Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 51, no. 2, April–May 2009, pp. 105–122
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For many American observers, Germany’s reaction to Russia’s August 2008 invasion of Georgia left something to be desired. German Chancellor Angela Merkel was relatively slow to denounce the invasion, and when she did so she took a position that was less strong than many in Washington would have preferred. After the crisis, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier sought to maintain the warmest possible relations circumstances would permit, pushing to reinstate the NATO–Russia Council as quickly as possible. German politicians across the political spectrum stood behind him. For many in the United States, Russia’s invasion had primarily damaged Russia itself and hastened a trend toward Russian ‘self-isolation’, as then-US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice put it in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Many in Germany agreed with this analysis, but for most German observers Russian self-isolation was something to be avoided at all costs, a potentially disastrous development for the post-Cold War European order.
It would be too simplistic to contrast a confrontational US policy toward Russia with wobbly-kneed German capitulation. But the responses that Russia’s invasion of Georgia evoked in Washington and Berlin pointed to deeper differences that have been apparent for some time, as in the debate over NATO enlargement or US plans to deploy missile-defence installations in Eastern Europe. Within Germany itself, there is an uncanny degree of consensus when it comes to Russia policy. It can be difficult to find major differences between not only the main political parties, but also the major social and economic interest groups. Social Democrats, Greens, post-communists and conservatives might differ in their rhetoric on Russia, but in substance they share many of the same views, and these are very different from those that predominate in the US foreign-policy establishment. Indeed, Merkel’s delayed reaction to Russia’s invasion of Georgia was only the latest manifestation of Germany’s emerging Russlandpolitik – a policy that is itself a manifestation of the broader trends in German foreign policy since the end of the Cold War.
The nature and logic of Germany’s Russia policy is not well understood in Washington, and too often portrayed in wishful or simplistic terms. To fully understand German policy, one must go beyond the tired clichés about Germany’s dependence on Russian energy to the deeper historical, political, economic and cultural forces that have shaped Berlin’s evolving relationship with Moscow.As Russia regains significance in the transatlantic relationship, finding common ground between Berlin and Washington over Russia policy will grow more important, especially given Germany’s central role in the European Union. At the same time, it may grow more challenging.
Germany’s new Russlandpolitik
Germany’s geographical position as the largest country in Central Europe has for centuries encouraged Berlin to pursue a policy of balancing between East and West. Even after the Second World War, some West German leaders favoured a policy of neutrality in the Cold War as a shortcut to German reunification. They were defeated, however, by the pro-NATO, Atlanticist orientation of Konrad Adenauer’s conservative Christian Democratic Party. West German economic power...
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Christopher S. Chivvis is an Associate Political Scientist with the RAND Corporation in Washington DC. Thomas Rid is Calouste Gulbenkian Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies.
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