Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 51, no. 5, October–November 2009, pp. 143–154
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On 8 December 2008 the European Union launched its first naval operation, Atalanta. A French initiative to fight piracy in the Gulf of Aden, it was named for a Greek heroine who, in the Arcadian version of the myth, was a formidable huntress and the only woman to take part in the voyage of the Argo. Another, Boeotian myth had it that Atalanta would only marry a man who could beat her in a foot-race – and that suitors who failed would be killed. Hippomen took up the challenge and won, distracting Atalanta by throwing three golden apples onto the track.
No doubt the EU had Atalanta’s martial and maritime nature in mind when it named its operation, but Washington could well be tempted to play the part of the sprinter. Just after the launch of Atalanta two American scholars said it could be the EU’s ‘crucial first step toward becoming an independent military power’. On 8 January 2009, the US commander of the 20-nation Combined Maritime Forces announced at US Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain the establishment of Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151), a maritime force intended to fight piracy. Did this reflect a convergence of agendas or an American desire to mark its strategic territory? Observers across the Atlantic seem to have perceived the political significance of the EU operation and new trends in European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) before Europeans did themselves. But did these developments in fact inaugurate a new phase in European integration? Crystallising as they do questions of the identity and purpose of the EU, prospects for ESDP deserve renewed attention.
Towards European defence
Development of a European defence identity remained moribund between the failure of the European Defence Community in 1954 and the St Malo Summit in 1998, when for the first time France and Britain called for the constitution of an ‘autonomous’ European defence. In its first ten years ESDP made considerable progress, albeit largely unnoticed by the public. It is now endowed with institutions such as the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee, the EU Military Staff, the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (with embryonic planning capacities), and a permanent Situation Centre. It has capacities, in the form of pre-constituted armed forces with a European dimension (Eurocorps, Eurofor, Euromarfor, Eurogendfor and 1,500-strong EU battlegroups deployable within ten days for operations up to 30 days without resupply). A European Defence Agency promotes industrial cooperation. A European Security Strategy was adopted in 2003 and updated in 2008. Around 20 civilian and military operations are currently taking place, comprising more than 5,000 personnel at the end of 2008.
Until recently the biggest military operation was EUFOR Chad/CAR, set up to protect refugee camps in eastern Chad and northern Central African Republic before handing over to UN troops on 15 March 2009. It comprised approximately 3,700 personnel and was commanded from Mont-Valérien (Suresnes, France) by Irish General Pat Nash. This operation is generally considered to have been a success. The biggest...
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Pierre-Henri d’Argenson is a French senior civil servant and lecturer in International Relations at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris.
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