by Jason Alderwick and Bastian Giegerich
Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 52, no. 4, August–September 2010, pp. 13–20
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Beginning in the 1990s, the maritime domain has suffered from a lack of thorough intellectual engagement within NATO. While much work was done to revitalise and reform Cold War-era force structures, it is fair to say much of the thinking at this time was dominated by current NATO operations. Kosovo and Afghanistan were both air- and land-centric campaigns, but for these and other NATO operations, naval assets are important enablers.
Recent acts of piracy have revived discussions about maritime security among policymakers and the public alike. High-profile events such as the detention of the weapons-carrying MV Faina, the seizure of the crude-carrying super tanker Sirius Star and the attempted capture and subsequent hostage-taking on the Maersk Alabama have highlighted maritime insecurity off East Africa, particularly in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia.
While NATO is, fundamentally, a political and military alliance, it is also, as its very name suggests, a maritime alliance. Its members and geographic areas of interest are linked by sea. NATO Allies are the principal beneficiaries of globalisation dependent on accessible and open sea lanes of communication and, when needed, the ability to project power across the maritime domain. At a time when around 90% of world trade and about
80% of global hydrocarbon flows depend on shipment by sea, maritime forces have a unique and unmatched capacity to demonstrate global reach and flexibility and to establish an enduring presence if required.
Since 2008, NATO discussion of maritime security has been anchored in deliberations about a new Alliance Maritime Strategy (AMS) and an overall Maritime Security Operations (MSO) concept, both of which were still pending release as this article went to press. The last time NATO engaged in a systematic formulation of maritime strategy was nearly 30 years ago, with the most recent AMS document dating from 1984.
Given the need to maintain the unhindered movement of trade at sea, particularly in light of the fragile state of the global economy, recent years have seen unprecedented international maritime efforts to limit the threats to international shipping in the Gulf of Aden and the waters off the Horn of Africa. There is a lively debate, however, about the level of threat that pirates actually represent. While clearly traumatic for the seafarers involved and a hindrance to global trade, incidents of piracy are increasingly seen as more of a nuisance than a threat to overall allied maritime security. Yet the issue of piracy has in many circumstances dominated discussions about maritime matters in NATO’s new strategic concept to be unveiled in the second half of 2010, to the detriment of a more encompassing conversation.
Allied naval forces have to serve a variety of purposes, ranging from traditional power projection and sea control to supporting crisis-response operations, defence diplomacy, and operations to counter terrorism, weapons proliferation, piracy and illicit trafficking. Although the drafting of both NATO’s new strategic concept and new maritime strategy is currently under way, unanswered questions include what the landscape of ...
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Jason Alderwick is an independent consultant and former Defence Analyst for the IISS. Bastian Giegerich is Research Fellow for European Security at the IISS.
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