of Defence can change priorities accordingly, especially if we move to a quadrennial or quinqennial model.
But we all know that the future is uncertain and unpredictable. I have referred in the past to the kaleidoscope of conflict and the more I look at the future the more I think that this analogy is correct. Peace-keeping, peace-enforcement, COIN, irregular warfare and conventional war fighting are neat, linear ways to look at conflict. But we now know that we are facing a complex amalgam of all of these, delivered by hybrid adversaries within an increasingly complex environment. Our Soldiers, Sailors, Marines and Airmen are experiencing many of these complexities on a daily basis around the world and we must ensure that the Review results in the optimising of our defence capabilities to face this emerging character of conflict. We will therefore require Armed Forces that offer genuine political choice and relevance across this expanded kaleidoscope of conflict. But importantly we should recognise the emerging – and principal – threat from failed states and non-state actors and the requirement to deal with this particular threat. This will force us to place greater emphasis on conflict prevention but, due to our global history and interests, we are perhaps uniquely placed among the European nations to deliver global influence to prevent conflict through military capacity building and strategic partnering. And as I have already stated we are now recognising that war is among, about and for the people and so there needs to be greater emphasis on the people – but if prevention fails, intervention may be inevitable and then stabilisation operations are a key role that the military must deliver, and so the means to do this must be properly attributed in the Defence Programme. This does not mean throwing away what we have: I believe that this requires us to maintain a relevant force, unbalanced by design to face the threat and realities of the current fight, whilst maintaining elements of overall capability balanced as a hedge against the uncertainty of the future. As the future advances towards us we can rebalance again, to retain our relevance to adjusting circumstances and to tailor a future force accordingly. Because, we have to accept, there can be no simple solution to the range of threats that challenge us – actually, I think it has ever been thus. And so there are no strategic concepts or technologies that represent a silver bullet: we must retain a carefully calibrated broad range of capabilities and should not specialise, but I believe we would be wise to optimise in the near term at least. Overall, we need a flexible, agile and responsive strategy – relevant to the nature of the conflicts we are and will be engaged in – and we need relevant and balanced forces that become increasingly joint and interdependent. The Review will and must play a vital role in ensuring that we are suitably placed for the future.
Now let me pull these threads together. When I started this speech I said that I wanted to explain what we need from a Defence Review and how we should get there. The past and the present will be important influences on this debate but I believe that we are at a strategic crossroads. Much has changed since the last Review and we are currently committed to a complex and difficult war. But we do now have the opportunity to fundamentally review our place in the world and our associated level of national ambition – thereby setting the conditions for our future security. We may confirm our place in the world or adjust it, but review it we must. That said, personally I am confident that we already know the answer, but we would do well to confirm it before asking the more important questions: what do we want the shape, balance, size and roles of our Armed Forces to be? If I can offer any advice to those conducting this vital review it would be to try to understand the nature and character of future conflict – to understand what that kaleidoscope will look like and agree with what we will need to equip ourselves to face it – and to win and succeed. I believe that this work will be absolutely critical and would not wish to pre-judge its conclusions. This is a matter that the senior leadership of the Army and academia, and of course the other Services too, have been debating for some time and we believe that the result will be a force relevant to the evident and demanding challenges of the near term but with sufficient provision for the uncertainties of the long term – balancing these two requirements will not be simple but the debate must be policy led and not financially driven. We must have what we absolutely need for the short term, and limit our ambitions for the medium and long term to what we can afford. So getting this balance right, over time, will be vital for the defence of our nation and our position in the world – and both depend on us making the right decisions. And those answers will also dictate the position that our Armed Forces have in the life and security of our great nation.
So that is my argument, but Field Marshal, permit me please a couple of minutes in my last speech as CGS to say a few words about the military and our relationship with the general public. I have enjoyed my 40 years as a soldier immensely but I would like to pay particular tribute as my time as CGS comes to an end to the courage, skill and professionalism of the young men and women of the Army – and the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force – who continue to put themselves in harms way, on behalf of the Nation. Our people have much to be proud of and I have been immensely humbled by the fortitude of our servicemen and women, and their families, over the past few years. Our nation also has much to be proud of and I would also like to thank the general public for their numerous and very moving public displays of support for our young soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines. We in the Armed Forces are called to do tough and on occasion unpleasant, difficult and dangerous tasks but we all take great succour from the fantastic support that we are given – after all we operate in the name of the Nation.
But my final word must be to those young men and women of the Army on operations, recovering from operations or preparing to go on operations. It has been a tremendous privilege to lead these outstanding people for the past few years and as I march into the military sunset I do so confident that our capability, professionalism and reputation remains where it should be; second to none.
